Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina; May 18, 1999; North Carolina; State Appellate Court
In the case Green Tree Financial Servicing Corp. v. Elijah B. Young d/b/a E.B. Young. Sons, Green Tree Financial, as the plaintiff-appellant, sought possession of a mobile home after the owner, Linda Burnette, abandoned it. Brunson Housing Center had initially sold the mobile home to Burnette and assigned the security interest to Green Tree. After Burnette's abandonment, Brunson obtained a judgment for possession and requested Young to remove the mobile home. Young, with a subcontractor, removed the home without communicating with Burnette. Young stored the mobile home and later asserted a lien for towing and storage upon Green Tree's attempt to reclaim it. Following a trial, the court ruled in favor of Young, awarding $4000 for the lien. Green Tree appealed, arguing that the trial court failed to find sufficient facts to support its conclusions. The appellate court clarified that under Rule 52(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, while the trial court must find material facts, it is not required to detail all evidentiary facts. The court determined that the trial court's findings were adequate, confirming that Green Tree held a perfected security interest in the mobile home while Young had a superior towing and storage lien under N.C.G.S. Section 44A-2.
Green Tree contends that the trial court’s findings, labeled as findings of fact, are actually legal conclusions, a position the court agrees with. The trial court did not establish factual support for its claim that Young. Sons has a towing and storage lien. However, since the facts are undisputed, the sole inference is that Young. Sons holds a lien on the mobile home, as established in Harris, 91 N.C.App. at 150. Green Tree argues for the dismissal of the lien, asserting that Young. Sons lacked evidence of a contract as mandated by N.C. Gen. Stat. 44A-2(d), which grants a lien to those towing or storing vehicles under an express or implied contract with the vehicle's owner. Both parties acknowledge the relevance of this statute, which classifies mobile homes as motor vehicles.
It is undisputed that Burnette, the mobile home's owner, did not have a contract with Young. Sons. However, it is also undisputed that Brunson, following a Judgment of Summary Ejectment and writ of possession, became the legal possessor of the mobile home. Young. Sons admits it did not expect Brunson to cover the towing and storage fees, anticipating instead that the owner would. The court references Case v. Miller and State v. Davy, which established that a towing or storage company can secure a lien under similar circumstances involving an implied contract with a legal possessor, such as a sheriff. The court finds no reason to deviate from this precedent and thus affirms the decision, with Judges Walker and Hunter concurring.
