Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; May 24, 1982; Georgia; State Appellate Court
Hosea Lorenzo Williams was convicted of operating a vehicle after his driver's license was revoked as an "habitual violator" and of leaving the scene of an accident. His appeal followed the denial of his motion for a new trial. The defense acknowledged that Williams had been declared an habitual violator since 1975 and was still under that order on the date of the incident, July 18, 1980. The jury's factual determination focused on whether Williams was driving a rented Buick that collided with another vehicle. Testimony from the other driver indicated a near head-on collision, during which he was injured. Witnesses reported seeing an unidentified black male at the scene who suggested that Williams was the driver, which was permitted under the res gestae exception to hearsay.
Evidence found in the Buick included documents addressed to Williams and a rental agreement in his wife’s name. A lookout was issued for Williams, who was found nearby at a bingo parlor shortly after the accident, wearing a flowered shirt and appearing disoriented. An expert analysis of the accident scene suggested that the driver had struck the vehicle's rearview mirror, with physical evidence supporting this conclusion. Williams claimed ownership of a briefcase with cash found in the car and tomatoes, which a bingo parlor customer confirmed he had received shortly before the incident. Williams claimed that the charges against him were politically motivated.
The defendant denied being the driver of a stolen Buick involved in an accident, claiming he was at a bingo parlor at the time and had sustained a head injury shortly before his arrest. Four witnesses supported his account, but none reported the car theft to the police, and an accident report submitted by his son did not mention it, instead naming an employee as the driver. A nurse who examined the injury noted it required sutures, but the defense presented photographs from the day after the accident that showed no visible injury. However, the photographer admitted to falsifying a receipt related to the photographs' date. The defendant did not contest the evidence for the "hit and run" charge but argued against the habitual violator conviction, raising procedural issues. The record indicated that the defendant was declared a habitual violator in 1975 and prohibited from driving until legally restored. A 1980 court order allowed reinstatement of his license after the suspension expired. The applicable law transitioned from a 1972 statute, which vested habitual violator authority in the courts, to a 1975 statute that transferred this authority to the Department of Public Safety, authorizing felony charges for driving while revoked. The indictment against Williams referenced the 1975 statute, charging him with driving without a valid license after having been declared an habitual violator.
The defendant cannot be convicted of being an habitual violator since he was not designated as such by the Department of Public Safety, and his driver's license was not revoked under the 1975 statute. The earlier 1972 statute has been completely repealed, and even if it were still in effect, its sanctions would not apply because the court order prohibiting the defendant from driving was rescinded before the incident. The state’s reliance on an Attorney General's opinion (Opinion No. 80-94) is misplaced, as it does not address the applicability of felony convictions under the 1975 statute for someone whose habitual violator status was rescinded. Additionally, opinions from the Attorney General are not binding on the court. A stipulation made by defense counsel regarding the defendant’s prosecution under the 1975 statute is deemed null and void, as attorneys can only bind clients on factual matters, not legal conclusions. The evidence shows the defendant was not in violation of either statute at the time of the collision. The court appropriately allowed testimony from three bystanders about an unknown person’s comment identifying the driver, as these statements were made shortly after the event and the witnesses had no vested interest in the case outcome. Consequently, the habitual violator conviction is reversed, while the conviction for leaving the scene is affirmed. The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, with concurring opinions from Birdsong, J., and McMurray, P. J.
