You are viewing a free summary from Descrybe.ai. For citation and good law / bad law checking, legal issue analysis, and other advanced tools, explore our Legal Research Toolkit — not free, but close.

White v. State

Citations: 247 S.E.2d 536; 146 Ga. App. 810; 1978 Ga. App. LEXIS 2539Docket: 55511

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; July 3, 1978; Georgia; State Appellate Court

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil
Dr. White was convicted on six counts for prescribing controlled substances without legitimate medical purpose, violating the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed the convictions on Counts 1 and 2 due to the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the law of entrapment, which was relevant to those counts. The facts indicated that two undercover GBI agents pressured White into writing prescriptions by posing as patients, with one agent allegedly physically obstructing him and demanding drugs. White admitted he did not have a legitimate medical purpose for two prescriptions written for an absent individual but denied that the other four prescriptions were inappropriate.

For Counts 3 through 6, the court affirmed the convictions since White did not contest the legitimacy of those prescriptions, thus entrapment was not applicable. The court also ruled that entrapment was not a legal issue warranting a directed verdict. Furthermore, the court dismissed White's argument regarding the agents' use of aliases, stating it did not justify suppression of evidence. A juror's inquiry about "duress" was addressed by the court, which stated that duress isn't a valid defense, and White did not request or object to the omission of a duress charge, precluding him from raising this issue on appeal. Finally, White's claim regarding the admission of certain testimony was not considered because he failed to specify the relevant portion of the transcript.

White's counsel did not object to the trial court's limitations on his arguments to the jury, and his appellate objection is not subject to review. The trial court defined "legitimate medical purpose" as relating to alleviating physical pain or correcting physical problems, which White contends was erroneous for not including mental depression treatment. Although this omission is acknowledged, it is deemed not to constitute reversible error since the equivalent language White requested was also lacking in the court's instructions. White's claim that the charge was harmful for not including specific language about reasonable doubt and lawful medical ends is rejected, as the court adequately addressed mens rea and reasonable doubt in its own wording. White's counsel did not object to the court's alleged prejudicial statements, and the jury was instructed to rely solely on evidence. Hence, no reversible error was found. Furthermore, White's attorney accepted the court's handling of voir dire and cannot raise objections on appeal. The court's oral announcement of a sentence contingent on the revocation of White's medical license was not reflected in the written judgment; however, this discrepancy is considered a harmless error. The judgment is reversed in part and affirmed in part, with judges Deen and Banke concurring.