Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia; October 7, 1986; Virginia; State Appellate Court
Kathy Ann Molash and Chester David Molash were convicted of larceny for failing to return a trailer, a bailed property, while employed as truck drivers for the Markhams. They abandoned the tractor and trailer while en route to deliver freight, claiming the evidence did not demonstrate fraudulent intent necessary for a larceny conviction under Virginia Code § 18.2-117. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, emphasizing the lack of a written agreement regarding the return of the trailer, which meant the prima facie evidence of larceny was inapplicable. The court noted that the bailors had taken possession of the trailer within two days of its abandonment, highlighting insufficient evidence of a violation of the statute and absence of any written or verbal agreement outlining the return process. Testimony indicated that Mr. Molash was uncertain about the trailer's location, leading to the conclusion that the evidence did not support a finding of criminal intent to defraud.
Mr. Markham learned the location of the tractor and trailer from Mr. Molash's brother during a phone conversation. Subsequently, a Virginia state trooper contacted the brother, who provided the exact location, leading local authorities to locate the vehicles. The Molashes asserted they had no obligation to continue working for the Markhams and believed they could quit at any time without repercussions. They informed B. L., the trailer's lessor, of their decision to quit, providing details about the trailer's location at a truck stop in Indiana and the tractor's location at a K-Mart parking lot in Radcliff, Kentucky. This testimony lacked contradiction from other witnesses. The trial court ruled that the Molashes did not convert the property or exhibit fraudulent intent but adhered to a strict interpretation of Code 18.2-117, which required the Commonwealth to show that the Molashes, as bailees, failed to return the property. However, case law indicates that proof of mens rea is implicitly required for offenses associated with property, as established in Maye and Makarov. The court must evaluate evidence favorably toward the Commonwealth, dismissing conflicting evidence from the accused. Although witness credibility is typically a matter for the fact-finder, the uncontradicted nature of the Molashes' evidence led to a presumption of truth. They contended there was no evidence of conversion or intent to defraud, arguing they simply left the property in designated locations and notified the rightful owner.
No evidence was found to support the idea that the Molashes had any intent to commit conversion regarding the trailer after leaving their employment with the Markhams. Testimony indicated that the Molashes informed B. L, the lawful possessor of the trailer, about its location upon quitting, and this was not contradicted by other witnesses, including B. L's agent, Tom Waters. Although there was conflicting evidence regarding a phone conversation between Mrs. Markham and Mr. Molash, even accepting Mrs. Markham's version does not substantiate a claim of conversion. The evidence does not demonstrate any fraudulent intent by the Molashes when viewed in favor of the Commonwealth. The court concluded that the Molashes' testimony was credible and that the Commonwealth's evidence failed to eliminate every reasonable hypothesis of their innocence. Consequently, the judgment was reversed and dismissed, with concurrence from Koontz, C.J. and Coleman, J.
