Morrow v. State

Citations: 532 S.E.2d 78; 272 Ga. 691; 2000 Fulton County D. Rep. 2237; 2000 Ga. LEXIS 492Docket: S00P0112

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia; June 12, 2000; Georgia; State Supreme Court

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Scotty Garnell Morrow was convicted of multiple serious offenses, including malice murder and burglary, following the deaths of Barbara Ann Young and Tonya Rochelle Woods. The jury imposed a death sentence, citing aggravating circumstances such as the torture involved in the murders and the commission of additional crimes during the acts. Morrow's appeal includes a challenge regarding the representation of Hispanics in the jury pools for both a 1994 grand jury and a 1999 traverse jury, asserting violations of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as state laws. 

To succeed in a Sixth Amendment challenge, Morrow must demonstrate that Hispanics are a distinctive group, show their underrepresentation in jury pools relative to their community population, and prove systematic exclusion in the jury selection process. For a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, he must establish that Hispanics are a recognizable class, quantify their underrepresentation over time, and indicate a racially biased selection process. Generally, an absolute disparity of less than 5% is considered constitutional, 5-10% usually constitutional, and over 10% likely unconstitutional. Morrow's appeal references precedents that highlight the thresholds for establishing violations of both the Sixth Amendment and state jury composition laws. Notably, a 17% disparity for females in jury pools has previously been ruled unconstitutional under state law.

The Unified Appeal Procedure mandates that cognizable groups must not exceed imbalances greater than 5%. The Court has interpreted the 5% threshold as a guideline to maintain disparities below constitutional minima. The defendant bears the responsibility to establish a prima facie case of constitutional error regarding jury pool composition. The standards for assessing such violations under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments are nearly identical, with the second prong involving both factual and legal considerations. The trial court acts as the fact-finder for the extent of underrepresentation, while the legal determination of whether the disparity constitutes a constitutional violation is a question of law. Disputed facts and witness credibility findings by the trial court are generally upheld unless clearly erroneous.

In the case of Morrow, it was argued that the 1990 Census was an unreliable indicator of the Hispanic population in Hall County due to significant demographic changes and undercounts. Morrow's expert conducted a 1996 test census in a high-Hispanic area and estimated that the Hispanic population was approximately 2.5 times that reported in the 1990 Census, suggesting that 14.1% of jury-eligible individuals were Hispanic compared to only 0.8% on the grand jury list, resulting in a 13.3% absolute disparity. A similar analysis for 1999 indicated a 12.7% disparity. Despite acknowledging Hall County Hispanics as a cognizable group, the trial court found Morrow's expert's estimates unreliable, criticizing the methodology of the test census, including potential bias in how respondents were approached and the limited geographic scope of the survey. The State highlighted errors in the expert's data and assumptions about population growth rates.

The trial court declined to accept Morrow's expert's Hispanic population estimates, favoring the official 1990 Census data. This decision was upheld as not clearly erroneous, as the court is not obligated to accept unreliable figures, even if unchallenged by the government. The determination of expert testimony's weight is at the discretion of the trier of fact, who is not bound by such testimony. Morrow's estimates were based on a small, non-representative section of the county, while the 1990 Census was a comprehensive count conducted with local assistance, making it more reliable than Morrow's 1996 survey.

Morrow criticized the 1990 Census data as unreliable, but the court found it to be a more thorough representation than Morrow's limited data. The court did not need to consider how Morrow's estimates might be affected by the citizenship status of Hall County's Hispanic population, which is relevant for jury service. The court noted that the 1990 Census showed 3,252 Hispanics over 18 in Hall County, representing approximately 4.6% of the jury-eligible population, whereas Morrow's expert found only 0.8% of the 1994 grand jury list was Hispanic, resulting in a 3.8% absolute disparity, which is legally permissible.

Comparative analyses revealed that absolute disparities of under 10% are generally not considered unconstitutional. The trial court ruled that the composition of both the grand and traverse jury pools complied with legal standards. Although there was a previous decision to change venue, the court ultimately concluded that the trial would remain in Hall County after an evidentiary hearing on the grand jury’s composition. Morrow had previously received funds for his expert to analyze the grand jury list for Hispanic representation. Following the decision to keep the trial in Hall County, Morrow sought additional funds to analyze the traverse jury list for Hispanic demographics.

The trial court denied Morrow's motion for funds to conduct an analysis regarding the jury pool, and Morrow contended this was an error. The court found that Morrow’s evidence was largely similar to that previously deemed unconvincing regarding the grand jury pool. Morrow's request for additional funds lacked justification, and the ruling was upheld absent an abuse of discretion. Morrow's arrest was deemed lawful, as police had sufficient probable cause based on survivor identification and a description of his vehicle. After a brief period in custody, Morrow voluntarily provided a videotaped statement, which was admissible as he was coherent, aware of his rights, and did not request an attorney.

Morrow also contested the voluntariness of consent for a warrantless search of his house and vehicle, but the court found that both Morrow and his mother consented willingly, complying with legal standards for voluntary consent. Morrow’s mother, the property owner, also signed consent forms. Lastly, Morrow's motion for a change of venue in 1995 was granted by consent of the State, and no evidentiary hearing was conducted, as the motion was not contested. The trial court's decisions on these matters were affirmed without error.

The trial court directed the parties to agree on or separately propose a transfer county for juror selection, with the trial to occur in Hall County. No recommendations for transfer were made by either party, and the trial court did not designate a transfer county. In 1998, the State withdrew its consent for the venue in Hall County and requested an evidentiary hearing on whether the venue should remain due to minimal media coverage since the crimes. Initially, the court denied this motion but later ordered the hearing to assess potential prejudice from pretrial publicity. After the hearing, the court ruled to keep the venue in Hall County.

