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Tennessee v. Lane
Citations: 158 L. Ed. 2d 820; 124 S. Ct. 1978; 541 U.S. 509; 2004 U.S. LEXIS 3386; 2004 D.A.R. 5854Docket: 02-1667
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; May 17, 2004; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Paraplegic respondents filed a lawsuit against Tennessee and its counties, claiming violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) due to lack of physical access to the courts. The District Court denied the State's motion to dismiss based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Sixth Circuit, holding the appeal in abeyance pending a Supreme Court decision in Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, later ruled that the Eleventh Amendment bars private damages actions for state violations of ADA Title I, which addresses employment discrimination. However, the en banc Sixth Circuit's Popovich decision interpreted Garrett to permit Title II damages actions based on due process claims, which led to the Sixth Circuit panel affirming the denial of the State's dismissal motion. The Supreme Court determined that Title II of the ADA is a valid exercise of Congress's authority under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly regarding the fundamental right of access to the courts. The Court outlined two questions to assess Congress's ability to abrogate state immunity: whether Congress clearly expressed its intent to do so, and whether it acted under a valid constitutional grant of authority. The ADA explicitly provides for abrogation, and Congress can act under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, Congress's power is not unlimited and must not fundamentally alter existing law. The Court referenced previous rulings to distinguish permissible remedial legislation from unconstitutional changes, concluding that Title II meets the necessary criteria for a valid exercise of Congressional authority. The Boerne inquiry mandates the identification of constitutional rights Congress aimed to enforce through Title II, which seeks to uphold the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition against irrational disability discrimination, along with other fundamental rights, notably the right of access to the courts, subject to heightened scrutiny. Title II was enacted in response to extensive historical discrimination against individuals with disabilities in state services, including systematic exclusion from courthouses, as evidenced by a Civil Rights Commission report indicating that 76% of public services in state buildings were inaccessible. Congressional hearings revealed widespread accounts of disabled individuals being denied access to judicial services, indicating a pattern of unconstitutional treatment by state agencies. Title II is deemed appropriate legislation under §5, specifically addressing judicial service accessibility issues. The requirement for program accessibility is seen as a proportional response to the documented history of discrimination, which has persisted despite prior legislative attempts to address it. Congress concluded that additional measures were warranted, given the inadequacies of earlier efforts. Title II mandates reasonable measures to eliminate barriers to accessibility but does not impose an obligation on States to utilize all possible means for access or alter essential eligibility criteria for services. Instead, it allows for "reasonable modifications" without fundamentally changing the nature of the services, applicable only to individuals who are otherwise eligible. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) mandates that public entities must provide reasonable modifications to ensure individuals with disabilities are not excluded from services, programs, or activities. This requirement can be met through various means, including less expensive alternatives to structural changes. The duty to accommodate aligns with due process principles, ensuring individuals have a meaningful opportunity to be heard in court, as established in cases like Boddie v. Connecticut, Griffin v. Illinois, and Gideon v. Wainwright. These cases emphasize that cost and convenience should not hinder access to the courts. In this context, Title II's obligation to accommodate serves as a preventive measure aimed at ensuring legitimate access rights. The case at hand involves respondents George Lane and Beverly Jones, who, as paraplegics, alleged violations of Title II by the State of Tennessee due to lack of access to the state court system. Lane was forced to crawl up stairs to attend court, and Jones, a court reporter, claimed she was unable to access several courthouses, hindering her work and participation in the judicial process. They sought damages and equitable relief. The State attempted to dismiss the suit based on Eleventh Amendment immunity, but the District Court rejected this motion. The United States intervened to support Title II's jurisdiction over state immunity. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently held the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett. The Eleventh Amendment prohibits private lawsuits for monetary damages against states for violations of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) as established in Garrett, although it remains unclear whether it allows such suits under Title II. The Court of Appeals, in Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court, held that a hearing-impaired litigant could proceed with a Title II suit against the state for lack of accommodation in a child custody case, despite the state's claim of immunity. The majority opinion differentiated between ADA claims based on equal protection principles, which are barred, and those based on due process, which are permitted. A panel later affirmed the District Court’s denial of the state's motion to dismiss, emphasizing that the Due Process Clause guarantees access to courts, particularly in light of evidence presented to Congress about physical barriers