Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina; June 7, 1983; North Carolina; State Appellate Court
Deborah A. Henderson, an employee of Cone Mills Corporation, and her minor son were covered under a group insurance policy with Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company. On December 1, 1978, Henderson signed a form to terminate her son's coverage, confirming it on her enrollment card. Cone Mills prepaid premiums for the coverage month, with deductions from employee salaries for dependents. On December 7, 1978, $11.14 was deducted from Henderson's paycheck, which the defendant claims reimbursed premiums for coverage through December 3, 1978. Henderson argues it covered from December 3 to December 17, 1978. Her son contracted spinal meningitis on December 5 and died on December 11, 1978. Henderson sought $4,113.50 for medical expenses and a $400 death benefit under the policy. The defendant asserts that coverage ended on December 3, 1978, while Henderson argues it was in effect on December 5. After a trial on December 14, 1981, the jury ruled in favor of Henderson, prompting the defendant to appeal. The defendant's motions for summary judgment were previously denied. Following the jury verdict, the defendant sought judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial, but a judgment was entered by the trial judge based on plaintiff's counsel's preparation before the defendant was aware. The appeal was filed on December 30, 1981, with a provision asserting that it did not waive the motion for judgment n.o.v. The appellate rules state that the time for filing an appeal is tolled by a timely motion, and the appeal period begins upon the entry of an order on such motions.
Defendant's motions for judgment n.o.v. and a new trial were denied on February 24, 1982, with a notice of appeal filed on March 2, 1982. The appeal record was submitted by July 19, 1982, making the case properly before the Court. The defendant's first substantive assignment of error claimed that the trial court incorrectly denied its motions for summary judgment, which were based on an affidavit from David Moff and supporting documents. The evidence indicated that the plaintiff's dependent coverage ended on December 3, 1978, while the plaintiff argued that a payroll deduction on December 7, 1978, maintained coverage through December 17, 1978. The trial judge identified a material factual dispute and thus correctly denied the motion for summary judgment. After renewing the motion on July 10, 1981, the trial judge again denied it due to the presence of genuine issues of material fact, emphasizing that the burden lies with the moving party to prove no triable issue exists.
The defendant further contended that the trial court erred in denying its motions for directed verdict and judgment n.o.v., arguing that the plaintiff's rights should be determined by the policy's written terms and that parol evidence should not alter these terms. The policy stated that dependent insurance would terminate at the end of the last contribution period. Evidence showed that premiums were paid by Cone Mills monthly, with deductions from employee paychecks for coverage. A central issue was the disputed insurance coverage period. The plaintiff testified that her dependent's coverage began in April 1977 and was maintained through deductions, specifically stating that a $11.14 premium paid on December 7, 1978, covered her son at least through December 17, 1978. The defendant's personnel director claimed coverage ended with the pay period of the change made. This conflicting evidence necessitated jury deliberation on the factual issue regarding the coverage period.
The trial judge correctly denied the defendant's motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (n.o.v.). The defendant also argued that the judge erred by denying its motion for a new trial based on improper jury arguments made by the plaintiff's attorney. During closing arguments, the plaintiff's attorney referenced a letter from the defendant to Cone Mills Corporation regarding employee coverage under a group policy, which was not in evidence and was outside the judge's presence at the time. Although the argument was deemed improper due to the use of this inadmissible letter, it was not considered prejudicial enough to warrant a new trial. The decision to grant or deny a new trial lies within the trial judge's discretion, and absent an abuse of that discretion, such rulings are not subject to appeal. The court concluded that no prejudicial error occurred and affirmed the trial judge's decisions. Judges Johnson and Phillips concurred.
