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Dunham v. Roer
Citations: 708 N.W.2d 552; 2006 Minn. App. LEXIS 9; 2006 WL 44312Docket: A05-421
Court: Court of Appeals of Minnesota; January 10, 2006; Minnesota; State Appellate Court
The Court of Appeals of Minnesota affirmed the district court's summary judgment dismissing Debra Ali Dunham's claims against Karen P. Roer, which included challenges to the constitutionality of the harassment statute (Minn. Stat. 609.748, subd. 1(a)(1)), as well as allegations of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and defamation. Dunham argued that the harassment statute was overbroad and void for vagueness, and claimed that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding her other claims. The court found no merit in her constitutional claims and determined that no genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. Dunham and Roer, both members of the Wayzata Country Club, became embroiled in conflict after Dunham discovered Roer's affair with her husband. Following confrontations, Roer obtained an ex parte restraining order against Dunham in June 2001, which Dunham allegedly violated shortly thereafter. A subsequent two-year restraining order was issued against Dunham based on findings of her harassment, including repeated unwanted contact and specific incidents occurring in May and June 2001. Dunham did not appeal the restraining order. The case escalated in June 2002, when Roer accused Dunham of making offensive remarks, which Dunham denied. Police arrested Dunham for violating the restraining order, and even though Dunham claimed Roer instigated the criminal prosecution, Roer stated she did not request the prosecution. After a jury trial, the appellant was acquitted of the charges against her. She claims the respondent falsely accused her of inappropriate behavior on two occasions in 2002 and that a summons was improperly issued by the City of Wayzata assistant prosecutor, which led to the eventual dismissal of charges. The appellant asserts that the respondent was also responsible for the termination of her family's membership at the Wayzata Country Club (WCC) in September 2002. The WCC board's decision was based on appellant's previous rule violations, objections to the dress code, and her conduct towards the respondent. In July 2003, the respondent sought to extend a restraining order from August 2001 for two additional years, citing harassment incidents. The district court extended the order for one year, finding the respondent's testimony credible while deeming the appellant's testimony not credible. However, the court's decision relied on a single incident of harassment in May 2003 rather than the repeated incidents required by statute, leading to a reversal of the order on appeal. The appellant also alleges that the respondent made defamatory statements about her, claiming she committed criminal acts and was violent. This was primarily based on a letter from the respondent to the WCC, which mentioned property damage but acknowledged a lack of evidence identifying any perpetrator. In May 2003, the appellant initiated a lawsuit against the respondent for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and defamation, among other claims. A scheduling order was established, but disputes arose over discovery issues, including a protective order that limited the appellant’s attendance at the respondent's deposition. The appellant attempted to depose the city prosecutor regarding her malicious prosecution claims, but the prosecutor invoked prosecutorial privilege. A stipulation was reached to serve written interrogatories, but this was not completed by the discovery deadline, and a motion to extend the deadline was subsequently denied. The district court denied the appellant's request for an extension of the discovery period, citing the approaching trial date of June 21, 2004, and the appellant's ample time—10 months—to complete discovery. The court characterized the appellant's claims as "not complicated" and stated it was "simply too late for more discovery," although it agreed to honor existing discovery agreements. The appellant failed to obtain answers to interrogatories from the city prosecutor and, in May 2004, attempted to amend her complaint to include a claim of unconstitutional harassment under Minn. Stat. 609.748, subd. 1 (a)(1). The district court subsequently granted summary judgment for the respondent on all claims, allowed the appellant's amendment, but dismissed her constitutional claim. On appeal, the appellant challenges the denial of declaratory relief and the dismissal of her malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and defamation claims. Key issues include whether the harassment statute is unconstitutionally overbroad or vague, whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment against the appellant's claims, and whether it abused its discretion in denying the discovery extension and restricting the appellant's presence at the respondent's deposition. The appellant argues the harassment statute is void for vagueness and overbroad, which raises constitutional questions that typically involve a presumption of constitutionality, except when First Amendment rights are at stake. The respondent contends that the appellant lacks standing to challenge the statute and that her claims are moot. The court will first address the standing and mootness before considering the constitutional merits, reviewing these legal questions de novo. Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines, while distinct, often overlap in First Amendment cases due to vague language causing statutes to be overly broad. A recognized exception allows facial overbreadth challenges even if a litigant's own rights are not violated, as established in Broadrick v. Oklahoma. This exception exists to prevent a chilling effect on free speech, allowing individuals to challenge statutes that may deter others from exercising their constitutional rights. The existence of a harassment statute raises concerns that it may suppress protected speech, thus enabling the appellant to challenge it without needing to demonstrate personal standing. The respondent argues the challenge is moot since no restraining order is currently against the appellant. However, mootness requires the personal interest to persist throughout litigation. A facial challenge remains valid if the statute is not repealed, even if the litigant is not currently affected by it. Since the harassment statute is still in effect and alleged to chill future expression, the court retains jurisdiction. The appellant claims the harassment statute is unconstitutionally overbroad, infringing on free speech rights. The statute defines harassment as a single instance of physical or sexual assault or repeated intrusive actions affecting another's safety, security, or privacy. Individuals subjected to harassment can seek restraining orders through a petition that must include specific allegations