Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, Minn.

Citations: 558 F.3d 794; 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5215; 2009 WL 635243Docket: 07-2705

Court: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; March 13, 2009; Federal Appellate Court

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Alfred Flowers appeals the Eighth Circuit's affirmation of a district court's summary judgment favoring Kevin Stoll and the City of Minneapolis regarding multiple civil rights claims and a state-law defamation claim. The case involves events from 2003 to 2004, beginning with Flowers, an African-American, renting a home on the same block as Stoll, a lieutenant in the Minneapolis Police Department. After Flowers was arrested in September 2003 for disorderly conduct and later acquitted, Stoll accessed the arrest report.

On August 1, 2004, Stoll observed unusual graffiti in the neighborhood and, after consulting a gang investigator who linked Flowers to gang activity, initiated a "directed patrol" of Flowers's residence. Stoll communicated information about Flowers to patrol officers and incentivized them with a steak dinner for arrests leading to convictions at the property. This resulted in increased police presence near Flowers's home, with officers checking the residence six times in August for a total of 69 minutes. Flowers reported distress from police activity, including intrusive patrols and a broken window, prompting his family to leave their home temporarily. The directed patrol ceased at the end of August 2004, coinciding with Flowers filing a lawsuit against the City and the involved officers.

Flowers claimed that Stoll and other officers harassed him, violating his constitutional rights, with the City being liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He presented three theories for this violation: (1) harassment based on his race, infringing his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection; (2) harassment driven by Stoll's personal animus; and (3) retaliation for pleading not guilty to charges, violating his First Amendment rights and Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Additionally, Flowers raised a federal substantive due process claim, a § 1981 claim against the City for racial discrimination, and state law claims for defamation and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted summary judgment for Stoll on all claims except the substantive due process claim, and for the City and other officers on all claims. Following Stoll's appeal regarding qualified immunity, the appellate court reversed the district court's denial, stating that Flowers did not demonstrate a deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right. Upon remand, the district court ruled in favor of Stoll, the other officers, and the City on all claims. Flowers appealed the judgment on remaining claims, asserting that Stoll's actions constituted constitutional violations. His attorney argued that Stoll's conduct exceeded acceptable police behavior but acknowledged difficulties in aligning it with specific constitutional text. The court noted concern regarding the misuse of authority for personal agendas but emphasized that the appeal focused on narrower legal questions. It concluded that Flowers failed to provide sufficient evidence of a constitutional right violation. Flowers's claims were categorized as selective enforcement, asserting that investigators were improperly deployed against him without initiating a prosecution. The court recognized the broad discretion of the State in decisions regarding prosecution and investigation, noting that such matters are typically unsuitable for judicial review.

Courts lack the capacity to assess the validity of leads for investigation because such determinations hinge on the quality of information, agency priorities, and the context of enforcement strategies. Judicial scrutiny of investigative choices can deter law enforcement by exposing their motives to external examination. However, prosecutorial discretion must not be influenced by factors such as race or religion, nor should it violate constitutional rights, with selective enforcement claims evaluated under standard equal protection principles. A claim of selective investigation could also be unconstitutional if stemming from impermissible motives. 

In this case, Flowers asserts he was targeted for harassment due to his race, citing two main points: first, his home was the only one on his block with Black residents, and he and his family were the sole individuals investigated when graffiti appeared. To substantiate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Flowers must demonstrate he was treated differently than others similarly situated. However, he is not similarly situated to other residents, as he had recently moved in and was identified by a gang investigator as related to a gang member linked to the graffiti.

Second, Flowers references an email from police officer Olson, which mentions recent African American arrivals in the area. The admissibility of this email is questionable due to hearsay concerns, and even if it were admissible, it does not inherently indicate discriminatory intent, especially since it lacks evidence of bias.

Flowers also posits a "class of one" equal protection claim, arguing he was singled out without justification. However, the Supreme Court's ruling in Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture limits this theory's applicability in public employment contexts, leading to the dismissal of Flowers's claim.

The class-of-one theory of equal protection was deemed inappropriate in contexts involving discretionary decision-making, as individual assessments can lead to different treatment without violating equal protection principles. Specifically, police officers' investigative choices are inherently discretionary, and while class-based equal protection claims can arise from discriminatory practices, class-of-one claims cannot challenge subjective decisions. Flowers' allegations of harassment due to his not guilty plea were insufficient, as temporal proximity alone does not establish retaliatory motive without additional evidence. Consequently, the district court correctly dismissed Flowers' claims against both the individual officer and the City for failing to demonstrate constitutional violations or a pattern of unconstitutional policies. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of Flowers' defamation claim against Officer Stoll, finding that the alleged defamatory email was not sufficiently specific and made under a proper investigative purpose, thus granting conditional privilege. The district court's summary judgment in favor of Stoll on the defamation claim was affirmed.