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Amisub of South Carolina, Inc. v. Passmore
Citations: 447 S.E.2d 207; 316 S.C. 112; 1994 S.C. LEXIS 176Docket: 24133
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina; July 25, 1994; South Carolina; State Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed a family court order that found Carl Passmore and York County Department of Social Services (DSS) financially responsible for the care of Beatrice Passmore, Carl's wife. In April 1992, Beatrice, who had been on a ventilator for two years, was ready for release from Piedmont Medical Center but was not discharged due to Carl's refusal to accept responsibility for her care. The hospital sought a court order for Carl to take responsibility under S.C.Code Ann. 20-7-420 or, alternatively, for DSS to assume custody under the Adult Protective Services Act. The family court initially held Carl liable for his wife's care until July 2, 1992, after which DSS was deemed responsible. The court addressed two main issues: the hospital's standing to bring the action and the family court's jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the hospital's claim against Carl, ruling that its exclusive jurisdiction applied only to alimony and child support matters, not third-party actions. Consequently, the relevant portion of the family court's order was deemed void. Regarding DSS's argument on standing, the court ruled that the hospital did have standing to bring the action against DSS, as it qualified as an "interested person" under the Adult Protective Services Act, focusing on welfare rather than altruism. DSS contended that the family court incorrectly mandated it to take on financial responsibilities for Mrs. Passmore's care. The court agreed, referencing S.C.Code Ann. 43-29-10(7), which defines "protective services" as services aimed at safeguarding an incapacitated individual, including evaluations and arrangements for living conditions and medical services. However, this statute does not assign financial obligations to DSS for the care of a protected individual. Consequently, the family court exceeded its authority in imposing such financial responsibility on DSS. The court did not need to address other issues raised, and the decision was reversed. The opinion was supported by Justices Finney, Goolsby, Littlejohn, and Shuler. Additionally, it noted that Mrs. Passmore had been given a year to live after being placed on a ventilator and passed away in September 1993. The relevant act was repealed on September 11, 1993, and replaced by the Omnibus Adult Protection Act. The family court also affirmed its jurisdiction, stating that the best interests of Mrs. Passmore warranted the continued involvement of her husband in the proceedings.