Vogt v. Murraywood Swim and Racquet Club

Citations: 593 S.E.2d 617; 357 S.C. 506; 2004 S.C. App. LEXIS 8Docket: 3729

Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina; January 27, 2004; South Carolina; State Appellate Court

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Vincent A. Vogt appealed an adverse jury verdict in a personal injury case against Murraywood Swim and Racquet Club, focusing on his classification as either a licensee or an invitee. The trial court categorized Vogt as a licensee, ruling that he was a social guest, which the Court of Appeals upheld. Vogt was injured while diving into the pool after being invited by members Don Pevey and Lynne Soobitsky. Despite the club allowing limited guest access, Vogt argued he should be considered an invitee due to the club's practice of charging non-members an admission fee. The court disagreed, affirming the licensee status based on legal definitions. Additionally, Vogt challenged the trial court's exclusion of post-1971 DHEC regulations as standards of care, but the court permitted the jury to consider expert testimony based on more recent regulations while adhering to the 1971 standards for jury instructions. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in its rulings regarding Vogt's status or the applicable standards of care.

A licensee enters another's property primarily for their own benefit, not that of the landowner. Landowners owe licensees a duty of reasonable care to discover their presence and to avoid injury, as well as to warn them of known concealed dangers. In contrast, an invitee is someone who enters with permission for the benefit of the landowner, to whom the landowner owes a greater duty of care, including the obligation to discover and mitigate unreasonable risks. A social guest is classified as a licensee, not an invitee, as their presence is a personal favor rather than for business purposes. In the case of Landry v. Hilton Head Plantation Prop. Owners Ass’n, the court determined that a dues-paying member had a right to use common areas, categorizing them as an invitee. Conversely, a guest of a member, like Vogt, entered by permission and not right, making him a licensee. Evidence showed Vogt's presence at the pool was entirely permissive, and he did not enter for a purpose related to the possessor's business. The court found no conflicting evidence regarding Vogt's status, supporting the trial court's conclusion that he was a licensee. Vogt's appeal claiming error in jury charge requests was deemed without reversible error, as the trial court must provide accurate legal instructions.

An appellate court reviewing a jury charge assesses the entire charge in relation to trial evidence and issues. A trial court's refusal to provide a requested charge constitutes reversible error only if the requesting party demonstrates prejudice. In this case, Vogt's requests for charges A-1 through 7 were based on his claimed status as an invitee; however, the trial court correctly ruled he was a licensee, leading to the denial of these requests. Furthermore, Vogt's request for charge 10-A, which sought to incorporate specific DHEC swimming pool regulations, was also properly denied. The relevant regulations were inapplicable to the Murraywood pool, as they governed new constructions or alterations made long after the pool's original approval in 1975. Additionally, the trial court had allowed ample opportunity for Vogt to establish negligence against Murraywood, including expert testimony that referenced the 1995 DHEC Regulations. The court concluded that the jury was sufficiently informed to make its verdict. Overall, the court affirmed the trial court's decisions regarding Vogt's status and the denial of the requested jury charges, confirming that no prejudice resulted from these rulings.

Vogt's strict liability claim was withdrawn, and he proceeded solely on a negligence claim. There is no evidence indicating that a fee was paid. Murraywood's pool rules restricted local guests to ten visits per swim season. The case presents an unusual context for determining the appropriate standard of review. Vogt sought a directed verdict to establish himself as an invitee, but Murraywood argued that the facts indicated he was a licensee. The trial judge denied Vogt's motion and ruled him a licensee as a matter of law. During oral arguments, Vogt did not assert a factual dispute requiring jury consideration of his status. The parties agreed this issue is a legal question, and the proposed standard of review will be followed.