Wehunt v. Wren's Cross of Atlanta Condominium Ass'n

Citations: 332 S.E.2d 368; 175 Ga. App. 70; 1985 Ga. App. LEXIS 2021Docket: 69766

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; June 7, 1985; Georgia; State Appellate Court

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In the case WEHUNT v. WREN'S CROSS OF ATLANTA CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., the Court of Appeals of Georgia addressed an appeal concerning attorney fees and litigation expenses. Appellant Wehunt recorded a non-purchase money second mortgage on a condominium unit owned by Peller, who was current on his assessments at the time. Peller later failed to pay assessments, leading Wren's Cross to file a lawsuit for outstanding amounts, which became a pre-foreclosure lien on the unit.

Wehunt subsequently foreclosed on his mortgage and recorded the Deed Under Power of Sale, after which Wren's Cross demanded payment for the lien. Upon Wehunt's refusal, the association sued him, incurring additional costs. The trial court ruled in favor of Wren's Cross, affirming the validity of the pre-foreclosure lien as prior to Wehunt's mortgage and holding Wehunt jointly liable for its payment. The court ordered that reasonable attorney fees incurred would be determined in a later hearing.

A subsequent evidentiary hearing liquidated the attorney fees related to the pre-foreclosure lien at $399, with the amounts paid into court. Wehunt later filed a "Plea in Bar of Res Judicata and Estoppel by Judgment," asserting that the April order adjudicated all claims and barred further actions regarding attorney fees. The court denied this plea and scheduled a jury trial for unresolved issues, including additional attorney fees incurred in the lawsuit against Wehunt.

On May 17, 1984, a jury awarded the association $9,000, leading to a judgment by the court. Wehunt filed multiple motions, including a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a new trial, all of which were denied. The association requested that Wehunt post a supersedeas bond, which the court granted. On appeal, Wehunt contended that the court erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on general grounds. The appellate court's review focused solely on the existence of evidence supporting the jury's verdict. The record included a detailed billing summary exceeding $7,000 for legal services prior to the trial, testimonies regarding a retainer arrangement and the reasonableness of the fees, which provided sufficient evidence for the verdict regarding attorney fees and expenses.

Wehunt also argued that his amended motion for a new trial, which cited a plea of res judicata and estoppel by judgment, should have been granted. He claimed that reasonable attorney fees were fixed as of March 1, 1983, following a summary judgment order, leaving only the determination of the amount and reasonableness of those fees. The court's earlier order did not address the specific collection expenses, including attorney fees, related to the suit against Wehunt. Under OCGA 44-3-109 (b), the lien for assessments includes collection costs and reasonable attorney fees as stipulated by the condominium instruments. These collection expenses were not fully liquidated until the verdict and judgment were rendered. The trial court's denial of Wehunt's amended motion for a new trial was upheld, as the fees were deemed to accrue until the verdict was reached.

Wehunt challenges the court's judgment of $9,000, claiming it is excessively high. He argues that the judgment violates the Directory Rules of the State Bar, which outline that a lawyer should not charge an illegal or clearly excessive fee. The rules specify that a fee is considered clearly excessive if a reasonable lawyer would believe it exceeds what is reasonable based on several factors, including the time and labor required, customary local fees, results obtained, and the lawyer's experience. The court finds Wehunt's assertion of excessive judgment to lack merit based on the trial evidence.

Additionally, Wehunt argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his plea of res judicata and estoppel by judgment. Res judicata prevents relitigation of issues that were or could have been addressed in a previous case, while estoppel by judgment applies to matters actually adjudicated in earlier cases. However, the court determines that there were not two separate proceedings involving the same parties attempting to relitigate the same issues, nor was there an attempt to litigate previously adjudicated matters in a new cause of action. The court notes that the summary judgment motions did not resolve all aspects of Wehunt's obligations. Furthermore, the law of the case rule is no longer applicable, and the court can address parts of a case without waiting for full adjudication of all issues. Thus, the trial court appropriately denied Wehunt's plea, as the doctrines of res judicata and estoppel by judgment do not apply in this situation.

Wehunt argues that the court incorrectly failed to limit attorney's fees to $2,988.50 up to February 1, 1983, based on a summary of legal fees (plaintiff's exhibit 12) admitted during trial. This exhibit details fees from March 1, 1982, to May 14, 1984. The court noted that the initial order for summary judgment occurred on February 9, 1983, with an amended order on March 1, 1983, but found no judgment valid as of February 1, 1983, for limiting fees. Additionally, the exhibit does not support Wehunt's claimed fee limitation. Assuming Wehunt intended to argue fees should be limited to the March 1, 1983 order, the court had previously ruled against him.

Wehunt also contends the court erred by not applying OCGA 13-1-11 concerning attorney fees. This statute allows for a prescribed percentage of fees in certain debts, but the court determined it is inapplicable here. Wehunt's debts arise from a lien for assessments under the condominium instruments and OCGA 44-3-109(b)(3), which allows for "reasonable attorney's fees actually incurred" rather than a fixed percentage. Thus, the court concluded that OCGA 13-1-11 does not apply to this case. The judgment was affirmed, with Deen, P. J. and Pope, J. concurring.