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Aebischer v. Stryker Corp.
Citations: 535 F.3d 732; 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16427; 2008 WL 2941172Docket: 07-1954
Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; August 1, 2008; Federal Appellate Court
Lenore Aebischer underwent hip replacement surgery in December 1997, with her doctor estimating the prosthetic device would last 15 to 20 years. However, by early 2001, she experienced pain and difficulties with mobility. Initial evaluations did not reveal the cause, but by January 2002, her doctor diagnosed her with osteolysis due to wear from the prosthetic. Despite being advised that she needed a replacement, Aebischer delayed surgery until June 2003, when her doctor discovered severe deterioration of the implant. Following this, Aebischer filed a lawsuit against Howmedica and Stryker on April 14, 2005, nearly two years post-surgery, alleging product defects. The district court dismissed her case, citing Illinois' two-year statute of limitations, asserting Aebischer was aware of potential wrongful causation by January 2002. The Seventh Circuit Court reversed this decision, stating that the statute of limitations should have begun when Aebischer realized her injury might have been wrongfully caused, which a jury could determine to be within the two-year period before her filing. The case was remanded for trial. Under Illinois law, personal injury lawsuits must generally be filed within two years of the injury (735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-202). However, if the injury is not immediately discoverable, the two-year period begins when the victim either discovers the injury and its wrongful cause or has enough information to prompt a reasonable person to investigate. In this case, the district court determined that Aebischer was on inquiry notice by January 2002, when her doctor indicated that she had osteolysis and related issues with her prosthesis. Aebischer did not file her lawsuit within two years of this date, leading the court to rule her claim was time-barred. Aebischer acknowledges awareness of her injury by January 2002 but argues that she only suspected wrongdoing in June 2003, after her second surgery when her doctor described her prosthetic device as failing. Typically, the determination of when a plaintiff receives inquiry notice is a factual question for the jury. The court held that a jury could only reach one conclusion, but there was enough evidence for a jury to side with Aebischer. Prior to her first surgery, her doctor had warned her of risks associated with her activity level and hip structure, which could lead a jury to believe she reasonably attributed her issues to those factors rather than to wrongdoing. Cases cited support the notion that plaintiffs are not expected to immediately recognize the wrongful cause of their injuries, especially if a non-negligent cause appears evident at the time of injury. A jury might find that Aebischer could not have recognized her implant was defective until its removal. However, a reasonable jury might also conclude that Aebischer should have been aware of the potential wrongdoing by January 2002, especially considering the early failure of her implant compared to the doctor's initial predictions. The reasonableness of Aebischer's suspicion could hinge on when her doctor considered the possibility of a product defect and whether he communicated those concerns to her. A jury may determine that the plaintiff, Aebischer, reasonably believed her hip issues stemmed from nonwrongful causes until informed otherwise by an expert, as illustrated by Clark's case. Testimony from Bonutti indicates that he found Aebischer's rapid wear unusual but did not clarify if he linked this to her activity level, socket size, or suspected a product defect before the second surgery. The extent of bone damage observed during surgery exceeded his expectations based on pre-surgery x-rays, raising questions about whether this influenced his final assessment of Aebischer's hip failure. Additionally, it is unclear if Bonutti communicated any suspicions to Aebischer prior to the surgery, as his deposition revealed inconsistencies in his recollection of discussions with her, particularly regarding the abnormal results. Given these uncertainties, a jury could reasonably conclude that Aebischer was not aware of any issues until June 2003, allowing her to file suit within the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Therefore, the district court's summary judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for trial. Notably, one of Howmedica's defenses is that Aebischer's activity level and small socket contributed to the excess wear.