Miller v. Solaglas California, Inc.

Citations: 870 P.2d 559; 17 Brief Times Rptr. 1516; 1993 Colo. App. LEXIS 264; 1993 WL 398708Docket: 91CA1745

Court: Colorado Court of Appeals; October 7, 1993; Colorado; State Appellate Court

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In the case of George Joseph Miller v. Solaglas California, Inc. and PPG Industries, Inc., the Colorado Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff George Joseph Miller, who sustained severe injuries, including quadriplegia, from a 1982 automobile accident involving a 1980 GMC pickup truck. Miller had borrowed the truck, which had its windshield replaced by the defendants shortly after its original sale. After a series of legal proceedings, including a previous trial where the jury ruled the defendants' negligence did not cause Miller's injuries, the case was remanded for a new trial. During the second trial in 1991, the jury found the defendants liable for negligence and strict liability, awarding Miller $6.1 million in damages, which included economic damages, mental pain and suffering, and punitive damages. The trial court applied an offset for prior settlements before adding prejudgment interest to the final amount. The defendants' appeal and Miller's cross-appeal concerning the offset were both affirmed by the court.

Defendants appeal the trial court's judgment, while the plaintiff cross-appeals regarding interest calculation. The defendants argue that the trial court wrongly denied their motion to dismiss the plaintiff's strict liability claim based on res judicata, which the plaintiff claims was waived by the defendants. The trial court struck the defendants' 'law of the case' defense, ruling that the strict liability claim had not been dismissed in the prior trial, only the jury had been instructed on negligence. The court determined that the doctrine of law of the case did not apply due to new evidence, and there was no abuse of discretion in this ruling. The defendants, for the first time on appeal, argue that their law of the case defense impliedly included res judicata, but this defense must be affirmatively pleaded under Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure (C.R.C.P.) 8(c). The defendants failed to assert res judicata in their answer or present it at trial, which bars it from review. Consequently, the court upheld the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss the products liability claim.

Additionally, the defendants claimed the trial court erred by denying their directed verdict motion concerning the products liability claim, arguing that Solaglas did not manufacture or sell a 'windshield retention system' as defined in the jury instructions. However, the court found no error, clarifying that a products liability action can be based on various actions related to a product, including installation and assembly, per Section 13-21-401(2), C.R.S. 1987.

Strict liability in tort holds manufacturers or sellers accountable for harm caused by defective products placed into commerce without proper warnings or instructions. Liability extends to manufacturers of component parts if those parts reach consumers without significant alteration. According to Colorado law, a product liability action under strict liability cannot be brought against a seller unless they are also the manufacturer of the product or its defective part. The term “manufacturer” encompasses those who design, fabricate, or prepare a product, including sellers who know of defects or control the manufacturing process in a significant way. The trial court instructed jurors that the plaintiff must prove the defendants were manufacturers of the windshield retention system, aligning with the statutory definition. Evidence showed that Solaglas did not manufacture the component parts of the windshield system, which were made by GMC, nor the replacement windshield it installed. However, the complete windshield retention system included a sealing strip of urethane glue supplied by GMC.

Solaglas utilized silicone instead of urethane for sealing the windshield in the plaintiff's truck, indicating a significant deviation from the product provided by GMC. The defendants' arguments, relying on sales/service distinctions seen in other jurisdictions, do not align with the present facts. Citing precedents like Hoover v. Montgomery Ward Co., Inc., the text highlights that strict liability in tort pertains only to defective products, not negligent service involving non-defective products. Similar rulings in Lemley v. J. B. Tire Co. and DeLoach v. Whitney reinforce this limitation. However, the evidence presented allows reasonable jurors to view the windshield retention system as a product that Solaglas manufactured for sale, which could be deemed defective under the relevant product liability statute. The trial court correctly followed Bailey v. Montgomery Ward Co., which permitted jury consideration based on evidence of unsafe installation practices. Thus, the court found no error in denying the directed verdict against the plaintiff's claim and appropriately instructed the jury on product manufacturer negligence rather than general negligence.

Defendants assert that the trial court made several errors regarding jury instructions on comparative fault in a products liability case. They claim the court misapplied the products liability statute, improperly limited the jury's consideration of the plaintiff's comparative fault concerning seat belt evidence, and erred in denying their mistrial motion due to the jury's failure to find the plaintiff contributorily negligent. The court finds these arguments unpersuasive.

The trial court's instruction on comparative fault was in line with the requirements of Section 13-21-406 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, which mandates a reduction in a plaintiff's recovery based on their own fault. The court accepted the defendants' proposed instruction, which conformed to standard jury instructions related to comparative fault in negligence cases. Defendants argued that an additional instruction on product misuse was necessary, but they failed to propose such an instruction, and the statute does not mandate it. The definition of fault under the statute encompasses misuse along with other culpable behaviors.

Additionally, the defendants challenged the court's instruction regarding the limited effect of seat belt usage evidence, arguing it unjustly restricted the jury's ability to consider this evidence in products liability cases. However, Colorado's mandatory seat belt statute explicitly limits the impact of such evidence to mitigation of damages for pain and suffering, not affecting economic loss or medical expenses. The trial court's jury instruction adhered to this statute, clarifying that seat belt evidence could only be considered for mitigating pain and suffering damages, not for determining liability.

