Childress v. Yadkin County

Citations: 650 S.E.2d 55; 186 N.C. App. 30; 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1979Docket: COA06-1467

Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina; September 18, 2007; North Carolina; State Appellate Court

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Delbert Chris Childress and others (plaintiffs) appeal a summary judgment favoring Yadkin County and Jerry Bryant (defendants) regarding the rezoning of Bryant's property from rural agriculture to restricted residential. Bryant filed a petition on December 29, 2004, for approximately 51 acres in Boonville Township, which was initially recommended for denial by the Yadkin County Planning Board during a meeting on January 10, 2005. Following public notice and a hearing on February 21, 2005, the Yadkin County Board of Commissioners approved the rezoning by a 3-2 vote.

Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a complaint claiming the rezoning constituted illegal spot or contract zoning. Defendants denied the allegations, with Bryant countersuing for harassment. On April 19, 2005, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction against the rezoning. Both parties then sought summary judgment, which resulted in the trial court granting the defendants' motion and denying the plaintiffs’. The court considered an affidavit from County Manager Cecil Wood, which detailed public support and opposition at various meetings, along with the Planning Board's repeated recommendations against the rezoning. Ultimately, the Board voted to approve the rezoning petition. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.

Plaintiffs submitted multiple affidavits opposing the defendants' summary judgment motion and supporting their own motion. Delbert Chris Childress, one of the plaintiffs, stated that the defendants did not provide evidence of adequate water and sewer systems for the proposed subdivision and claimed the Board failed to justify its re-zoning decision against the Planning Board's opposition. Other affidavits asserted that the re-zoning was not in the community's best interest, would alter the surrounding area's character, and would increase local traffic. The plaintiffs raised two issues for review: (1) whether the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on the illegal spot zoning claim, and (2) whether it erred regarding illegal contract zoning. The court reviews summary judgment grants de novo, determining if there are any genuine material facts in dispute. Zoning decisions typically receive deference, and the burden of proving invalidity rests with the challenger, unless spot zoning is involved, where the zoning authority must demonstrate a reasonable basis for the action. The plaintiffs contended that the trial court wrongly ruled that the re-zoning was not illegal spot zoning. Spot zoning is defined as a zoning change that targets a small tract owned by one individual, imposing different restrictions compared to the surrounding area. In North Carolina, such zoning is not inherently invalid if the authority shows a reasonable basis for the distinction. The plaintiffs only made a general assertion of spot zoning and challenged the Board's rationale, but before assessing the reasonableness of the Board's decision, it must first be determined whether spot zoning occurred in this case.

To assess whether spot zoning has occurred, a court evaluates three factors: (1) the size of the re-zoned tract; (2) its surrounding area; and (3) the nature of restrictions imposed on the tract compared to those on the surrounding area. In this case, the defendants argue that the property is not a small tract, but prior rulings indicate that a 50-acre tract can qualify as small for spot zoning analysis. Defendant Bryant's property, being similar in size, meets this first criterion. 

Regarding the second factor, plaintiffs claim that Bryant's property is enveloped by a larger area uniformly zoned as rural agriculture, while defendants cite numerous non-rural agricultural classifications nearby. However, a map shows that within a one-mile radius, the area surrounding Bryant's tract is primarily uniformly zoned rural agriculture, supporting the plaintiffs' position.

The third factor examines whether re-zoning imposes greater restrictions on the small tract or relieves it from restrictions present in the surrounding area. The court notes that while re-zoning typically alters restrictions, it is essential to interpret this factor carefully. In the precedent case, Good Neighbors, spot zoning was established when a tract was re-zoned from a highly restrictive classification to a much less restrictive one. In contrast, the current re-zoning maintains protections by designating the area as restricted residential, which prohibits light or heavy industry and requires adequate infrastructure, thereby offering more safeguards to neighboring agricultural properties than the prior zoning in Good Neighbors.

The minimum lot size for residences in both restricted residential and residential agricultural zones is set at thirty thousand (30,000) square feet in the absence of public water and sewer systems. Defendant Bryant's property remains subject to these restrictions. Single-family homes are permitted in both rural agricultural and residential restricted zoning districts, indicating that the third element of spot zoning is not satisfied. As a result, the Board's decision is valid, and plaintiffs failed to challenge this presumption, providing a legitimate basis for the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

Even if spot zoning occurred, the Board had a reasonable basis for its decision. Relevant factors for assessing this include: 1) the size of Bryant's property (approximately fifty-one (51) acres, considered a 'small tract'); 2) compatibility with the existing comprehensive zoning plan, supported by an affidavit from County Manager Wood, acknowledging the inevitability of residential subdivision development as the County transitions from rural to mixed-use; 3) a benefits versus detriments analysis, which examines the effects on the property owner, neighbors, and the community, requiring more than just the absence of detriment.

