People v. Howell

Citations: 238 N.W.2d 148; 396 Mich. 16Docket: Docket Nos. 55799, 56180, (Calendar Nos. 3, 11)

Court: Michigan Supreme Court; January 27, 1976; Michigan; State Supreme Court

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The Michigan Supreme Court addressed the validity of prosecuting individuals for assault with intent to commit gross indecency (Howell) and for committing gross indecency (Helzer) amid claims of unconstitutional vagueness of the statutes. Howell sought to dismiss charges, arguing the statute lacked clarity, but the trial court denied this motion, and the Court of Appeals declined an interlocutory appeal. The prosecution alleged Howell forced a complainant into his car and made her perform fellatio, while Helzer was convicted for engaging in sexual acts with a 9-year-old boy.

The court affirmed Helzer's conviction and remanded Howell for trial, outlining that vagueness challenges to statutes are evaluated based on three criteria: (1) fair notice of prohibited conduct, (2) discretion given to the fact-finder, and (3) overbreadth affecting First Amendment rights. Neither defendant claimed constitutional protection for their actions nor argued that the statutes were overly broad. They contended instead that the statutes failed to provide clear standards for what constituted a crime. The court noted that vagueness claims must be assessed in light of the specific case facts, referencing prior case law. Ultimately, while the term "act of gross indecency" might lack clarity in isolation, both defendants were aware their alleged actions could lead to prosecution, thus affirming the statutes' application in their cases.

The term 'act of gross indecency' as interpreted by Michigan courts provides sufficient warning that acts like forced fellatio and fellatio with a minor are prohibited; however, the Court of Appeals' interpretation grants excessive discretion to the fact-finder in determining the crime's commission. In *People v Carey*, the court upheld the application of common societal standards to define indecent acts, referencing *People v Hicks*, which emphasized that 'indecent and improper liberties' are defined by societal norms. The court in *Carey* affirmed that similar reasoning applies to gross indecency prosecutions. While it is generally accepted that acts like fellatio with a minor or through force are indecent, societal views on sexual acts between consenting adults vary widely, leaving ambiguity in what is considered gross indecency. Consequently, the court rejected the Court of Appeals' view in *Dexter*, clarifying that the gross indecency statute prohibits non-consensual acts or those involving minors, as well as public sexual acts. The case of Howell remains to be tried, focusing on whether he forcibly required fellatio. In Helzer's case, despite an imprecise jury instruction, it was minimally adequate since the jury understood a conviction required finding that an oral or manual sexual act occurred. Helzer cannot argue that the jury's consideration of societal standards for indecency was flawed, as this standard appears to have been uniformly applied in similar cases.

Helzer's appeal raises several issues regarding the endorsement of witnesses and the specifics of the alleged offense. Even if the boy's parents and Helzer's stepson were considered necessary witnesses, their absence was acknowledged by Helzer's counsel, who chose not to call the boy's father despite listing him as an alibi witness. Consequently, this failure does not constitute reversible error. 

The boy reported the incident to his parents a month later and could not provide an exact date for the offense, suggesting it occurred approximately two weeks before the Rogers City Centennial, around July 20, 1971, and on a weekday. The prosecution framed the offense as occurring “on or about July 27, 1971,” within a time frame established at trial from July 18 to 29, 1971. Helzer did not testify but presented an alibi defense, supported by his employer's records indicating he was in Indiana on July 20 and employed during the relevant period.

The trial judge informed the jury that the specific time of day was not essential to the offense of gross indecency, allowing for conviction if the offense occurred within the statute of limitations. The Code of Criminal Procedure requires the timing of the offense to be stated as closely as possible, but Helzer did not request clarification on this point, nor did he assert an error based on the timing variance. Instead, he argued that the jury should have been restricted to the time period established by the evidence, especially given his alibi defense. 

Despite the erroneous instruction indicating that the date was not a material element of the offense, the jury was not misled, as they were correctly advised they could convict if the crime occurred within the statute of limitations. The case is distinguishable from precedents where multiple acts were presented, necessitating a more confined jury instruction.

A single incident between Helzer and the boy was presented, with the boy indicating he met Helzer only a few days prior. Children often struggle with recalling exact dates, thus the jury's failure to focus solely on the specific act charged did not lead to a conviction for another act. The prosecutor asserted in closing that the exact date of the offense was not critical, as long as the jury was convinced the acts occurred at Swan River. This context negates Helzer's reliance on a precedent (People v Ayers) regarding the necessity for the prosecution to adhere to a specific transaction once identified. Helzer's conviction is upheld, while Howell is remanded for trial. The trial judge acknowledged the challenge but felt unable to grant relief due to precedents set by the Court of Appeals. 

The excerpt also discusses the principle of due process concerning vague laws, which can lead to confusion about what is prohibited, potentially trapping the innocent. Vague laws risk arbitrary enforcement and inhibit First Amendment freedoms. The discussion references case law establishing the need for clear statutory language, noting that a statute must provide a reasonable opportunity for compliance. It highlights that claims of vagueness should be considered within the context of how courts have interpreted the statute. The excerpt concludes by affirming that a Tennessee statute prohibiting "crimes against nature" was upheld by the Supreme Court as providing adequate notice of prohibited conduct.

The application of legal standards regarding indecent exposures, liberties, and obscene publications extends to gross indecencies, with the statute effectively informing the defendant of the charges without detailing the evidence or specific acts involved, due to the nature of gross indecency. Previous cases, including People v McCaleb, People v Ferguson, and People v Roy Edwards, that conflict with this interpretation are disapproved. The recent 1974 criminal sexual conduct law has overlapping provisions with the gross indecency statute, particularly regarding acts involving minors and coercion. Notably, the statute under consideration for Howell's case, which included gross indecency, was repealed prior to the alleged incident occurring in 1973. The requirement for witness presence during the crime is clarified, and potential issues regarding witness competence are acknowledged. The Court of Appeals reversed a prior decision, asserting that jury deliberations should be limited to a specific timeframe supported by evidence, while dissenting opinions argue that the prosecution should not be strictly bound by exact dates in cases involving young victims. The court's affirmation of Helzer's conviction allows for the possibility of a delayed motion for a new trial, preserving the defendant's rights for future legal action.