Plaintiff's seat belt usage cannot be used to diminish other damage elements in verdict forms. The statute 42-4-236(7) applies to products liability cases solely for mitigating pain and suffering damages, as determined by the legislative intent and history. The General Assembly did not intend to limit the statute's application, and attempts to amend it to allow broader mitigation were rejected. Defendants' claim regarding the admissibility of seat belt evidence for a strict liability defense was not addressed due to their failure to present the necessary jury instruction.

Additionally, the trial court's denial of the defendants' motion for a mistrial, based on the jury's finding that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent despite admitting to a traffic violation, was upheld. The jury was correctly instructed that comparative fault requires proof that the plaintiff's negligence was a cause of their injuries, and they could reasonably determine that the plaintiff's actions were not the proximate cause of the accident.

Lastly, the court did not err in denying defendants' motion to exclude the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 212 (FMVSS 212) from evidence or in refusing to instruct the jury about its inapplicability to Solaglas. FMVSS 212 sets safety standards for windshield retention in crashes, requiring compliance verified through crash tests, which the jury was entitled to consider.

Safety codes and standards can be admitted as evidence to support expert testimony when they are recognized as objective safety standards in the relevant industry. In Pust v. Union Supply Co. and McComish v. DeSoi, the courts affirmed this principle. In Seese v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., although the court did not apply this rationale directly regarding a van's windshield failure, it permitted the introduction of FMVSS 212 as evidence, with a caution that non-compliance does not alone indicate negligence, since the standard was not applicable at the time of manufacture. The court noted that FMVSS 212 was relevant to expert testimony about industry safety standards, and the defendants did not request limiting instructions, thus no reversible error occurred in admitting the evidence.

Regarding the defendants' claims of error in denying motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict concerning exemplary damages, the court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's $1 million award. Exemplary damages are permissible in cases involving fraud, malice, or willful conduct, as defined under Colorado law. To recover these damages, the plaintiff must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted with intent to harm or with reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights. The standard for "wanton and reckless conduct" involves an awareness of risks and disregard for the consequences, which can be demonstrated if a defendant knew or should have known that their actions could likely result in harm.

Exemplary damages are warranted when a defendant's actions demonstrate wanton and reckless disregard for the plaintiff's rights, as established in Frick v. Abell. The court emphasized that a 'knew or should have known' standard is insufficient for assessing exemplary damages, which must be evaluated based on the totality of the evidence in favor of the jury's findings. A motion for directed verdict regarding exemplary damages can only be granted when no reasonable juror could disagree on the evidence presented. In this case, the defendants failed to show that their actions—installing windshields without urethane—were unintentional, given their extensive experience and established policy against using urethane despite clear industry standards and guidelines. The evidence indicated that this conduct posed a significant risk of harm and was executed with awareness of the consequences, justifying a finding of wanton and reckless conduct. Consequently, the trial court's denial of the defendants' motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict for exemplary damages was upheld. Additionally, the defendants argued that the trial court improperly admitted video deposition testimony instead of live testimony and failed to consider their objections prior to the jury viewing the video, but these claims were also rejected.

No reversible error was found regarding the admission of deposition evidence under C.R.C.P. 32(a)(3). This rule permits depositions instead of live testimony if a witness is over 100 miles away from trial or if exceptional circumstances justify their use, ensuring fairness in the judicial process. The trial court exercised broad discretion to protect the rights of both parties and ruled that defendants' objection to the video deposition was untimely, given that the plaintiff had filed a trial data certificate indicating the use of video testimony on December 21, 1990, and the pretrial order required all motions to be filed by that date.

The court determined that the video deposition met the criteria for exceptional circumstances because the witness lived more than 100 miles away, the plaintiff made significant efforts to obtain the deposition, and proper notice was given. The trial court concluded that the timely notice of intent to use the video deposition constituted sufficient application and notice under C.R.C.P. 32(a)(3)(E). Additionally, the plaintiff incurred substantial costs in securing the deposition, reinforcing the court's decision to admit the evidence in the interest of justice. The defendants were aware of the plaintiff's intent to use the video deposition prior to trial but failed to object until it was presented in court. Thus, the trial court's findings regarding the timeliness of objections and the exceptional circumstances justified the admission of the deposition evidence.

The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of video deposition testimony under C.R.C.P. 32. Even if there were an error in the admission, it was deemed harmless due to several factors: the witness's testimony was brief and cumulative, defendants had the opportunity to present the witness live but chose not to challenge his deposition testimony, and they failed to provide an offer of proof regarding how the live testimony would differ. Additionally, defendants did not raise specific objections at trial concerning the deposition, limiting their ability to appeal on those grounds. Regarding the trial judge's absence during the video presentation, defendants' prior stipulation that the judge's presence was unnecessary precluded any related claims of error. On cross-appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court incorrectly calculated prejudgment interest by not deducting prior settlement amounts from the jury's damage award before adding interest. The court affirmed the trial court's approach, referencing established case law that supports the necessity of deducting settlement proceeds prior to adding statutory interest. The judgment of the trial court was upheld.