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Wilson v. State
Citations: 352 S.E.2d 618; 181 Ga. App. 435; 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 2541Docket: 72959
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; January 5, 1987; Georgia; State Appellate Court
Appellant Wilson was convicted of robbery and kidnapping and is appealing the trial court's rulings. Key issues in the appeal include: 1. **In-Court Identification**: The trial court permitted the victim to identify Wilson in court. Wilson argues this identification was tainted by an impressibly suggestive pre-trial confrontation. However, the court found that the identification process, where the victim was asked to identify the perpetrator among a group of similar-looking individuals, was not suggestive. Even if it had been, the victim's in-court identification was deemed reliable based on an independent basis. 2. **Sixth Amendment Violation**: Wilson contends that the admission of testimony regarding the victim's pre-trial identification violated his Sixth Amendment rights due to the absence of defense counsel at the identification. The court distinguished this case from Moore v. Illinois, stating that no preliminary hearing occurred where adversary proceedings were initiated. Instead, the case was transferred to juvenile court, meaning Wilson’s rights were not violated as no critical stage was missed. The court upheld the trial court's decisions, indicating no errors in allowing the identification evidence. Appellant was not bound over to the superior court until after a juvenile court hearing and subsequent indictment. The pre-trial identification occurred before a critical stage of the criminal proceeding and did not involve defense counsel, thereby not violating the appellant's Sixth Amendment rights. The court found no constitutional error in admitting evidence of the pre-trial identification. Appellant also contested the District Attorney's closing argument, claiming it referenced facts not in evidence. However, the argument was based on inferences from the appellant's own statements to law enforcement, which is permissible during closing arguments as long as it is reasonably suggested by the evidence. The court upheld this practice, distinguishing it from a prior case where there was no evidentiary basis for the prosecutor's remarks. During redirect examination of the investigating officer, appellant objected to questions about irrelevant testimony and the officer's qualifications. These objections were overruled, as the officer was qualified as an expert and the questions were relevant due to appellant's cross-examination. Although part of the officer's answer could be seen as exceeding the question's scope, no timely objection was made regarding its responsiveness. Consequently, the admissibility of the officer's testimony was not preserved for appellate review. The judgment was affirmed.