preventing access to essential services for disabled individuals. The panel acknowledged the complexity of the issues and remanded for further proceedings, leading to the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari and subsequent affirmation of the lower court's decision. The ADA, enacted after extensive congressional hearings and investigations, aims to address discrimination against individuals with disabilities, recognizing them as a historically marginalized group. Congress asserted broad authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and regulate commerce as a basis for the ADA, which seeks to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals. Discrimination against individuals with disabilities is prohibited in three key areas: employment (Title I), public services and activities (Title II), and public accommodations (Title III). Title II specifically mandates that public entities, including state and local governments, cannot discriminate against "qualified" individuals with disabilities in their services or programs. Qualified individuals are those who meet essential eligibility criteria with or without reasonable modifications, barrier removals, or auxiliary aids. The enforcement of Title II references §505 of the Rehabilitation Act, allowing private citizens to sue for damages. The Eleventh Amendment grants states immunity from lawsuits by citizens of other states and their own, but Congress can abrogate this immunity. The Act explicitly states that states cannot claim Eleventh Amendment immunity for violations under this statute. The Supreme Court has established that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement power, which is broad and allows for legislation that addresses constitutional violations. This has been upheld in various cases, affirming Congress's ability to enact laws that prevent and deter unconstitutional conduct. The recent case of Hibbs reaffirmed this broad power in the context of the Family and Medical Leave Act, allowing state employees to seek damages for noncompliance. The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) was upheld as a valid exercise of Congress' §5 power to address unconstitutional sex discrimination, despite the absence of evidence that a state's leave policy was implemented with discriminatory intent. Congress is authorized under §5 to enact legislation that prevents or remedies discriminatory practices, even if those practices were not intentionally discriminatory, to fulfill the Equal Protection Clause's objectives. However, Congress' authority is not boundless; it cannot effectuate a "substantive change in the governing law." The distinction between remedial legislation and substantive redefinition is not always clear, but must be respected, with a test of "congruence and proportionality" established to assess this. In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court found that Congress overstepped its §5 authority with the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which aimed to restore protections rejected by the Court in Employment Division v. Smith. RFRA was deemed disproportionate to its intended objective, effectively attempting to alter constitutional protections. The "congruence and proportionality" test was further clarified in Florida Prepaid Post-secondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, where the Patent Remedy Act was invalidated due to a lack of historical unconstitutional actions by states regarding patent infringement. Similar conclusions were reached in Kimel and United States v. Morrison regarding the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Violence Against Women Act, respectively. Ultimately, the Court ruled that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) did not constitute a valid use of Congress' §5 power, as it lacked a historical basis of constitutional violations in public employment. The dissent highlighted substantial evidence of state discrimination against individuals with disabilities, but the Court noted that most of this evidence pertained to public services and accommodations, which are governed by Titles II and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), rather than Title I. The Court found that neither the legislative findings nor history of the ADA indicated a concern about unconstitutional employment discrimination by states. Congressional reports focused on discrimination within the private sector, omitting public employment issues. Consequently, the Court concluded that Title I's provisions were inadequate for addressing unconstitutional discrimination in public employment and suggested that its aim was more to alter existing Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. The Court then shifted focus to Title II, questioning its validity under Congress's enforcement powers. The initial inquiry required identifying the constitutional rights Congress intended to enforce through Title II. Similar to Title I, Title II aims to combat irrational disability discrimination but also seeks to uphold various constitutional guarantees subject to rigorous judicial review. These encompass rights protected by the Due Process Clause, such as a defendant's presence during trials to ensure fairness, the right to a meaningful opportunity to participate in civil proceedings, the right to a jury composed of a fair cross-section of the community, and the public's right of access to criminal trials secured by the First Amendment. Title II's enforcement of constitutional rights is evaluated based on historical experiences, as established in South Carolina v. Katzenbach. Congress is empowered by §5 to implement remedial legislation to address significant harms, but the appropriateness of such measures depends on the severity of the issues they target. Title II aims to rectify pervasive discrimination against individuals with disabilities, notably in state services, where historically, laws have systematically denied fundamental rights, such as voting and marriage. Evidence from past court cases