Davis v. Commonwealth

Citations: 381 S.E.2d 11; 8 Va. App. 291; 5 Va. Law Rep. 2621; 1989 Va. App. LEXIS 69Docket: Record No. 1274-87-3

Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia; June 6, 1989; Virginia; State Appellate Court

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Kenneth Palestine Davis was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .10 percent or more, as determined by a chemical test, under Code 18.2-266(i). On appeal, he raised two main issues: whether the Commonwealth proved his BAC was at or above the legal limit while driving, and whether he could present evidence of his condition at the time of the incident. The incident occurred on November 24, 1986, when Davis's truck rear-ended another vehicle. Witness John Hines reported that Davis did not smell of alcohol and was polite, while Davis admitted to having one beer earlier in the day. After a field sobriety test, he was arrested and tested later that evening, yielding a BAC of .10 percent.

Davis conceded he was driving and that the blood test complied with legal procedures but challenged its accuracy, arguing it did not reflect his BAC at the time of driving due to inherent test variabilities. He intended to present evidence of his actual condition at the time of the accident, claiming the incident was due to faulty brakes rather than alcohol impairment. However, the trial court precluded him from introducing evidence regarding his condition at the time of the accident, deeming it not relevant, but allowed for discussion on the accuracy of the blood test's results during the trial.

At trial, the court reaffirmed its previous ruling, clarifying that because Davis was charged under Code 18.2-266 (i) for having a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more, evidence regarding his condition at the time of the accident was deemed irrelevant. The court determined that the trial focused solely on whether the blood test complied with Code 18.2-268 and whether Davis had a blood alcohol level of 0.10% or more at the time of testing. Davis’ vague references to his condition complicated the court's evaluation of his motion. The court established that a conviction under Code 18.2-266 (i) requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Davis was driving the truck and that the blood test results accurately indicated a blood alcohol concentration of at least 0.10%. The court adopted a "per se" interpretation of the statute, concentrating on the blood test's accuracy at the time it was conducted, rather than its correlation to Davis' condition while driving. Consequently, the court did not consider whether Davis was driving under the influence of alcohol regardless of the test results. 

An analysis of Code 18.2-266 and its legislative history reveals that it prohibits driving with a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more, while a previous version prohibited driving while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Legislative provisions allowed for certain presumptions regarding intoxication based on blood alcohol levels, though these presumptions were not definitive and could be challenged by evidence. The text highlights the variability in manifestations of intoxication among individuals, indicating that assessments of whether a person was under the influence cannot rely solely on objective measures, but must consider the overall evidence presented. This complexity underscores the challenges in proving or defending against intoxication charges in court.

In the 1980s, state legislatures responded to public safety concerns regarding intoxicated driving by enacting stricter laws against driving under the influence (DUI). Key elements of this legislation included the introduction of chemical tests to determine a maximum allowable blood alcohol concentration (BAC) for drivers, thereby providing an objective measure to assess intoxication. Scientific advancements revealed that BAC is influenced by various factors, such as alcohol consumption, food intake, individual physiology, and time elapsed since drinking. Courts have recognized that BAC does not uniformly correlate with the level of impairment in driving ability; thus, a BAC of .10 can affect individuals differently. Empirical evidence supports that driving ability is compromised at a BAC of .10, prompting many states to legislate against driving at or above this threshold, either as a separate offense or under DUI laws.

Significant revisions to Virginia's Code 18.2-266 began in 1984, initially prohibiting driving with a BAC of .15 or more, which was later lowered to .10 in 1986. In 1987, the code was further amended to stipulate that driving is prohibited when it impairs a driver's ability to operate a vehicle safely. These amendments aimed to create a clear regulatory framework addressing DUI through two distinct legal standards.

Code 18.2-266 (ii) prohibits driving while under the influence of alcohol, with Code 18.2-269 establishing certain presumptions to determine this influence based on chemical tests. In contrast, Code 18.2-266 (i) specifically prohibits driving with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .10 percent or more, as determined by a chemical test administered under Code 18.2-268. The presumptions in Code 18.2-269 do not apply to this offense due to a 1986 amendment, which means the focus is not on whether the driver's ability to operate a vehicle is impaired, but rather on the BAC measurement at the time of driving.

This provision is referred to as a "per se" statute, indicating that a BAC of .10 percent or more constitutes a violation. However, the term "per se" can be misleading, as it implies that the BAC measurement is definitive proof of guilt. Instead, it is a rebuttable presumption that suggests the measurement reflects the driver's BAC at the time of driving. This interpretation necessitates a connection between the test results and the alcohol consumption that occurred before or during driving.

