Marks v. Bunker

Citations: 165 Cal. App. 2d 695; 332 P.2d 340; 1958 Cal. App. LEXIS 1344Docket: Civ. 5745

Court: California Court of Appeal; December 4, 1958; California; State Appellate Court

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In the case of Emily K. Marks v. Chester R. Bunker et al., the California Court of Appeals addressed a specific performance action regarding the sale of Lot 1, Tract 2924 in San Bernardino. Plaintiff Marks claimed that defendant Peterman, the property owner, and Bunker, his agent, entered into a written agreement on September 3, 1950, to sell the property to her for $550, which she alleged was the reasonable value. Marks asserted she fulfilled her obligations under the agreement, but the defendants refused to transfer the title.

Peterman admitted ownership but denied the other allegations. Bunker did not respond, resulting in a default judgment against him. The trial court determined that Bunker was not acting as Peterman's agent and found Marks' claims to be credible. It ruled that Peterman was estopped from denying Marks' claim despite no formal estoppel being pleaded. The court ordered the defendants to convey the property or, if unable, to pay Marks $550 plus interest.

Additionally, evidence was presented regarding a 1947 agreement between Peterman and the Bunker Land Company, which allowed for the sale of lots and required a release payment for Lot 1, which had not been made. Marks testified about her purchase and payment history for the lot, while Peterman acknowledged some awareness of her purchase but claimed he only learned of her payments in 1955. The receipt book documenting Marks' payments was not formally entered into evidence, although it contained relevant information regarding the transaction terms. Peterman appealed the judgment.

Tax bills for the property in question were issued with Peterman's name removed and the plaintiff's name added; the plaintiff paid these bills from 1951 onward, but no evidence was presented regarding who sent the bills. The trial court found no evidence supporting Peterman's written agreement with the plaintiff. The evidence only indicated that the plaintiff agreed to purchase the property from the Bunker Land Company through Bunker, with no participation from Peterman. The complaint did not claim an equitable right regarding any contract between Peterman and the Bunker Land Company. As a result, the plaintiff relied solely on the doctrine of estoppel for her judgment, but did not plead estoppel in her complaint, which is typically required. The plaintiff argued that the defendant waived any objection to the estoppel evidence by not objecting to its admission; however, the record did not support this claim, as the court upheld objections to the testimony on the grounds of immateriality. The court ultimately determined that Peterman was estopped from asserting ownership due to his negligence and lack of oversight regarding Bunker’s handling of the property, thereby preventing him from defeating the plaintiff's claim to ownership. This determination rested more on legal conclusions than on factual findings, necessitating a review of both the findings and the evidence for a proper decision.

To establish an estoppel against a property owner in this jurisdiction, four conditions must be met: (1) the party to be estopped is aware of their true title, (2) there is an admission made with intent to deceive or with significant negligence equating to constructive fraud, (3) the other party lacks knowledge of the title's state and means to acquire such knowledge, and (4) the other party relies on that admission to their detriment. Peterman did not imply or represent to the plaintiff that Bunker owned the property. A vendor who puts a vendee in possession does not misrepresent the title to potential purchasers and cannot be deemed negligent. A vendee can contract to sell property they are purchasing, provided they will have title at the time of conveyance. It would be unjust to hold a vendor accountable for a vendee's resale rights. The assertion that Peterman conferred sole ownership indicia to Bunker lacks evidentiary support. A court of equity requires some misconduct before enforcing an estoppel that forfeits property rights. Turpitude may be established by intentional deceit or significant negligence but does not require designed fraud. Peterman was not obligated to oversee Bunker’s sales or warn the plaintiff about potential risks. Silence does not create an estoppel unless there is a duty to speak, which was not present here. Peterman acquired ownership of tract 2924 in 1947, and his title has been recorded since then. He complied with legal requirements by filing a Notice of Intention to Subdivide and a Subdivision Questionnaire, which were acknowledged by the State Real Estate Commissioner in a subsequent public report.

An examination of public records would have revealed Peterman's ownership of the property, as the plaintiff had access to the Real Estate Commissioner's Public Report and received tax bills indicating Peterman as the property assesse since 1951. There was no evidence that the plaintiff relied on any representations or actions by Peterman that led to the purchase agreement with Bunker. For estoppel to apply, a party must be unaware of true facts and suffer an injury based on the other party's representations. Previous cases established that a landowner's silence does not estop them from asserting title unless there is evidence of wrongdoing, which was not present in this case. The plaintiff's difficulties stemmed from Bunker's contractual dishonesty and her failure to investigate the property title adequately. A proper search of public records would have clarified the title status. Consequently, the judgment was reversed, with concurrence from judges Griffin and Shepard.