Court: California Court of Appeal; December 14, 1953; California; State Appellate Court
William P. Von Hasseln, the plaintiff, claims ownership and right to possess a parcel of real estate in Los Angeles, asserting that his brother, Gus E. Von Hasseln, the defendant, wrongfully ousted him and claims an adverse interest in the property. The defendant denies the plaintiff’s claims, asserting sole ownership. The jury ruled in favor of the plaintiff, awarding damages of $2,500, based on evidence that Theresa and Otto Patton, the parties' parents, conveyed the property to the plaintiff via a grant deed on February 2, 1942, although the deed was not recorded.
The defendant appeals the judgment, arguing several grounds for reversal, including the admission of the deed's contents as evidence, insufficient proof of its delivery and intent, and other prejudicial errors. Testimony revealed that the Pattons owned two properties, one in Santa Ana and one in Los Angeles (the Clinton Street property). The Santa Ana property was deeded to the defendant on the same date, while the Clinton Street property was purportedly deeded to the plaintiff. The mother and stepfather discussed the arrangement with the plaintiff, indicating a plan to ensure an equitable division of property between the two brothers. The plaintiff recalled a brief glance at the deed, mentioning specific details but could not confirm its complete content or date.
Lot 4 and Lot 5 in Block 3 were referenced in relation to a deed that included the names of Mr. William Letts, the witness, and the plaintiff's mother and father. The plaintiff confirmed his name appeared on the deed, along with both parents' signatures. The deed, presented in a typed printed form, was placed in a shared safe in the family home for safekeeping, alongside other important documents and valuables, including insurance papers and cash. The plaintiff never recorded the deed.
In 1948, the plaintiff and his wife moved into an apartment on the Clinton Street property, which had two houses and several tenants. He lived there for about two years, during which he accessed the safe frequently and believed the deed remained there. Following his mother's illness in May 1950 and her death on June 3, the plaintiff was instructed by the defendant to vacate the premises. Upon returning to check the safe after his mother's death, he found no documents there and learned neither brother disclosed the existence of the deed to each other.
During cross-examination, the plaintiff asserted that he regarded the deed as his property after it was handed to him. Previous legal action he filed to cancel a deed from Otto Patton to the defendant was dismissed, as he later realized it mistakenly referenced a will naming him as the sole heir. On redirect examination, the plaintiff confirmed he received a grant deed in February 1942 from Otto Patton and Theresa C. Patton, with his name listed as the grantee, and that it was signed by his mother and stepfather and acknowledged before a notary public.
William Letts served as a notary public for a grant deed delivered to the respondent at their home by Otto Patton and his mother. The respondent placed the deed in a designated safe at the Patton residence and accessed it multiple times thereafter. The respondent's brother did not inform him about the deed until after Otto Patton's death. Upon discovering the deed, the respondent consulted an attorney but did not disclose that he was the sole heir of Otto Patton or that a will existed. After Otto Patton's death in September 1950, the respondent told the plaintiff about the deed concerning the Clinton Street property, to which the plaintiff claimed entitlement. Witnesses testified that the Pattons intended to divide their property between the plaintiff and the respondent, with the Clinton Street property deeded to the plaintiff. It was noted that William Letts had passed away, and his notarial records had been destroyed. The court emphasized that when reviewing conflicting evidence, all interpretations must favor the respondent, and an appellate court must respect the trial court's findings if supported by substantial evidence. The respondent's claim to the property relies on a purportedly lost instrument, and establishing its execution and contents requires clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence, although exact verbal accuracy is not necessary.
Appellant argues that the respondent's testimony regarding his observation of the deed is not only implausible but impossible. Citing Evje v. City Title Ins. Co., the document clarifies that appellate courts will not uphold judgments based on inherently improbable evidence; however, unusual circumstances alone do not render testimony invalid. Rejection of a credible witness's statements requires either a physical impossibility of truth or an evident falsity without inference. Conflicts in testimony do not justify reversing a judgment, as assessing credibility is the trial court's role.
Respondent testified that he glanced at the deed, confirming that his name was listed as grantee and that it was signed by the Pattons and acknowledged by a notary. Although uncertain about the property's legal description, he identified it as "also known as 1914 Clinton Street." The determination of deed delivery is fact-specific, relying on circumstantial evidence, and substantial evidence supporting the court's finding cannot be overturned on appeal.
The jury's verdict and judgment are deemed supported by adequate evidence. Appellant also challenges an instruction regarding damages, which allows for the assessment of reasonable rental value from June 4 or 5, 1950, until trial. Since the respondent acknowledged the Pattons' right to possession until Otto Patton's death on September 11, 1950, the court agrees that damages should be assessed starting from that date. The case is remanded for reassessment of damages, while the judgment is otherwise affirmed, with each party bearing their own appeal costs.