Morrow argued that the trial court erred in ordering the hearing and in maintaining the venue after previously granting a motion for a change of venue in 1995. However, the change was based solely on party consent without a determination that an impartial jury could not be obtained in Hall County. The court concluded that it was within its discretion to order the hearing and maintain the venue. To justify a venue change, the defendant must demonstrate inherent prejudice from pretrial publicity or actual juror bias. The court found that the media coverage was not extensive or inflammatory, occurring mainly over four years prior to trial, and that Morrow did not show a significant number of jurors held biased opinions.

Regarding jury selection, the trial court properly excused juror Wilkerson for cause due to his inability to consider the death penalty, consistent with legal precedents. Other jurors were also excused for similar biases. The court did not restrict voir dire improperly, as it was sufficient to identify juror biases. Additionally, the court did not err in refusing to excuse several prospective jurors who expressed a willingness to consider all sentencing options despite leaning towards the death penalty.

A prospective juror is not disqualified for having a personal opinion about the death penalty. Juror O'Kelley, who had a distant friendship with the district attorney, claimed this would not influence her judgment, and the court deemed her qualified. Similarly, jurors Hoynes and Gibson, despite personal connections to cases of bias, were also found capable of impartiality. The trial evidence detailed the violent actions of Scotty Morrow, who shot and killed Barbara Ann Young and severely injured two others after she ended their relationship. Following a confrontation at Young's home, Morrow fatally shot her and then executed Ms. Woods, who was paralyzed from earlier injuries. Ms. Horne, although severely injured, managed to identify Morrow as the shooter. Morrow later confessed to the murders, and the evidence supported charges against him, including malice murder and aggravated assault. Morrow contended that the court wrongly allowed evidence of prior incidents to be presented.

Morrow contends that the testimony regarding Ms. Young's statements about his violent actions was inadmissible hearsay, improperly introduced under the necessity exception to the hearsay rule. For the necessity exception to apply, the proponent must demonstrate both a necessity for the evidence and a circumstantial guarantee of its trustworthiness. Ms. Young's unavailability due to her death established the necessity for using her hearsay statements. These statements were relevant to indicate Morrow's motive, intent, and mindset related to his relationship with Ms. Young, proving more probative than other evidence of prior difficulties.

The circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness includes multiple incidents of abuse. On December 6, 1994, evidence showed Morrow physically assaulted Ms. Young, corroborated by witnesses who observed her injuries and her statements about the incident. On December 9, 1994, Ms. Young reported being forcibly taken by Morrow and assaulted, with immediate witness accounts supporting her claims. Despite Morrow's argument regarding the absence of an arrest warrant, Ms. Young consistently maintained her account, bolstered by witness observations of her injuries.

On December 24, 1994, a neighbor testified that Ms. Young expressed fear of Morrow, claiming he threatened her with a gun, and although she later suggested he may have had a knife, she did not recant the threat. The trial court's admission of this hearsay evidence was not erroneous in light of the established necessity and trustworthiness.

Morrow's actions and statements provided circumstantial evidence supporting the admission of a neighbor's statement regarding an incident with Ms. Young. Morrow admitted to a confrontation with Ms. Young on Christmas Eve, and LaToya Horne testified she witnessed Morrow physically assaulting Ms. Young during a party. Although Horne testified that Ms. Young received a call from Morrow on the morning of the murders, she did not hear his voice or confirm the caller's identity. The trial court allowed Horne's opinion that the caller was Morrow, which was deemed an error since identification based solely on conversation content is inadmissible. However, this error was considered harmless as telephone records confirmed a call from Morrow to Ms. Young, which he acknowledged making.

The cruelty to children statute was upheld as not void for vagueness, and the court correctly did not define "maliciously" for the jury. There was sufficient evidence to establish Morrow lacked authority to enter Ms. Young's home on the day of the incident, and the jury could reasonably find him guilty of cruelty to a child due to the circumstances of the murder occurring in the child's presence. Testimony revealed that the child, Christopher, witnessed Morrow's violent actions, which supported the court's denial of Morrow's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.

During sentencing, the jury found sufficient statutory aggravating circumstances to support the death penalty. The constitutionality of the relevant statutes and methods of execution was affirmed, and Morrow's death sentence was deemed free from arbitrary factors such as passion or prejudice, aligning with penalties imposed in similar cases.

The imposition of the death penalty in this case is supported by similar cases listed in the Appendix, which involve deliberate, unprovoked murders, intentional murders during burglaries, or murders with aggravating circumstances under OCGA 17-10-30 (b)(7). The judgments are affirmed with the concurrence of all Justices, except Justice SEARS, who partially concurs and partially dissents. Justice SEARS agrees with the affirmance of the guilt adjudication but dissents regarding the death penalty due to concerns about its method of execution by electrocution.

The crimes occurred on December 29, 1994, leading to Morrow’s indictment on March 6, 1995, for multiple charges, including two counts of malice murder. The State's notice to seek the death penalty was filed on May 1, 1995, with the trial held from June 7 to June 29, 1999. The jury convicted Morrow on all counts and recommended a death sentence. As the jury did not specify a death sentence for each murder, the trial court merged the convictions, resulting in a single death sentence. The felony murder convictions were vacated by law. In addition to the death sentence, Morrow received consecutive sentences for aggravated battery, cruelty to a child, burglary, and possession of a firearm. Morrow filed a notice of appeal on July 21, 1999, and the case was docketed on October 4, 1999, with oral arguments held on January 18, 2000.