Wood's affidavit aligns with the County's zoning ordinance, which allows for the re-zoning of rural agricultural land to residential classifications to facilitate compatible subdivision development. Thus, it is concluded that the re-zoning is compatible with the County's comprehensive plan, favoring the defendants. The benefits versus detriments factor is guided by recent case law, emphasizing the need to show both positive and negative impacts on the surrounding community rather than merely proving a lack of detriment.

Numerous and flexible factors guide judicial balancing of interests in zoning decisions. The Good Neighbors Court, referencing Chrismon, restricted its analysis to three specific areas, ruling that benefits to the town, such as an increased tax base, were not relevant. The Chrismon Court emphasized the importance of considering the broader benefits of rezoning for the surrounding community and the public interest, rather than focusing solely on advantages or disadvantages for individual landowners. It highlighted that local governments are tasked with making decisions in the interest of public health, safety, and welfare. Thus, the review of zoning cases should encompass the overall impact on the entire county, not just the immediate vicinity.

In the current case, defendant Bryant acknowledged potential detriments to neighbors due to increased population density and traffic from the rezoning. However, Bryant argued that similar traffic concerns would arise regardless of whether site-built homes or manufactured homes were placed on the property, as both are permissible uses under current zoning. Without rezoning, the property could be subdivided into multiple lots, allowing for the potential placement of over 40 manufactured homes with minimal road requirements. Conversely, rezoning to residential restricted would permit a major subdivision with stricter planning requirements, allowing for fewer site-built or modular homes but with necessary road improvements. Concerns regarding water and sewer services would apply to both types of housing, indicating that the proposed development may not substantially detract from community interests.

Building homes for the community on Bryant's property offers advantages over placing forty manufactured homes, as the latter would avoid road specifications and Board oversight. Restricted residential zoning requires Board approval for subdivision and adherence to North Carolina road standards, limiting development to stick-built and modular homes. In contrast, rural agricultural zoning permits a variety of home styles, including different manufactured homes, promoting consistent subdivision development.

Economic conditions in the County, particularly uncertainties in the tobacco market and declining agricultural prices, have prompted farmers to seek more productive uses for their land, such as subdividing for single-family homes. This approach is expected to increase the population and attract more businesses, thereby creating additional employment opportunities.

The fourth factor examines the relationship between anticipated uses under the new zoning and adjacent land use. Rural agricultural zoning aims to maintain a rural development pattern with intermingled single-family housing and agricultural uses, while restricted residential zoning seeks to stabilize residential neighborhoods with medium density homes when adequate utilities are available. Rezoning to commercial or industrial in established residential districts is generally objectionable, but the current case involves a shift to residential use, consistent with surrounding tracts.

Both zoning districts maintain a minimum lot size of 30,000 square feet, ensuring that Bryant’s re-zoned property remains subject to the same restrictions as before. This finding supports the defendants' position. Plaintiffs reference case law to argue that the re-zoning represents a significant departure from adjacent tracts; however, the cited cases are distinguishable due to their context of re-zoning from agricultural to industrial use, which conflicted with surrounding residential and agricultural uses.

Budd does not apply to this case, as the property remains residential rather than being re-zoned for commercial or industrial purposes. Good Neighbors is also unconvincing since it involves a shift from rural to industrial uses. The factors relevant to spot zoning favor the defendants, demonstrating that: 1) the re-zoning will benefit community growth regulation; 2) Bryant's property aligns with the County's comprehensive plan; and 3) restricted residential zoning is compatible with surrounding areas. The re-zoning from rural to restricted residential does not constitute the significant change present in Good Neighbors, affirming that the Board and County had a reasonable basis for the re-zoning, thus rejecting plaintiffs' claims of illegal spot zoning.

Regarding contract zoning, plaintiffs argue that a contract was formed based on Bryant's testimony and the Board's decision. However, plaintiffs admitted they had no direct evidence of a specific bargain, undermining their claims. They inconsistently argue both that the Board acted without reasonable basis and that detailed information implies a contract, which is contradictory. 

Plaintiffs assert that zoning boards must make factual findings to justify their decisions, citing Good Neighbors. However, the referenced language indicates a requirement to consider evidence of property use rather than establishing an absolute obligation to make findings. The minutes from the Board meeting confirm that the impact of the re-zoning was considered. When acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, zoning boards are required to make factual findings, as established in Devaney v. City of Burlington.

A re-zoning decision is classified as a legislative act, and the trial court's role during a summary judgment motion does not include making findings of fact or conclusions of law. The plaintiffs' argument regarding the Board's consideration of the relevant Chrismon factors is dismissed. Additionally, although the plaintiffs won a preliminary injunction, such findings are not binding as 'the law of the case' for other proceedings, nor do they affect the final hearing outcomes. The court concludes that the Board did not engage in spot zoning regarding defendant Bryant's property, and even if it had, such zoning would not be considered illegal. Furthermore, there was no instance of contract zoning by the defendants. All remaining arguments from the plaintiffs are rejected, leading to the affirmation of the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Judges Elmore and Geer concur.