People v. Brooks

Citations: 605 P.2d 1306; 26 Cal. 3d 471; 162 Cal. Rptr. 177; 1980 Cal. LEXIS 145Docket: Crim. 21000

Court: California Supreme Court; February 15, 1980; California; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of California addressed an appeal by the People concerning the dismissal of the case against Darrell Edward Brooks, which followed the granting of his pretrial motion to suppress evidence based on illegal search and seizure. The court was asked to determine if it had jurisdiction to entertain a renewed suppression motion after a prior appeal had reversed an initial suppression order. Brooks was charged with murder, assault on a peace officer, and possession of a controlled substance. He initially filed a motion to suppress evidence based on the alleged invalidity of a search warrant, which the trial court granted after finding issues with the informant's reliability and misstatements in the warrant affidavit.

Following the dismissal of the case by the trial court, the People appealed, but the Court of Appeal reversed this decision. Brooks subsequently filed a second motion to suppress, claiming the officers did not comply with the knock-notice requirements. The trial court found insufficient compliance and suppressed the evidence again, leading to a dismissal upon Brooks' request. The People contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction for this second motion, arguing that Brooks had already exhausted his opportunity to litigate the issue.

However, the Supreme Court concluded that Brooks had not received a full opportunity to litigate his original motion during the first hearing. Thus, the trial court had the jurisdiction to consider his renewed motion for suppression. Since the People did not challenge the merits of the second ruling, the judgment of dismissal was affirmed.

Section 1538.5 establishes an exclusive procedure for resolving search and seizure issues before trial, aiming to address inefficiencies in previous protocols. Key objectives include reducing time spent on repeated challenges during criminal proceedings, preventing juror distraction by pretrial determinations, and allowing for appellate review of adverse rulings before trial. 

Defendants must file motions for the return of property or suppression of evidence early in the process, specifically during the preliminary hearing or before indictment, and are entitled to two pretrial suppression hearings. However, they cannot renew these motions during trial or raise new search and seizure issues at that time, except under a specific exception.

The case of Madril v. Superior Court is cited, which asserts that a defendant is limited to one pretrial suppression motion in superior court, and that once determined, the court loses jurisdiction to reconsider unless the prosecution seeks to reopen the matter at trial for good cause. The interpretation of Madril was challenged by the outcome of a related case involving codefendants who successfully renewed their suppression motion before a different judge, despite objections. The court ruled that the renewed motion did not warrant a second hearing since it addressed the same issues and evidence as the first, emphasizing that defendants had already received a comprehensive hearing.

A defendant's only option for pretrial review of an adverse ruling on a motion to suppress is to file a writ of mandate or prohibition, as established in section 1538.5, subd. i. The court emphasized that allowing rehearings on such motions would lead to repetitive litigation of search and seizure issues. In the cases of Green and Madril, the courts found that both instances involved attempts to relitigate previously decided matters after complete hearings. In Green, the second hearing was essentially a repeat of the first, while in Madril, the prosecution sought another chance to present its case based on additional evidence. Both courts determined they lacked jurisdiction for these second hearings, aligning with legislative intent to prevent relitigation of search and seizure questions. The court noted that any review after a special hearing in the superior court must occur through extraordinary writs. The document details the procedural history of a motion to traverse and quash a search warrant, indicating a continued focus on the sufficiency of the warrant during the hearings, with no further witnesses called by the defense after the initial evidence was presented.

The trial court granted the motion to suppress evidence based on the invalidity of the search warrant. Following this decision, the prosecutor sought a conference to address a procedural concern, expressing the desire to resolve all matters regarding the warrant and evidence suppression at once to avoid piecemeal appeals. The court indicated it would not consider any waiver of rights due to the bifurcation of the hearing, stating that the quashing of the warrant rendered the issue moot. 

The record reflects ambiguity regarding the specific grounds for the defendant's initial motion under section 1538.5. However, it is evident that the defendant sought to suppress evidence based on both the invalidity of the search warrant and invalid entry, with each serving as an alternative ground for suppression. The discussion around the section 1531 motion confirms this understanding. 

