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Meridy v. State
Citations: 594 S.E.2d 378; 265 Ga. App. 440; 2004 Fulton County D. Rep. 314; 2004 Ga. App. LEXIS 40Docket: A03A2578
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; January 13, 2004; Georgia; State Appellate Court
Tory Meridy was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and appealed, arguing insufficient evidence and a denial of his motion for a directed verdict. The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the conviction, stating the standard of review for a directed verdict motion aligns with assessing the sufficiency of evidence for a conviction. During a search warrant execution at James Meridy's house, officers discovered over 28 grams of cocaine based on a tip from a confidential informant. Co-defendant Derrick Burns testified against Tory Meridy, stating he sold cocaine for James Meridy, Tory's brother, and that they often divided cocaine deliveries. On the day of the search, Tory Meridy was observed cutting cocaine in the living room and had hidden cocaine on his person. Officers found multiple bags of cocaine throughout the residence, including under cushions and scattered on the floor. Two tested bags yielded a total of 29.32 grams with varying purity levels. Meridy's motion for acquittal was denied, and the jury was instructed on trafficking, possession with intent to distribute, and the definition of a party to a crime, ultimately convicting him of trafficking. Meridy contends that the evidence was inadequate to support his conviction for possession of at least 28 grams of cocaine, as the state allegedly only demonstrated he possessed approximately 22 grams found in the living room, with no evidence linking him to an additional 7 grams located in another room. The indictment against Meridy and his co-defendants charged them with possessing 28 grams or more of cocaine or a mixture with at least 10% purity, per OCGA § 16-13-31(a)(1). The statute allows for conviction based on both actual and constructive possession. Actual possession entails direct physical control, while constructive possession involves the power and intention to control an item without direct possession. Witness Burns testified that the Meridy brothers regularly purchased and sold cocaine, with Tory Meridy cutting and distributing it prior to police intervention. He indicated that Tory often concealed his share of the cocaine on James Meridy’s property, including under the sofa where Meridy was sitting that day. This testimony was corroborated adequately, leading to a conclusion that evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find Tory Meridy guilty of actual possession of the cocaine in the living room and joint constructive possession of the cocaine in James's bedroom, or at least as a party to the crime. Meridy also argued that his motion for a directed verdict should have been granted, claiming the conviction relied solely on uncorroborated co-defendant testimony. For a felony conviction based on an accomplice's testimony, independent corroboration is required, which can be circumstantial. Corroborating evidence, such as Sampson's observation of Meridy's location and the cocaine discovered near him, along with the cocaine in plain view where he had been cutting it, was deemed sufficient. Given that only minimal corroboration is necessary to connect Meridy to the crime, the denial of his motion for a directed verdict was upheld, affirming the judgment.