Various court cases have explored whether additional evidence is required to correlate BAC results with driving, with some courts determining that tests conducted within specific timeframes post-driving can reliably indicate BAC at the time of driving. The analysis of these cases highlights the importance of the specific language in the relevant statutes when interpreting Code 18.2-266(i). Ultimately, this code does not prohibit driving after consuming enough alcohol to register .10 percent or more, provided the chemical test is administered according to Code 18.2-268.

The excerpt addresses the legal interpretation of Code 18.2-266(i), establishing that guilt for a per se offense is determined solely by evidence that the accused was driving with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .10 percent or higher, irrespective of the time elapsed between driving and the chemical test. The statute does not specify a time limit for administering the chemical test; however, prosecution under it requires a chemical test obtained as per Code 18.2-268(B). If alcohol is consumed after driving, the test results cannot accurately reflect the BAC at the time of driving, as they cannot differentiate between alcohol consumed before or after. The provision allows for a presumption that the BAC at the time of driving aligns with the test results, but this presumption can be challenged by the accused through evidence demonstrating insufficient alcohol consumption to reach the indicated level. Consequently, the trial court correctly ruled that evidence related to faulty brakes and the accused's condition was irrelevant to the charge under Code 18.2-266(i), as it did not dispute the accuracy of the BAC results. The question of whether the accused was "under the influence of alcohol" was not pertinent to the case.

Davis was allowed to present testimony from Dr. James C. Valentour, a toxicologist with extensive experience in blood alcohol testing, who was recognized as an expert by the Commonwealth. Dr. Valentour explained the scientific principles underlying the blood alcohol test, including how timing and quantity of alcohol consumption impact test results, asserting that tests conducted closer to the time of consumption yield results that more accurately reflect the blood alcohol concentration (BAC) at the time of driving. However, the trial court limited its consideration of Dr. Valentour's testimony to confirming the accuracy of the test results at the time they were taken and did not evaluate evidence suggesting that these results might not accurately represent Davis' BAC while driving, as per its interpretation of Code § 18.2-266(i). Consequently, the appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in not considering this relevant evidence and refrained from deciding whether Dr. Valentour's testimony sufficiently rebutted the presumption established by the BAC results. The court noted that Davis did not consume alcohol after the accident, distinguishing his case from previous rulings where post-driving consumption was a factor. The court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for retrial. Judge Benton dissented but concurred on the remand, agreeing on the need for the Commonwealth to prove the statutory requirements regarding BAC beyond a reasonable doubt but disagreeing with the majority's interpretation concerning the existence of a presumption aiding the Commonwealth’s burden of proof.

The General Assembly has not established a presumption that would relieve the Commonwealth of its responsibility to prove all elements of the offense under Code 18.2-266(i). While the Assembly could have created a rebuttable presumption, it did not, as evidenced by its clear language in other statutes like Code 18.2-269. The intent of the General Assembly appears to require proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without relying on presumptions. The Commonwealth must demonstrate that the accused had a blood alcohol concentration of .1 at the time of driving, not merely at the time of a subsequent blood test. Evidence from the chemical test, administered at 10:17 p.m., must be linked to the driver's condition prior to the incident at 9:00 p.m. The defendant should be allowed to present evidence regarding his observable condition at the time of driving, as it is relevant to assessing the accuracy of the blood alcohol test results. Such evidence could indicate whether the test accurately reflected the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of the accident, which is a crucial aspect of the prosecution's case. Therefore, the trial judge erred in excluding the defendant's evidence concerning his condition at the time of the accident.

A jury may reasonably determine that a defendant's blood alcohol content (BAC) was .10% at the time of driving based on the totality of circumstances. Evidence relevant to whether a subsequent BAC reading accurately reflects the defendant's level when driving is crucial and admissible. However, symptoms of intoxication must be presented carefully to avoid prejudice, as confusion between the .10% offense and general driving under the influence could mislead the jury. The trial court must provide clear instructions to prevent such confusion. Although a reversal of the conviction and a remand for a new trial is warranted, there should be no presumption relieving the Commonwealth of its burden to prove facts beyond a reasonable doubt. Additionally, Virginia Code 18.2-268(B) establishes that anyone operating a vehicle on public highways consents to blood or breath testing if arrested for specific violations, with procedures for admissibility outlined. Compliance with this code is not contested in this case, but chemical test results do not presume guilt; the Commonwealth must also prove the defendant was operating a vehicle. The suggestion is made that a law prohibiting driving after consuming alcohol sufficient to reach a BAC of .10% could address proof issues, but enacting such legislation is a legislative responsibility, not a judicial one.