The preliminary hearing transcript shows that the defendant first attempted to quash the search warrant, which was denied, and subsequently presented a section 1531 motion that was also denied. The motions were presented sequentially, but it was evident the defendant intended to argue both grounds for suppression. Thus, the court's choice to bifurcate the hearing does not negate the dual basis for the motion, and whether this bifurcation was directed by the court or agreed upon by the parties is not critical. The orderly conduct of the hearing suggests that had the court denied the first argument, it would have proceeded to consider the second. The People's argument that the defendant withdrew the objection regarding invalid entry lacks merit, as the court recognized both grounds for suppression.

The court suppressed evidence on one ground and deemed it unnecessary to consider an alternative suppression ground, which deprived the defendant of a full hearing on his motion. The renewed hearing did not constitute a second section 1538.5 motion or a relitigation of the original motion, but rather a completion of the initial hearing he was entitled to. During the renewed hearing, it was clarified that the motion was related to section 1531, as the initial hearing had already determined that such a review would occur if the matter returned from an appellate review. The record indicates that all parties understood the existence of alternative suppression grounds. The case of Moreno v. Superior Court (1978) is referenced, where the court mandated a hearing on the merits after a defendant was denied a full hearing due to procedural issues. The distinction drawn in Moreno is that a second motion can be heard if the defendant had not received a hearing on the merits of the first motion. The People argued that the defendant could raise any relevant issues during the first hearing, but the principle established in Moreno emphasizes that a defendant’s right to a pretrial suppression hearing is statutory, not discretionary. The trial court's discretion in declining to hear alternate suppression grounds during the first hearing is briefly commented on, noting the need to balance judicial efficiency with the defendant's right to fully present objections to evidence.

Compelling the court to address all suppression grounds in a single motion may lead to lengthy and unnecessary proceedings; an order to suppress based on the primary ground could withstand an appeal or not be appealed at all. Conversely, preventing a defendant from contesting alternate grounds if the suppression order is reversed poses a risk of prejudice and contradicts the statutory aim of pretrial resolution of search and seizure issues. Trial courts should exercise discretion in deciding whether to hold a comprehensive hearing on all suppression grounds or to bifurcate the issues, considering various factors such as the number of grounds, witnesses, and the relevance of evidence among the grounds. In the case at hand, the trial court's decision to limit the first proceeding was not an abuse of discretion, given the extensive testimony presented in both hearings.

If a trial court bifurcates a suppression hearing, grants the motion on the first ground, and that decision is reversed on appeal, the appellate court should remand the case for consideration of the alternate suppression grounds. The People argue that a reviewing court cannot remand for further evidence on search and seizure matters post-pretrial hearing, referencing Lorenzana v. Superior Court (1973). In Lorenzana, the court rejected the idea that the case should be remanded for new arguments regarding evidence admissibility, emphasizing that all relevant testimony and theories must be presented during the pretrial hearing to uphold the integrity of Penal Code section 1538.5. This case differs, as the People attempted to introduce a new admissibility argument for the first time on appeal. 

Additionally, after the hearing, the defendant sought to augment the appeal record with a declaration from the trial judge about an unreported in-chambers conference, while the People submitted a non-opposing response with a declaration from their attorney regarding discussions with defense counsel. The defendant then filed a declaration from his attorney disputing the statements made by the People.

Augmentation of a record on appeal is governed by rule 12 (a) of the California Rules of Court, which allows for the supplementation of an incomplete record but prohibits adding material not included in the original trial court record. The process is to be interpreted liberally, as seen in relevant case law (Wagner v. Chambers; People v. Gaston). Augmentation has been permitted in certain instances, such as including an affidavit from a trial judge to clarify evidence considered during the trial (S.F. etc. Sch. Dist. v. Bd. of Nat. Missions) or to document unreported matters (Gibson v. Southern Pacific Co.). However, the current application for augmentation seeks to introduce discussions not recorded at trial, which is not permissible. The existing record already adequately reflects the trial judge's relevant statements. Conflicting declarations from counsel for the People and the defendant further complicate the motion for augmentation, as courts typically do not resolve such conflicts on appeal (Estate of Cazaurang). Consequently, the application to augment the record is denied, and the judgment is affirmed. Additionally, the court discussed the procedural aspects of dismissal motions under section 1385, clarifying that while a defendant can suggest a dismissal, it does not constitute a formal motion. The discussion surrounding the defendant’s suppression motion is noted, indicating it was initially denied but later addressed in superior court. The document concludes by stating that further review of search or seizure validity can be pursued by a defendant on appeal.