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Branker v. Superior Court
Citations: 165 Cal. App. 2d 816; 332 P.2d 711; 1958 Cal. App. LEXIS 1360Docket: Civ. 5933
Court: California Court of Appeal; December 9, 1958; California; State Appellate Court
Petitioners Sol Branker et al. seek a writ of mandate from the California Court of Appeals to compel the Riverside County Superior Court to hear their motion to dissolve a temporary injunction issued in the case of Roy E. Smith v. Sol Branker et al. The superior court had previously issued a temporary restraining order on February 18, 1958, followed by an injunction pendente lite on March 27, 1958, prohibiting the defendants from handling profits from the sale of steers. The injunction did not extend to the Bank of America National Trust and Savings Association. After the order, petitioners filed a motion to dissolve the injunction, supported by affidavits, but the respondent's counsel objected, claiming the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the motion. The trial court sustained this objection, leading petitioners to file their writ of mandate on June 20, 1958. Citing Robinson v. Superior Court, the appellate court noted that trial courts are obligated to address all matters within their jurisdiction and that mandate can enforce this duty, even if the court erroneously believes it lacks such jurisdiction. The court in Temple v. Superior Court established that it cannot relinquish jurisdiction based solely on an unsubstantiated claim of lack of jurisdiction, thus obligating it to hear and determine cases. Mandate can be issued to compel a court to address the merits of a case when it has only upheld a jurisdictional objection, leaving the case unresolved. The ruling is supported by precedents like Lissner v. Superior Court and Miller v. Municipal Court. Additionally, Sontag Chain Stores Co. v. Superior Court affirms a trial court's inherent authority to modify or vacate preventive injunctions if justice requires or if there is a change in the relevant facts. The ongoing nature of such injunctions allows for modification to prevent injustice, as noted in Woods v. Corsey. In the current matter, the transcript from a May 29, 1958 hearing indicates that the motion to dissolve the temporary injunction was not evaluated on its merits due to jurisdictional objections. The court stated it would rule on jurisdiction by June 21, allowing for further submissions depending on its ruling. Ultimately, the court determined it had the jurisdiction to consider the petitioners' motion and to assess any changes in the factors regarding the injunction, thereby granting the petitioners a writ of mandate to ensure a hearing on the merits of their motion.