highlights unconstitutional treatment of disabled persons across various sectors, including unjust commitments and discrimination in zoning and public services. Despite previous legislative efforts, significant gaps remained that failed to adequately combat discrimination against people with disabilities. Congressional findings revealed extensive examples of unequal treatment, particularly regarding the administration of public programs. Additionally, Congress identified that a vast majority of public services in state-owned buildings were inaccessible to individuals with disabilities, with 76% reported as unusable. Testimonies from affected individuals further underscored the physical barriers in accessing local courthouses. Numerous examples illustrate the exclusion of individuals with disabilities from state judicial services, including disallowing those with visual and hearing impairments from jury duty, lack of interpretive services, inability for adults with developmental disabilities to testify in abuse cases, and inaccessible courtrooms for witnesses with physical disabilities. The dissent's argument questioning Congress' justification for its prophylactic power is deemed perplexing given the substantial evidence of unconstitutional discrimination against people with disabilities in public services. Previous rulings, such as Hibbs, supported Congress' action based on evidence of discrimination, particularly concerning family leave, which involved sex-based classifications. Title II of the ADA aims to enforce fundamental rights, including access to courts, warranting a rigorous judicial review standard. The record of constitutional violations presented is more comprehensive than in Hibbs, with findings indicating persistent discrimination in critical areas like education and public services. The ADA's findings affirm the necessity for legislation addressing inadequate public services and facilities access. The primary issue is whether Title II appropriately responds to the documented history of unequal treatment. Unlike other reviewed statutes, Title II encompasses a broad spectrum of official conduct to enforce various constitutional guarantees. The petitioner contends that the broad applicability of Title II indicates a lack of proper tailoring; however, the inquiry should focus specifically on Congress' authority under §5 to enforce the constitutional right of access to courts, rather than the law's overall breadth. Title II is validated as appropriate legislation under §5 concerning access to judicial services for disabled individuals. Congress's remedy, which mandates program accessibility, aligns with its goal of ensuring court access. Historically, disabled individuals have faced significant discrimination and exclusion in judicial services, prompting Congress to implement additional protective measures due to the inadequacy of previous legislative efforts. Title II requires states to take reasonable steps to eliminate barriers to accessibility, recognizing that lack of accommodation can equate to exclusion. However, it does not mandate exhaustive measures or alteration of essential program eligibility criteria; rather, it calls for reasonable modifications that do not fundamentally change the service. For facilities constructed or modified after 1992, specific architectural standards must be met. For older facilities, compliance can be achieved through less costly alternatives, such as relocating services or providing aides, with structural changes required only if other measures fail. States are not obliged to undertake actions that impose undue financial or administrative burdens or disrupt preservation interests. This accommodation duty aligns with due process principles, ensuring all individuals have a meaningful opportunity to access the courts. Previous rulings affirm that cost and convenience cannot justify a state’s failure to provide access. Consequently, Title II's obligations for accommodating disabled individuals in judicial administration are proportionate and appropriate to address and prevent unconstitutional behavior. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), concerning access to the courts, is deemed a valid exercise of Congress's authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court affirms the lower court's judgment, citing that Title II serves as a reasonable and targeted measure to protect a fundamental right. Various amici curiae briefs have been submitted both for reversal and affirmance by multiple state attorneys general and organizations, including the American Bar Association and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. The document references previous case law, including *Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf, Eddy, Inc.* and *Ex parte Virginia*, to underline congressional power and the importance of civil rights legislation. Legislation aimed at deterring or remedying constitutional violations may be considered within Congress' enforcement powers, even if it also restricts conduct that is not unconstitutional or encroaches on state autonomy. The Supreme Court has upheld various congressional actions under the Fifteenth Amendment to combat racial discrimination in voting, such as suspending literacy tests (South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 1966) and other voting rights protections, despite their impact on states. Additionally, Congress has enacted measures like the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which includes provisions that place burdens on states but serve to enforce constitutional rights. Other cases cited include bans on literacy tests (Katzenbach v. Morgan, 1966) and the extension of preclearance requirements for certain jurisdictions (City of Rome v. United States, 1980). Additional examples illustrate the enforcement of constitutional rights, including prohibitions on the marriage of individuals deemed mentally disabled and the mistreatment of disabled individuals in institutional settings. The excerpt also references various legal cases