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State v. Lance

Citations: 94 S.E.2d 335; 244 N.C. 455; 1956 N.C. LEXIS 429Docket: 1

Court: Supreme Court of North Carolina; September 19, 1956; North Carolina; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of North Carolina addressed the appeal of Albert Lance, who was indicted for violating G.S. 14-177. The indictment did not specify the ages of Lance or the victim, Cecil Henderson, who was 13 years old, while Lance was 23. Lance contended that the State should have been nonsuited because a crime against nature involving a minor under 16 should fall under G.S. 14-202.1, enacted in 1955, which he argued had repealed G.S. 14-177 for such cases. The court noted that there was no express repeal of G.S. 14-177, and emphasized that repeals by implication are generally disfavored. The court discussed the principles surrounding statutory interpretation, stating that if two statutes can coexist without conflict, both should be given effect. The ruling highlighted that a new penal statute can repeal a prior one only if it covers the same subject matter comprehensively and clearly indicates legislative intent to replace the older statute. Ultimately, the court found that the legislative intent to repeal G.S. 14-177 was not manifest, affirming that both statutes could apply without contradiction.

Legislative intent is central to determining whether one statute implicitly repeals another when there is no explicit repealing clause. Courts are tasked with uncovering this intent using established principles. A key consideration is whether the objects of both statutes are the same; if they are not, both statutes can coexist even if they address similar subjects. The excerpt discusses two North Carolina statutes: G.S. 14-177, which penalizes crimes against nature, and G.S. 14-202.1, which focuses on protecting children from sexual offenses. The latter explicitly repeals conflicting laws but does not repeal G.S. 14-177 in its entirety or serve as a substitute. The court finds that interpreting G.S. 14-202.1 as partially repealing G.S. 14-177 would lead to illogical outcomes, such as providing lesser penalties for offenses against children under 16 compared to those against adults. Ultimately, the statutes are deemed complementary rather than conflicting, allowing for both to operate concurrently. The trial court's decision is upheld, with no errors found.