Court: Supreme Court of Kansas; January 13, 1984; Kansas; State Supreme Court
Tamarac Development Company, Inc. appealed a summary judgment favoring Delamater, Freund. Associates, which the trial court determined was based on a tort claim rather than a contract claim, thus subject to a two-year statute of limitations, K.S.A. 60-513. The appellant, a residential developer, had contracted with the appellee, an engineering firm, for services related to a mobile home park in 1976 and 1977, with no breach of written contracts alleged. Instead, Tamarac claimed a breach of an oral contract for supervision of grading, resulting in costly drainage problems due to excessive dirt removal. Initially alleging negligence, Tamarac later amended its claim to breach of contract, which would be subject to a three-year limitation under K.S.A. 60-512. The sole appellate issue was whether the district court correctly classified the cause of action as tort rather than contract. The court highlighted the complexity and inconsistency in determining whether a claim is tort or contract, referencing Professor Prosser's views on the subject. While plaintiffs often have the freedom to choose their claim type based on procedural matters, this flexibility diminishes when personal injury is involved, typically categorizing such claims as tort. This case illustrates the ongoing legal ambiguity in distinguishing between tort and contract claims and the implications for statutory limitations.
A distinction exists between tort and contract actions, with contract actions stemming from a breach of an agreement and tort actions arising from violations of legal duties. In the current case, the appellant claims an oral agreement for accurate grading, which could imply either a specific contractual obligation or an implied warranty of competent work. Conversely, the appellee contends that the inspection was negligently conducted, framing the case as one of architect malpractice, which is generally classified as tort.
Kansas case law supports both perspectives. The appellee cites cases that assert breaches of legal duties by professionals constitute tort actions, such as in Brueck v. Krings and Malone v. University of Kansas Medical Center. However, those cases involved clear legal duties owed by the professionals, unlike the current case, where no explicit statutory duty for architects is established. While professionals can be liable for malpractice due to breaches of legal duties, they may also contract to exceed legal standards of care. This principle was affirmed in Noel v. Proud, where a breach of warranty was treated as a contract issue despite its context within a physician-patient relationship, leading to the application of a contract statute of limitations.
Malone establishes that professionals like physicians and hospitals can enter contracts that warrant a specific result, which can lead to breach of contract claims. In this case, if the architectural firm agreed to deliver a specific outcome instead of merely planning and inspecting, the claim could be based on contract rather than tort. In general construction cases, actions can arise from both tort and contract theories. Kansas courts recognize that a person can pursue remedies for breach of implied warranty through either or both theories. An implied warranty of workmanlike performance exists for contractors, which the appellant claims was violated due to the architect's failure to ensure proper grading according to blueprints. Unlike doctors and lawyers, architects and engineers are expected to guarantee precise results, leading to an implied warranty of workmanlike performance. The trial court's summary judgment, which dismissed the case as purely tort-based and barred by the statute of limitations, was erroneous since material facts regarding the existence of an oral contract for a specific result and breach of implied warranty were still in dispute. The appellate court reversed and remanded for trial.
