McLeod v. Piggly Wiggly Carolina Co.

Citations: 313 S.E.2d 38; 280 S.C. 466; 1984 S.C. App. LEXIS 365Docket: 0083

Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina; February 21, 1984; South Carolina; State Appellate Court

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In the case of McLeod v. Piggly Wiggly Carolina Co., the South Carolina Court of Appeals addressed a Workers' Compensation claim filed by David G. McLeod, which had been approved by the Industrial Commissioner, the Full Commission, and the Circuit Court. The employer and its insurance carrier appealed this decision. The court affirmed part of the lower courts' rulings, reversed others, and remanded the case.

A key issue in the case was whether an employer-employee relationship existed at the time of McLeod's injury, a jurisdictional requirement for Workers' Compensation claims. The determination of this relationship is based on a preponderance of the evidence. McLeod, who had a congenital defect (spina bifida), previously worked jobs that required heavy lifting but only experienced one back issue across those roles. He sustained injuries from two car accidents in 1960 and 1973, with the latter causing him to miss work and receive a settlement.

In May 1974, McLeod missed work again due to back pain from lifting steel, but he recovered fully. He began working for Piggly Wiggly in May 1975, omitting crucial details about his medical history, including his birth defect and prior injuries, on his employment application. Relying on these misrepresentations, Piggly Wiggly hired him. McLeod injured his back three years later while lifting a heavy box, having efficiently met production quotas without prior complaints.

The court distinguished this case from a previous ruling (Givens v. Steel Structures) where the claimant was denied benefits due to false representations made shortly before a similar injury. In contrast, McLeod's injury occurred years after his employment application, which the court found significant.

Three criteria must be met for a false statement in an employment application to disqualify workers' compensation benefits: 1) the employee must have knowingly and willfully misrepresented their physical condition; 2) the employer must have relied on this misrepresentation as a substantial factor in the hiring process; and 3) there must be a causal link between the misrepresentation and the injury. In this case, McLeod's false representation regarding his back condition was established. The key issue was whether Piggly Wiggly demonstrated, by a preponderance of evidence, that a causal connection existed between McLeod's misrepresentation and his injury. The hearing Commissioner, Full Commission, and Circuit Court found there was no causal connection, noting McLeod worked without injury for three years and had a history of heavy labor with minimal injuries. McLeod was determined to have a 25% partial loss of use of his back, but the evidence regarding this impairment, primarily from McLeod and a general practitioner, was deemed insufficiently expert to support the award. The court emphasized that compensation awards cannot rely on conjecture and must be based on substantial evidence. Additionally, McLeod was entitled to temporary total disability benefits from June 1, 1978, to December 6, 1978, but the basis for the December date lacked sufficient evidence. After the Circuit Court's ruling, McLeod sought to compel Piggly Wiggly to pay permanent partial disability benefits post-February 21, 1980, which the court granted. Piggly Wiggly appealed, arguing that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over the motion under Section 42-3-180, which mandates issues under the Workers' Compensation Title be submitted to the Industrial Commission first, while also allowing exceptions as provided in the Title.

Section 42-17-70 allows an award from the Commission, once affirmed on appeal, to be submitted to the Court of Common Pleas, which must render judgment in accordance with that award. Supreme Court Rule 41, Section 1(B)(9) specifies that there is no automatic stay of proceedings in such cases. Sections 42-17-60 and 42-17-70 permit the payment of weekly compensation accruing after the Commission's award date, as established in Case v. Hermitage Cotton Mills, 236 S.C. 515. The Circuit Court had the authority to hear the motion in question. The appeal of the Circuit Court order by the employer does not suspend the payment of permanent partial disability benefits awarded, as confirmed by Case v. Hermitage Cotton Mills and Section 42-9-20 of the South Carolina Code. Payments of these benefits are deemed support, similar to temporary total disability payments. The court affirmed all issues on appeal except for those concerning the extent of partial loss of use and the temporary total disability benefits, which were remanded for further factual findings. Payments on these remanded issues will not be required until thirty days after the Commission's decisions are made. The court's decision was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, with concurrence from CURETON and GOOLSBY, JJ.