highlighting the inadequate treatment and accessibility issues faced by persons with disabilities, emphasizing the need for legislative protections. The excerpt addresses various court cases involving the exclusion and discrimination of individuals with disabilities, particularly focusing on students and jury service. Key cases cited include Mills v. Board of Ed. of D.C., which involved the exclusion of mentally retarded students; Robertson v. Granite City Community Unit School District, which dealt with an elementary student with AIDS being barred from regular classes; and Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School District, concerning a kindergarten student with AIDS. Other instances include disenfranchisement of individuals with mental illness (Doe v. Rowe) and mobility-impaired voters facing access issues (New York ex rel. Spitzer v. County of Delaware). The text also highlights cases involving deaf and mobility-impaired individuals being denied necessary services or access, such as Galloway v. Superior Court (blind jurors excluded) and various instances of discrimination in jury selection based on hearing impairments. The excerpt concludes with a critique of the Chief Justice's dismissal of certain evidence in a case concerning the provision of judicial services, emphasizing the relevance of violations by nonstate actors and the immunity of local governments as "arms of the State" under the Eleventh Amendment. Evidence of constitutional violations by states is crucial, particularly in the context of cases like *Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank* and *Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents*, where the goal is to ensure states are treated similarly to private entities regarding liability. In *South Carolina v. Katzenbach*, much of the evidence referenced pertains to local officials rather than state actions. The legislative record cited in *Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs* regarding gender discrimination in employment leave is primarily based on private-sector practices, rather than clear patterns of state discrimination. Key evidence included disparities in parental leave policies across states and findings that public-sector leave policies closely mirrored those in the private sector. Contrary to assertions by the Chief Justice, cases like *Garrett* and *Florida Prepaid* do not support the idea that the Boerne test requires a comprehensive analysis of the entire statute against the constitutional right it seeks to enforce. These cases involved legislation targeting specific constitutional rights and do not address broader implications. The Boerne inquiry focuses on whether legislation alters the enforcement of a constitutional guarantee, and the relevance of unrelated applications of Title II to the inquiry remains unclear. In *Raines*, the court rejected a claim that the Civil Rights Act of 1957 overstepped Congress's power under the Fifteenth Amendment, emphasizing that the constitutionality of the statute should stand if its application is clearly constitutional. The case addresses the right of access to the courts, indicating that Title II's accommodation duty does not need to be evaluated against constitutional standards that are limited to irrational discrimination, as established in Cleburne. Various precedents are cited, highlighting the judicial stance on fees and access in different contexts, such as divorce, parental rights, habeas petitions, criminal appeals, and the provision of counsel for individuals charged with felonies or needing direct appeals. The Chief Justice argues that Title II cannot be considered remedial legislation because it imposes liability on states for failing to make accommodations without a constitutional violation being established. However, it is acknowledged that Congress can legislate beyond the precise language of the Fourteenth Amendment. The concurring opinion of Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, agrees with the application of congruence-and-proportionality criteria to Title II, emphasizing that evidence would support the appropriateness of congressional action to address discrimination against disabled individuals in court contexts. Historical references are made to past judicial endorsements of discrimination against individuals with mental disabilities, including involuntary sterilization practices and associated societal restrictions. Laws supporting the exclusion of individuals from public schools were historically rooted in eugenics, a discredited ideology that persisted in legal frameworks long after its decline. These laws failed to accommodate the diverse abilities and needs of people with disabilities, leading to harmful classifications that disregarded individual capacities. The judicial endorsement of these rigid legal barriers is being challenged, marking a shift towards more flexible interpretations of the law. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, concurs with the Court's decision, aligning with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, which aims to eliminate obstacles for individuals with disabilities and promote their equal participation in society. The ADA encompasses three titles: prohibiting discrimination in employment (Title I), public services and programs (Title II), and public accommodations (Title III). This case pertains to Title II, which mandates that public entities must make reasonable modifications to their rules and practices to include individuals with disabilities, emphasizing the need for responsiveness to differences rather than blind equality. Title I, § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the ADA mandates "reasonable modifications" in public accommodations. ADA advocates aimed to eliminate practices that, alongside physical and mental conditions, contribute to disability. This objective is supported by both broad universal access rules and specific individualized accommodations. In Olmstead v. L.C., the Supreme Court held that a state failed in its obligations