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Trotter v. Debnam
Citations: 210 S.E.2d 551; 24 N.C. App. 356; 1975 N.C. App. LEXIS 2488Docket: 7410SC806
Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina; January 2, 1975; North Carolina; State Appellate Court
Appellants challenged the trial court's decision to deny their motion to quash contempt citations, claiming that the underlying order from Judge Godwin was unconstitutional. The court found this argument unpersuasive, referencing the Supreme Court's ruling in Reid v. Johnston, which established that while civil courts do not have jurisdiction over purely ecclesiastical matters due to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, they do have authority over civil, contract, and property rights arising from church disputes. The court noted that a majority of a Missionary Baptist Church's congregation can control its property, provided they adhere to the church's fundamental beliefs and practices. However, the principles from Reid were altered by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, which affirmed a civil court's role in resolving property disputes without infringing on church doctrine. The North Carolina Supreme Court, in Atkins v. Walker, acknowledged these changes but maintained that civil courts must adjudicate property rights involving church property. The court concluded that the appellants' assertion that the case involved ecclesiastical issues, rendering the Godwin order void, was unfounded. Pleadings are deemed justiciable in civil courts, and Judge Godwin's order does not infringe on Atkins. Appellants argue that the order is unconstitutional as it imposes monetary payments for worship rights. However, since the appeal was not based on these payment provisions, the validity of those terms is not addressed. Appellants claim the contempt citations should be quashed because they were not served with Judge Godwin's order and are not parties to the action. According to G.S. 1A-1, Rule 65(d), injunctions must specify the reasons, be clear in terms, and apply only to the parties involved and those with actual notice. The court finds that appellants had both actual and constructive notice of the order prior to the alleged conduct on April 14, 1974. Although appellants assert they are not parties or associated with any named parties, the appellees argue that the lack of exceptions to the order implies acceptance of its findings. The appeal does raise the question of whether the appellants were in "active concert or participation" with the parties, which is necessary for contempt findings under Rule 65(d). The trial court failed to make such a finding, necessitating the vacating of the order and remanding the case for a new hearing. The decision to remand is agreed upon by Judges Vaughn and Arnold.