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Jones v. Hudgins

Citations: 126 S.E.2d 414; 218 Ga. 43; 1962 Ga. LEXIS 423Docket: 21649

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia; May 28, 1962; Georgia; State Supreme Court

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On June 27, 1960, T. H. Jones initiated a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Gwinnett County against J. R. Rodgers and several other defendants from DeKalb County. The original petition asserted that Jones purchased land from Rodgers on December 27, 1944, but the deed prepared by Carl T. Hudgins mistakenly omitted some of the land. The error was not discovered until January 15, 1960. Jones sought reformation of the deed against Rodgers and claimed that the other defendants unlawfully cut down 145 pine trees from his property in 1956, valued at $3,850, along with a request for $5,000 in punitive damages and an injunction against future trespasses.

Rodgers did not contest the allegations, while the other defendants demurred, arguing that the Gwinnett County court lacked jurisdiction over them as DeKalb County residents. The court dismissed the petition against these defendants for lack of jurisdiction but allowed Jones to amend his petition. The amendment claimed that the defendants erected a fence encroaching on Jones's land, which they alleged was an unlawful seizure. The defendants renewed their demurrers, arguing that the amendment introduced a new cause of action, which the court accepted. Consequently, the petition was dismissed against all defendants except Rodgers, and the order noted that other grounds for demurrer had not been addressed. Jones's original petition was deemed to support a claim for recovery of timber value and punitive damages under relevant Georgia statutes.

A civil action for damages due to trespass must be filed in the county of the defendants' residence, as mandated by Art. 6, Sec. 14, Par. 6 of the State Constitution. This requirement was highlighted in cases such as Osmond v. Flournoy and Brindle v. Goswick. Additionally, equity cases should be tried in the county where the defendant resides, according to Code 2-4903. In the present case, the plaintiff sought an injunction against defendants residing in DeKalb County, which the Superior Court of Gwinnett County lacked jurisdiction to grant. The presence of a separate equitable cause of action against a resident defendant does not confer jurisdiction over nonresident defendants with distinct causes of action.

Parties may amend pleadings at any stage, but amendments introducing new and distinct causes of action or parties are only permissible if expressly allowed by law. The proposed amendment in this case sought to add a new cause of action arising over three years after the original petition, leading to the trial judge's refusal to allow it. Consequently, the Superior Court of Gwinnett County properly dismissed the petition against the demurring defendants, all of whom were residents of DeKalb County. The judgment was affirmed with unanimous concurrence from all Justices.