under the ADA by not providing community placements for individuals with disabilities, emphasizing a comprehensive understanding of discrimination that includes a failure to accommodate. The legislation aligns with constitutional principles of federalism, suggesting that Congress should not need to label states as constitutional violators to exercise its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Some justices dissent, arguing that Congress should only apply such measures in states with a documented history of constitutional violations. The Court's findings note that Congress was presented with substantial evidence of access barriers faced by individuals with disabilities across various government levels, justifying a national solution aimed at enhancing dignity and access. The dissenting opinion from Chief Justice Rehnquist and others asserts that the current ruling contradicts previous decisions regarding state immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, specifically referencing the prior ruling in Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, which held that Title I of the ADA did not validly abrogate state immunity. The dissenters maintain that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits private federal lawsuits against unconsenting states, citing multiple precedents. Congress can only override states' sovereign immunity and authorize lawsuits if it clearly expresses its intent and acts under a valid exercise of power as per Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. While it is acknowledged that Congress met the first requirement regarding intent, there is disagreement with the conclusion that Title II constitutes valid enforcement legislation under Section 5. This section empowers Congress to enforce substantive guarantees of the Amendment, which includes protections against deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process and the right to equal protection under the law. Congress's power to create enforcement legislation is not restricted to merely replicating existing interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. It can also address broader conduct not explicitly prohibited by the Amendment, aiming to remedy and deter state violations of constitutional rights. However, such legislative measures must appropriately remedy identified violations rather than redefine state obligations. The enforcement power is corrective or preventive, not definitional, necessitating congruence and proportionality between the injury being addressed and the legislative means employed. Despite the Court's acknowledgment of the congruence and proportionality test, its application has been inconsistent with prior rulings. The analysis previously used in cases like Garrett and Hibbs demonstrated that Title II fails the congruence-and-proportionality test, as it substantively redefines rather than enforces rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The initial step involves precisely identifying the scope of the constitutional right in question, which was straightforward in past cases where the statutes addressed specific rights. However, Title II complicates this task by attempting to enforce multiple constitutional rights for disabled persons, including both equal protection and certain due process rights. The Court upholds Title II's application regarding access to the courts, focusing on specific due process rights it enforces: 1) the criminal defendant's right to be present at critical trial stages (Faretta v. California); 2) litigants' right to a "meaningful opportunity to be heard" (Boddie v. Connecticut); 3) the right to a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community (Taylor v. Louisiana); and 4) the public's right to access criminal proceedings (Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California). The inquiry then shifts to whether Congress identified a history of constitutional rights violations by States concerning disabled individuals, as this determines the legitimacy of Title II in remedying or preventing such violations. The majority finds no evidence in the legislative record indicating widespread violations of due process rights for disabled persons. Instead, it discusses historical societal discrimination against the disabled, which, while relevant for broader scrutiny, does not pertain to the narrowly focused "as-applied" inquiry regarding Title II. The majority's approach parallels previous cases where generalized evidence was deemed irrelevant to determining violations of specific constitutional rights. Furthermore, much of the evidence cited concerns discrimination by nonstate entities rather than direct state actions, which undermines its relevance to Congress's capacity to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. The majority also references congressional task force evidence previously rejected, further questioning its applicability to Title II's enforcement of due process rights. Instances of "unequal treatment" in public program administration are chronicled, but the evidence presented is deemed "unexamined" and anecdotal, insufficient to establish constitutional violations as outlined in prior cases like Garrett and Cleburne. Many anecdotes do not involve states, and those that do lack detail to determine irrationality or unconstitutionality. The court finds a notable absence of evidence indicating that disabled persons were systematically denied rights such as presence at criminal trials or meaningful participation in civil cases. The legislative record does not demonstrate a pattern of constitutional violations, undermining the justification for Title II. The court highlights that Congress did not adequately document due process violations, with only two reported cases found where federal constitutional rights of disabled individuals were violated. The majority's reliance on a Civil Rights Commission report, testimony regarding courthouse accessibility, and evidence from an ADA task force is scrutinized; the findings are largely non-specific