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Boyce v. Meade
Citations: 322 S.E.2d 605; 71 N.C. App. 592; 1984 N.C. App. LEXIS 3902Docket: 8414SC286
Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina; December 4, 1984; North Carolina; State Appellate Court
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants in the case of H. Spurgeon Boyce v. Sylvia Lloyd Meade and Carol Lloyd Crowell. The primary issue examined was whether a genuine issue of material fact existed, which would preclude the granting of summary judgment. The court reiterated that the moving party must demonstrate the absence of any triable issue of fact, and all evidence must be scrutinized against them. The plaintiff argued that an express trust, resulting trust, or constructive trust should exist concerning the properties in question. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed his transfer of property to his wife was intended to protect the deceased's interest due to potential legal liabilities and that an express parol trust was established with his wife as trustee. However, the court found that the evidence indicated the property would revert to the plaintiff, contradicting the notion of an express parol trust as it would undermine the deed’s explicit intention to convey absolute title. Regarding the resulting trust, the plaintiff asserted that because he financed the property purchase before title was transferred to his wife, and did not intend the conveyance as a gift, a resulting trust should be recognized. The court noted that the intention of the parties is crucial, but ultimately determined that the claims did not present a genuine issue of material fact that would survive summary judgment. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling. Plaintiff's claim to convert an unenforceable express trust into a resulting trust is unsupported by evidence, as established in Skinner v. Skinner. In that case, the court denied a wife's attempt to declare a resulting trust over property she had deeded to herself and her husband, emphasizing that she could not impose a trust on her own conveyance without evidence of fraud, mistake, or undue influence, none of which the plaintiff demonstrated. Consequently, no resulting trust exists, negating any factual issue for a jury. Additionally, the plaintiff's assertion for a constructive trust fails due to a lack of evidence showing any wrongdoing by his wife during the title conveyance. The relevant statute, G.S. 36-39(a), which was repealed in 1977, indicated a duty for an intended trustee to convey property back to the settlor only under specific circumstances, none of which were met as the wife held the title and did not refuse to perform the alleged trust before the statute's repeal. Therefore, the court found no statutory duty to reconvey the property and affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendants, allowing them to retain the rents and profits from the property.