Duke v. Cleland

Citations: 783 F. Supp. 600; 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6771; 1992 WL 17441Docket: 1:92-cv-00116

Court: District Court, N.D. Georgia; January 21, 1992; Federal District Court

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On January 21, 1992, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia addressed a case involving plaintiffs David Duke and others seeking a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against defendants, including Max Cleland, in their official capacities. The plaintiffs alleged that their rights to free speech and association were violated when Duke was denied access to the Republican primary ballot. They contended that Duke met the criteria for inclusion and was initially recommended for the ballot by Cleland, but subsequently voted off by the primary selection committee, which they argued acted as a state apparatus rather than in a private capacity. The plaintiffs claimed the exclusion was based on discriminatory motives related to Duke's political views, protected by the First Amendment. 

The court set a hearing for January 18, 1992, but ultimately found that the plaintiffs did not meet the burden of persuasion for the four elements required for a preliminary injunction: (1) likelihood of prevailing on the merits; (2) suffering irreparable injury; (3) that the threatened injury outweighed any potential harm to the opposing party; and (4) that the injunction would not negatively impact the public interest. The court noted that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and emphasized that plaintiffs must clearly demonstrate their case across all four elements. The plaintiffs argued that without the court's intervention, their First Amendment rights to engage in political campaigning and participate in the primary would be irreparably harmed. However, the court indicated that without establishing the existence of these rights, the plaintiffs could not succeed on their claims for irreparable injury or likelihood of success. The case of Belluso v. Poythress was cited as pivotal in determining the issue of rights relevant to the plaintiffs' claims.

Plaintiffs have not successfully established their First Amendment rights in relation to their claims, failing to differentiate their case from Belluso, which addressed similar rights concerning access to the Republican Party's primary ballot. The court in Belluso determined that while appearing on a general election ballot is constitutionally favored, it is not a fundamental right, and there is no inherent right to be included on a party’s primary ballot unless the party grants that right. Political parties maintain autonomy in deciding representation, exercising free speech and association as they strategize before elections. 

The plaintiffs have not demonstrated how the alleged state action has harmed their claimed rights, nor have they provided evidence that Mr. Duke and his supporters could not engage in political activities outside the confines of the Republican Party primary. The absence of Mr. Duke from the primary ballot does not bar him from running as an independent or write-in candidate in the general election. Additionally, the plaintiffs did not identify any obstacles preventing Mr. Duke's supporters from promoting him at the national convention. 

The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to prove any injury, thus negating the basis for issuing injunctive relief, as they did not meet the required four-prong test. To satisfy the substantial likelihood of success prong, plaintiffs must show: 1) the existence of the claimed constitutional right; 2) that the alleged action constituted state action; 3) that this action would infringe upon their rights; and 4) that there are no counterbalancing rights or interests at stake.

The key issue is whether the actions of the Republican Party members of the selection committee constitute "state action," which determines the likelihood of success for the plaintiffs' claims. The court highlights that private actors may be deemed state actors if their conduct is "fairly attributable" to the state, based on various criteria such as receiving assistance from state officials or having authority delegated by the state. The relevant Georgia legislation, O.C.G.A. 21-2-193, mandates the Secretary of State to compile a list of potential presidential candidates, ensuring that candidates who are constitutionally ineligible are excluded. Candidates not selected can request their inclusion on the ballot, but the Secretary of State does not participate in the decision-making process of the political parties nor does it provide assistance or set guidelines for those decisions.

The court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the actions of the selection committee were attributable to the state, indicating that the state has intentionally left the party representation process to the political parties themselves. The comparison is drawn to a case reviewed by the Eleventh Circuit, Delgado v. Smith, where the Florida Secretary of State's role in preparing voter initiatives was also limited to procedural support without making substantive decisions. This parallels Georgia's approach where the Secretary of State prepares ballots without intervening in party decisions.

The Eleventh Circuit clarified that the actions in question did not constitute state action, emphasizing that state officers provided assistance to citizens submitting initiative petitions without censorship or endorsement. The court noted the absence of a link between proponents of the English language petition and the state, highlighting that the state neither initiates nor participates in the petition process, which is managed entirely by private citizens. The state's role is limited to ensuring legal compliance, and only after a petition garners sufficient support does it enter the electoral process.

In evaluating the plaintiffs' request for a preliminary injunction, the court found their arguments insufficient, noting a significant potential injury to the defendants that outweighed any harm to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs failed to provide authoritative support for their claims, while the defendants demonstrated distinct harms, including interference with the Republican Party of Georgia's right to associate and the imposition of an unwanted presidential candidate. The court referenced established legal precedents affirming the right of political parties to select their representatives and manage their associations without state interference. Ultimately, the court concluded that the defendants' damages were substantial and relevant to the political process, influencing the assessment of the preliminary injunction's final prong.

The plaintiffs' request for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to prevent the exclusion of David Duke from the 1992 Georgia Presidential Preference Primary Ballot is denied. Mr. Alec L. Poitevint's request for intervention was granted. The court did not consider the claim of irreparable harm related to the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment rights, as they did not argue this point. The plaintiffs also failed to prove a First Amendment right, which is essential for meeting the preliminary injunction criteria. The ballot determination process is a two-step procedure initiated by the Secretary of State, which remains unchallenged. The court interprets O.C.G.A. 21-2-191, O.C.G.A. 21-2-195, and O.C.G.A. 21-2-193 as supporting party autonomy in the nomination process. It notes that if the State could not require parties to select ballot participants, it would constitute state action. Additionally, the court acknowledges that freedom of association includes a political party's decisions regarding its leaders and the electoral process.