and do not conclusively demonstrate that states failed to provide access or alternatives for disabled persons in judicial contexts. The ADA Task Force report on the rights of disabled Americans, while seemingly promising, does not indicate that any disabled individual has been denied access to courts. The majority's reliance on a general citation from the Government's Lodging in Garrett, which contains limited anecdotal evidence of inaccessible courthouses, lacks substantive findings regarding access to judicial proceedings. This evidence was submitted only to the task force and not to Congress, which did not recognize any constitutional pattern of behavior by states regarding access to courts in its legislative findings or committee reports. Furthermore, even if the anecdotal evidence were valid, merely having an architecturally "inaccessible" courthouse does not constitute a constitutional violation. Due process is only violated when an individual is actually denied access to a judicial proceeding, and the need for state assistance to access a courtroom does not infringe upon this right. Additionally, the existence of an inaccessible courthouse does not violate the Equal Protection Clause unless it can be shown that failing to make it accessible is irrational, which is typically justified by financial considerations. Consequently, evidence of inaccessible courthouses does not support the abrogation of state sovereign immunity, echoing findings from Garrett that minimal anecdotal evidence does not substantiate claims of unconstitutional state action. Congress did not identify a significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination that would justify the necessity of broad prophylactic legislation, as highlighted in the legislative record regarding the Patent Remedy Act. This absence of evidence undermines the validity of Title II as legislation enforcing due process rights related to court access. When comparing Title II's lack of documented constitutional violations to other upheld legislation, it becomes clear that Title II appears to be an attempt by Congress to alter the established interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than a genuine effort to address or prevent state violations. The congruence-and-proportionality analysis indicates that Title II's rights and remedies are not aligned with the constitutional rights it aims to enforce. Title II mandates that no qualified individual with a disability can be excluded from public entity services, requiring extensive accommodations that go beyond mere constitutional violations. This expansive liability imposed on states does not limit Title II to cases of clear constitutional violations, instead prohibiting a broader range of state conduct than what is covered under the Equal Protection Clause. The requirements for special accommodations should originate from statutory law rather than the Equal Protection Clause, as established in prior rulings. Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is criticized for attempting to redefine state legal obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment, similar to Title I. Although it is viewed as a positive public policy, it is argued that Title II does not effectively protect fundamental rights, such as access to the courts, voting, and marriage, as it applies broadly to all services, programs, or activities provided by public entities without a direct connection to these rights. The statute’s provisions, which include areas like transportation and education, are subjected only to rational-basis scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, lacking a necessary relationship to enabling disabled individuals to exercise their constitutional rights. The text compares Title II to previous legislation invalidated for overstepping constitutional boundaries, asserting that it likely does not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity. The majority's assertion that Title II's broad scope can be mitigated by limiting its application to cases related to judicial services is challenged, as this approach distorts the congruence-and-proportionality test necessary for evaluating Congress’s authority to legislate under the Fourteenth Amendment. The dissent argues that Title II cannot be narrowly construed to fit into a hypothetical statute that would align with recognized constitutional rights, emphasizing that the original statute indiscriminately targets all public entity services and does not meet the criteria for appropriate legislative action. The measurement of statutory provisions against constitutional rights reveals potential discrepancies in judicial outcomes if statutes were strictly aligned with core constitutional rights. For instance, Title I could have been upheld in cases of irrational employment discrimination, and the Patent Remedy Act could have been upheld regarding intentional patent infringements. The majority's reliance on the Raines case, predating the congruence-and-proportionality test, highlights a concern: adopting an "as-applied" approach could deter Congress from enacting legislation aimed at addressing constitutional violations, as courts would be left to determine the applicability of broad statutes like Title II against states. This could lead to extensive litigation over state sovereign immunity, undermining both recent judicial precedents and the judiciary's role. In the context of courthouse access, Title II fails to effectively abrogate state sovereign immunity, as Congress did not demonstrate that disabled individuals were constitutionally denied access to judicial proceedings. Without this evidence, Title II cannot be deemed a congruent and proportional response to state constitutional violations. Additionally, Title II imposes requirements beyond those of the Due Process Clause, holding states liable for not making "reasonable modifications" to facilities regardless of whether such failures lead to actual due process violations. The majority's references to cases like Boddie v. Connecticut