and an affidavit under oath. A district court may issue an ex parte temporary restraining order if a petitioner demonstrates an immediate danger of harassment and there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in such behavior. This order remains in effect until a hearing for a restraining order is held. Following the hearing, a restraining order can be issued for up to two years if the court finds reasonable grounds for believing that harassment occurred. Violations of this order can lead to criminal penalties. The appellant does not contest the constitutionality of the definition's first prong, which involves a single incident of physical or sexual assault, but challenges the second prong concerning repeated intrusive acts that substantially affect another's safety or privacy. The appellant argues that this prong is overbroad as it may include protected speech under the First Amendment, citing examples such as derogatory terms and expressions of emotion. The overbreadth doctrine allows for a statute to be deemed unconstitutional if it restricts protected activity alongside prohibited conduct. The respondent contends that the statute is not overbroad and does not violate First Amendment rights, relating it to case law involving time, place, and manner restrictions. However, the harassment statute targets repeated unwanted conduct rather than speech in public forums. Certain categories of speech, such as "fighting words" and "true threats," are not protected and may be regulated. The definition of "fighting words" involves language likely to provoke an immediate breach of peace, while "true threats" are serious expressions of intent to commit violence against individuals or groups. A narrowly tailored statute that regulates unprotected speech acts, such as "fighting words" and "true threats," does not infringe upon the First Amendment and cannot be deemed facially overbroad. The state has the authority to regulate conduct that intrudes on individual privacy, as exemplified in Gormley v. Director of the Connecticut State Department of Probation, where a statute against telephone harassment was upheld for focusing on conduct that intrudes on privacy. The Gormley court clarified that the statute is concerned with the intent to harass, annoy, or alarm, regardless of whether any actual conversation occurs. The Minnesota harassment statute specifically targets repeated and unwanted acts, words, or gestures that significantly affect another's safety, security, or privacy, encompassing constitutionally unprotected speech types. This statute is deemed constitutional as it regulates only "fighting words," true threats, or significant invasions of privacy. The appellant's argument that the statute is overbroad based on the subjective response of the target is countered by distinguishing it from the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in Machholz, where a different harassment statute was invalidated for being facially overbroad. The statute in Machholz was criticized for criminalizing all intentional conduct that caused a reasonable person to feel oppressed, thus covering both protected and unprotected speech. In contrast, the current statute requires both repeated unwanted conduct and a substantial adverse effect on another's safety, ensuring it does not encompass protected speech. A single instance of intimidating behavior, such as that evaluated in Machholz, does not meet the requirements of the applicable harassment statute. The statute mandates that a court must establish reasonable grounds to believe that the accused engaged in harassment, necessitating both objectively unreasonable actions by the harasser and a reasonable belief of harassment by the victim. Consequently, the statute does not violate constitutionally protected speech rights or exhibit substantial overbreadth. For instance, even if derogatory terms like "slut" are considered protected expression under the First Amendment, only speech intended to cause or causing significant adverse impacts on another's safety or privacy falls under the statute's definition. The government has a valid interest in regulating non-speech elements of conduct when combined with speech, justifying incidental restrictions on First Amendment rights, particularly to protect individuals from repeated, serious intrusions. The harassment statute does not demand an artificial standard of civility, rather it delineates conduct deemed intolerable in society. While individuals may express outrage, there are boundaries to maintain community peace. The court affirmed the issuance of a restraining order under this statute, highlighting that any incidental impact on protected speech does not render the statute overly broad. Regarding vagueness, the appellant argues that the harassment statute is unconstitutionally vague, infringing on due process rights guaranteed by both the U.S. and Minnesota Constitutions. Vague penal statutes are impermissible as they violate due process, necessitating a higher standard of clarity for laws imposing criminal penalties. The district court identified the harassment statute as creating a "quasi-criminal" offense due to potential prosecution for violating a restraining order. "Quasi-criminal" statutes impose civil penalties while allowing for potential criminal sanctions, similar to criminal laws for vagueness analysis purposes. The harassment statute in question is deemed "quasi-criminal" due to the possibility of misdemeanor or felony penalties for restraining order violations under Minn. Stat. 609.748. Such statutes must provide clear definitions of prohibited conduct to avoid arbitrary enforcement, though they are not required to be perfectly precise. To successfully challenge a statute as vague, a complainant must show it is vague in all contexts, indicating it cannot be constitutionally applied. The appellant failed to prove that a reasonable person could not understand the statute's prohibitions, as common behaviors like repeated confrontations or unwanted calls are clearly encompassed by the statute. Consequently, the district court's conclusion that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague was upheld. Additionally, the appellant argued against the district court's summary judgment favoring the opposing party on claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and defamation. In reviewing summary judgment, the court checks for any material factual disputes and assesses legal application. Summary judgment is appropriate when evidence shows no genuine issues of material fact exist and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Affidavits used to establish a genuine issue of material fact must be based on personal knowledge and contain facts admissible in evidence, according to Minn. R. Civ. P. 56.05. In reviewing evidence on appeal, courts must view it favorably towards the party against whom judgment was granted. A party cannot rely on unverified allegations or speculative evidence to contest a summary