Ellis v. Oliver

Citations: 515 S.E.2d 268; 335 S.C. 106; 1999 S.C. App. LEXIS 48Docket: 2960

Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina; March 15, 1999; South Carolina; State Appellate Court

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Michael Anthony Ellis, now deceased, initiated a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. David Oliver following injuries sustained in a 1988 car accident. After Ellis's death, his wife, Deborah Scott Ellis, substituted as the personal representative of his estate and amended the complaint to include wrongful death and survival actions. The trial court initially awarded Mrs. Ellis $411,102 for the survival action and $288,898 for the wrongful death action. However, following a settlement Mrs. Ellis reached with Richland Memorial Hospital for $140,000, Dr. Oliver sought a reduction of the jury award by that settlement amount. 

The trial court initially did not address Dr. Oliver's motion during the appeal process. Once the supreme court upheld the jury's verdict, the trial court subsequently granted the set-off, reducing the award by the settlement amount. Mrs. Ellis appealed this decision, arguing that the trial court improperly allowed Dr. Oliver’s set-off motion without adhering to procedural rules and claimed that the set-off was not warranted as there was no risk of double recovery. 

The court referenced South Carolina Code § 15-38-50, which allows for a reduction of claims against other tortfeasors by the amount received in a settlement with one tortfeasor, affirming the trial court's application of this statute in reducing the jury's award.

The court's interpretation of S.C.Code Ann. § 15-38-50 focuses on discerning and implementing legislative intent, prioritizing practical and fair interpretations aligned with the lawmakers' purpose. The statute lacks detailed procedural guidelines for claiming a set-off, which raises the question of whether the set-off arises automatically by law or requires a timely motion from the entitled party. The statute outlines the effects of releases or covenants when multiple parties are liable for the same injury but does not specify when rights under it must be asserted.

In the case of Broome v. Watts, the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that a statutory set-off is a mandatorily applied measure rather than an affirmative defense needing to be pleaded by the benefitting party. This ruling indicates that set-offs mandated by statute do not require establishment by the party benefiting from them. When South Carolina lacks direct precedent, courts may reference decisions from other jurisdictions. Similar statutes have been interpreted to allow set-offs to occur by operation of law, as seen in Cleere v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., where the court held that settlement credits are managed by the court, similar to mathematical calculations in comparative negligence cases.

The North Carolina Court of Appeals determined that amendments to settlements should be made to serve justice, specifically allowing for the deduction of settlement amounts from jury awards. In Biro v. Fairmont Gen. Hosp., the court identified methods for applying settlement credits against verdicts in cases involving joint tortfeasors: informing the jury of the settlement amount for deduction from damages, withholding settlement references until after the verdict for later application against the judgment, or stipulating the settlement as a credit. The Tenth Circuit's decision in Parker v. O'Rion Industries emphasized the trial court's duty to reduce tort judgments by settlement amounts when relevant only for damage reduction.

In the present case, the court affirmed that Mrs. Ellis's release of Richland Memorial automatically reduced the judgment against Dr. Oliver under § 15-38-50, without requiring a motion under civil procedure rules. Mrs. Ellis argued that the trial court erred in finding both defendants liable for the "same injury," claiming separate claims were brought and that her settlement with Richland Memorial did not pertain to wrongful death. The court disagreed, clarifying that all claims were based on the same factual circumstances. Although the measures of damages differ between wrongful death and survival actions, the statute's definition of injury encompasses all damages arising from the joint negligence of the defendants. Thus, the trial court's application of § 15-38-50 was upheld.

Mrs. Ellis argues that the trial court incorrectly applied § 15-38-50, claiming the doctrine of set-off did not prevent double recovery in her case. She points out that she did not present the medical expenses related to the alleged negligence of Richland Memorial during the trial and asserts that the jury's verdict against Dr. Oliver did not consider her medical bills or the settlement with Richland Memorial. The court's application of the settlement credit was required by statute, which does not allow for judicial discretion in cases where a good faith release has been executed between a plaintiff and joint tortfeasors. Mrs. Ellis did not indicate she was barred from presenting the total medical expenses to the jury. While acknowledging that strict adherence to the statute could produce undesirable results, the court maintains that any necessary changes should be made by the legislature, as the appellate court's role is limited to interpreting and enforcing legislative intent. Consequently, the trial court's decision is affirmed, with concurrence from the judges Howell and Anderson.