do not support Title II's broad liability, which does not hinge on constitutional wrongs. This situation mirrors the Patent Remedy Act, which similarly imposed liability without limiting coverage to cases involving due process violations, indicating Congress's failure to restrict the statute's application. Congress has permitted private lawsuits against states for maintaining inaccessible courthouses for disabled individuals, regardless of whether this leads to due process violations. This broad application of Title II is seen as problematic, particularly because there is insufficient evidence linking inaccessible courthouses to actual due process infringements. The dissent argues that the majority obscures the lack of constitutional violations by citing congressional findings of discrimination, which do not demonstrate a pattern of such violations under rational-basis scrutiny, as highlighted in the case of Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett. It is noted that the respondents, Lane and Jones, did not experience constitutional injuries; Lane was given accommodations to attend his trial, and Jones did not claim a constitutional violation. Additionally, the dissent points out that if states were indeed violating the due process rights of disabled individuals, extensive litigation would have arisen, as suggested by Justices in Garrett. Most cases cited by the majority either occurred after the ADA's enactment or did not establish federal constitutional violations. Title II lacks evidence as a legitimate response to constitutional violations, with no support for claims regarding its necessity for ensuring due process rights for disabled individuals in court settings. Testimonies from individuals highlight accessibility issues in courthouses, yet legislative history does not substantiate concerns over courthouse accessibility as a violation of due process. The Court's ruling emphasizes that Congress cannot bypass the required demonstration of state constitutional violations in enforcing due process rights, as established in precedents such as *Florida Prepaid* and *City of Boerne*. Unlike narrowly tailored laws addressing specific discrimination, Title II's broad approach is mismatched with the minimal evidence of unconstitutional conduct it intends to rectify. The case of *Raines* is deemed irrelevant as it involved a statute addressing a specific constitutional amendment with clear provisions for state actor applicability. The critical issue addressed is whether the statute in question is facially invalid due to its potential application to nonstate actors. The Court upheld the statute as applied to the respondents but did not consider the facial challenge. Unlike prior cases, the primary concern here is the constitutional application of Title II's broad provisions to the petitioner State. The dissent argues that the majority's reference to Hibbs to support Title II's breadth is not convincing, as the Hibbs decision was based on substantial evidence of state constitutional violations which is lacking in the current case. The dissent cites Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants Congress the authority to enact legislation to enforce its provisions, including the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. The precedent established in Katzenbach v. Morgan confirms Congress's ability to enact prophylactic legislation against facially constitutional conduct if deemed necessary to uphold the Amendment's guarantees. However, the dissent underscores that the Fourteenth Amendment's application is broader than the Fifteenth Amendment, and references City of Boerne v. Flores to highlight concerns over Congress potentially overreaching in its interpretation of the Amendment. The "congruence and proportionality" test is established to evaluate the appropriateness of prophylactic legislation enacted by Congress, requiring a balance between the legislative means and the legitimate ends pursued. Although the author initially expressed reservations about using malleable standards like "proportionality," they agreed to the test in the case of Boerne and applied it in subsequent rulings. Notable cases include: 1. **Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank** - The Court found the provisions of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act disproportionate to any intended remedial objective. 2. **Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents** - The Age Discrimination in Employment Act was deemed to impose requirements on state governments that were disproportionate to the unconstitutional conduct it aimed to address. 3. **United States v. Morrison** - A provision of the Violence Against Women Act was found lacking congruence and proportionality, not addressing discrimination by officials as the Fourteenth Amendment would. 4. **Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett** - Similar concerns regarding congruence and proportionality were raised about Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Subsequently, in **Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs**, the Family and Medical Leave Act was held to be congruent and proportional to its aim of preventing sex discrimination. The author joined Justice Kennedy's dissent, arguing that Congress had not identified any unconstitutional state action justifying the statute's measures. Today's decision affirms that Title II of the ADA aligns with the constitutional remediation of violations, despite dissent from the Chief Justice. The "congruence and proportionality" standard is criticized for fostering judicial arbitrariness and placing the judiciary in a supervisory role over Congress. This standard requires courts to evaluate Congress's identification of constitutional violations, which may lead to conflict between branches of government. The author argues against using the vague "congruence and proportionality" test, suggesting a more precise criterion supported by the Constitution's text. The author emphasizes that "enforcement" as defined