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Allstate Insurance v. Duncan
Citations: 462 S.E.2d 638; 218 Ga. App. 552Docket: A95A1286, A95A1287
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; September 19, 1995; Georgia; State Appellate Court
Douglas Duncan, a Georgia resident, was injured in a Missouri automobile accident involving an unknown uninsured motorist, referred to as 'John Doe.' Duncan sued John Doe in Georgia and served Allstate Insurance Company, the uninsured motorist carrier. Allstate moved to dismiss, claiming lack of jurisdiction over John Doe and that a judgment against him was necessary before pursuing a claim against the insurer, as per Georgia law. The trial court concurred with the jurisdiction issue but allowed the case against Allstate to proceed based on Missouri law, which does not require a judgment against the uninsured motorist first. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed the trial court's decision in both cases. It ruled that the substantive matters related to the contract are governed by Missouri law, while procedural matters are governed by Georgia law. The court clarified that under Georgia law, a judgment against an uninsured motorist is a prerequisite for recovery from the insurer. However, it noted that Georgia's legislation (OCGA 33-7-11(d)(1)) provides that if the motorist is unknown, the residence of 'John Doe' is presumed to be in the county where the accident occurred or where the plaintiff resides, thus establishing jurisdiction over John Doe. Consequently, Duncan's action against Allstate may proceed despite the jurisdictional challenges. Allstate contends that a statutory presumption regarding residency applies to venue but not to personal jurisdiction, a claim unsupported by the statute's language. The court indicates that if a trial court cannot establish personal jurisdiction over a known nonresident uninsured motorist, that motorist should be treated as unknown, allowing the case to proceed as a John Doe action. Allstate argues that exercising jurisdiction under OCGA 33-7-11(d)(1) could be unconstitutional if the John Doe lacks sufficient minimum contacts with Georgia. However, even if Allstate has standing regarding the John Doe's due process rights, those rights would not be violated since a judgment against John Doe is not an in personam judgment, but merely nominal. Citing previous cases, the court explains that the John Doe action is procedural, intended to establish the uninsured motorist carrier's liability without binding the unknown tortfeasor to the judgment. The court concludes that Georgia law requires a judgment against the unknown tortfeasor to recover from the uninsured motorist carrier, reversing the judgments in two cases. Consequently, John Doe is reinstated as a defendant, allowing the action against Allstate to proceed. The court notes that a prior case, Watts v. Allstate Ins. Co., is distinguishable as it involved a known uninsured tortfeasor.