judgment. A defendant is entitled to summary judgment if there is a complete lack of proof on an essential element of the plaintiff's claim. In the context of a malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the action was initiated without probable cause, (2) it was pursued with malicious intent, and (3) it terminated favorably for the plaintiff. Probable cause requires a reasonable belief in the legitimacy of the action based on facts and circumstances. This claim is narrowly defined and not favored in law due to public policy considerations. The appellant argues that incidents related to an ex parte restraining order filed by the respondent demonstrate genuine issues of material fact. However, the appellant fails to present evidence that would support her claims. The restraining order, issued due to the appellant's behavior being deemed harassing, indicates probable cause for the respondent's action. As the appellant did not appeal the restraining order, she cannot challenge it now. Additionally, her belief in the respondent's malicious intent is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Since the action did not terminate in her favor, the malicious prosecution claim regarding the restraining order fails as a matter of law. Appellant contends that her arrest in June 2002 for violating a restraining order from August 2001, along with subsequent allegations and prosecution, amounted to malicious prosecution. Despite differing witness testimonies from trial compared to the police report, appellant did not prove that the police report failed to support the prosecution. The district court found probable cause for the arrest based on respondent's statements and corroborating witness accounts. Appellant alleges that respondent improperly influenced the city prosecutor to pursue charges, resulting in her acquittal, but she did not demonstrate that the prosecutor acted without probable cause, as the initiation of the prosecution was based on independent prosecutorial discretion. Additionally, appellant did not provide evidence that respondent acted with malicious intent in reporting the violations. Although she met the criterion of having charges resolved in her favor, she failed to establish the lack of probable cause and malicious intent, as the complaint was pursued by the city prosecutor, not respondent. The district court had previously determined that probable cause existed for the arrest. Regarding the 2003 petition to extend the restraining order, appellant again did not meet the initial criteria for malicious prosecution, as the district court found respondent's claims credible and determined that appellant violated the original restraining order multiple times. The fact that this court later deemed the evidence insufficient for a second restraining order does not indicate a lack of probable cause for seeking the extension. Summary judgment was deemed appropriate based on these established facts. The court clarified that it did not determine the underlying petition and affidavits were inadequate to show probable cause for the respondent's violation of the restraining order; rather, it concluded that the findings from one harassment incident did not justify a new restraining order. The appellant failed to present substantial evidence of malice from the respondent regarding relief sought in 2003, which undermined any claim of malicious prosecution despite the appellant's successful appeal. Regarding the abuse-of-process claim, the essential elements require demonstrating an ulterior motive and misuse of the legal process for unintended results. The appellant alleged that the respondent's court and police applications were retaliatory but did not provide sufficient admissible evidence to create genuine material fact issues. The record indicated that the respondent's actions aimed solely to limit unwanted contact with the appellant, and mere allegations of a broader scheme were inadequate. On the defamation claim, the appellant needed to prove a false statement, third-party communication, and harm to reputation. Although she argued that the respondent made false statements about her committing criminal acts, the court found that the evidence did not support a claim of defamation by implication. A letter from the respondent to the WCC did not accuse the appellant of criminal behavior, thus failing to establish a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment on the defamation claim. Appellant argues that various records, including depositions, support her defamation claim; however, upon review, the evidence fails to substantiate her allegations. Specifically, appellant acknowledged that her friend inferred respondent called her a liar, but admitted the term "liar" was never explicitly used. Consequently, the court found insufficient admissible evidence and upheld the summary judgment against appellant. Appellant also challenges two discovery rulings by the district court, which possesses broad discretion in such matters. The court's decisions will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Appellant's request for an extension to depose the city prosecutor was denied because it was deemed untimely, filed just two days before the discovery deadline, despite having ten months to conduct discovery on relatively straightforward claims. Appellant did not dispute the court's findings regarding her lack of diligence or good faith in seeking further discovery. Additionally, appellant contests a protective order requiring her to monitor respondent’s deposition from another room. The court is authorized to impose such orders for good cause under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 26.03(e), aimed at preventing annoyance or undue burden during discovery. The district court did not abuse its discretion by issuing a protective order that allowed the appellant to monitor a deposition without direct contact with the respondent, given the parties' contentious relationship and an existing restraining order. The respondent's motion to strike 16 statements from the appellant's brief was noted, emphasizing that appellate courts cannot consider information outside the trial record. The court limited its review to facts supported by the record, disregarding any inadmissible evidence or mischaracterizations from the appellant's brief. The definition of harassing conduct under Minn. Stat. 609.748, subd. 1 (a)(1) was upheld as constitutionally sound, and the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence for claims of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and defamation. The district court's denial of the appellant's discovery requests was affirmed, leading to the overall affirmation of summary judgment for the respondent and denial of the declaratory judgment. The analysis clarified the distinction between malicious prosecution and abuse of process, noting the appellant's failure to demonstrate that the respondent acted with malice or improperly utilized legal process.