historically does not equate to imposing broader regulations that exceed the Fourteenth Amendment's provisions. Using an example of speed limits, the author illustrates that enforcing a law should not involve imposing further restrictions unrelated to the original statute. The interpretation of enforcement should be limited to actions that directly address constitutional violations, rejecting the notion that "prophylactic legislation" can serve as enforcement. The argument concludes that the legislative power should be confined to addressing only those laws deemed unconstitutional by the judiciary, challenging the idea that Congress can extend its reach beyond the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. A state law imposing racially discriminatory literacy tests after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment would have left individuals with no recourse to assert their constitutional rights against such discrimination. Section 5 of the Amendment empowers Congress to establish a cause of action for citizens to enforce their rights. The Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 was among the first legislations enacted under this authority, allowing individuals to sue any person acting under state law who deprives others of their constitutional rights. Section 5 permits Congress to impose enforcement measures, including reporting requirements, to identify violations of the Fourteenth Amendment, but does not authorize measures that prohibit conduct not forbidden by the Amendment itself. Stare decisis presents a challenge to expanding the interpretation of Section 5, particularly given the precedents set by the Morgan and South Carolina cases, which affirmed a broader understanding of enforcement measures aimed at racial discrimination. Subsequent cases have consistently upheld legislation addressing racial discrimination, emphasizing the importance of targeting practices that violate the core intent of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's early interpretation in the Slaughter-House Cases highlights the significance of the Equal Protection Clause in this context. The excerpt emphasizes that actions taken by a State must be directly discriminatory against African Americans as a class to fall under the specific provisions of the Equal Protection Clause. It suggests that the historical context focused primarily on racial discrimination, which was the main concern of early interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment. The text outlines that the expansion of the Equal Protection Clause to include other categories like sex and age had not yet occurred, and the incorporation doctrine had yet to be fully developed. The excerpt also notes that broad interpretations of congressional power were appropriate for racial discrimination, as that was the primary evil addressed by the Equal Protection Clause, with states historically resisting such prohibitions. It references cases like Oregon v. Mitchell, where the Supreme Court upheld certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act aimed at eliminating racial discrimination but deemed others, such as lowering the voting age, outside the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enforcement power. The author indicates a preference for applying a broader standard of congressional authority when addressing racial discrimination while maintaining that any congressional measures must still meet certain requirements. The conclusion asserts adherence to the McCulloch standard for measures aimed at remedying racial discrimination, while also emphasizing the necessity for Congress to impose prophylactic measures against such discrimination. Legislation under discussion is applicable only to States with a documented history of constitutional violations. The dissenting opinion emphasizes that prophylactic remedies for such violations should target States or state actors, not the general public. Congressional measures must align with the Necessary and Proper Clause and cannot contradict other constitutional provisions. While the dissent supports Congressional authority to address racial discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, it maintains that actions extending beyond enforcement into prophylaxis are considered overreaching. The dissent critiques current legislation requiring accessibility for disabled individuals in public buildings, arguing it does not enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and represents a misapplication of language in a context unrelated to the historical objectives of the Civil War Amendments. The opinion calls for clearer boundaries to prevent the expansion of legislative interpretations. Additionally, references are made to past Congressional attempts and specific Civil Rights Acts aimed at enforcing voting rights, illustrating the historical context of legislative actions related to racial discrimination. The Eighteenth Amendment prohibits the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes and grants Congress and the states concurrent power to enforce its provisions. The Supplemental Prohibition Act of 1921 limited medicinal use to spirituous and vinous liquor, which was challenged as unconstitutional for exceeding the enforcement scope of the Amendment. The Court applied the McCulloch v. Maryland standard, noting that the issue involved federal powers encroaching on state rights rather than constitutional authority. It referenced prior dicta indicating that non-prophylactic measures could only be implemented in response to state constitutional violations. The dissent, articulated by Justice Thomas, agrees with the Chief Justice's dissent regarding Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), arguing that Congress did not provide sufficient evidence of states denying disabled persons access to courts, and that Title II extends beyond mere access to the courts. Justice Thomas also expresses his continued disagreement with the previous decision in Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs.