Court: California Court of Appeal; November 19, 1956; California; State Appellate Court
James Jacob Grover, a student at San Mateo Junior College, was seriously injured in a plane crash during a flight arranged and paid for by the college as part of an optional aeronautics course in which he was enrolled. The flight was operated by Harry D. Cranston, Jr., who ran a flying school. Grover sued both the college district and Cranston, resulting in a jury verdict of $100,000 against both defendants, which Grover later reduced to $75,000.
The college district appealed, focusing on the argument that Cranston was an independent contractor, for whose negligence the college should not be held liable. The court noted that the jury had found, based on evidence, that Cranston was negligent, and acknowledged the college's liability under section 1007 of the Education Code, which holds school districts accountable for injuries caused by their employees' negligence.
Key evidence included Grover's enrollment in the "Aeronautics I" course, which provided flight experience as an optional component, and the fact that grades were not contingent on participating in the flight. The course's instructor, George Van Vliet, was a college employee and had previously taken students on flights using rented planes. The court emphasized that the arrangement with Cranston was for the benefit of the students' practical education and supported the jury's finding against the college.
After 1950 or 1951, Van Vliet could no longer conduct orientation flights for students and arranged for Cranston to take over these flights, with the appellant's approval. The appellant compensated Cranston $5.00 per hour for each student, with three students per flight planned for approximately three hours. Van Vliet and Cranston agreed on the flight content to ensure practical demonstrations aligned with classroom theory, considering the cross-country flight essential. Flight schedules were coordinated among Van Vliet, the students, and Cranston, who could adjust plans based on weather conditions. Van Vliet did not accompany the flights but facilitated arrangements through a list of interested students sent to the appellant's business office, which issued work orders for the flights, followed by billing from Cranston's company.
On a particular flight involving three students, including the respondent, they communicated their preferred date to Van Vliet, who arranged it with Cranston. Although the students prepared a flight plan under Van Vliet's guidance, Cranston altered it due to adverse weather. During the flight, Cranston provided instruction and allowed students to operate the plane. Following a crash caused by Cranston's negligence, the legal question arose regarding whether Cranston was an independent contractor, thereby limiting the appellant's liability. The determination of this relationship hinges on various factors, with distinct considerations under workmen's compensation and tort law, particularly regarding the relationship between the injured party and the alleged employer.
The case centers on the relationship between a college and a student enrolled in a course that included flight training, which, while not compulsory, was a significant component of the curriculum. The college arranged and financed this training, with Cranston acting as the instructor alongside Van Vliet. Students had no choice in selecting Cranston; he was assigned by the college, which held the responsibility for selecting instructors for both the theory and flight portions of the course. The lack of income tax deductions from Cranston's pay does not negate the perception of employment from the students' perspective.
The legal debate involves whether section 1007 of the Education Code holds the district liable for the negligent acts of its "agents" as well as its "employees." The section specifies liability for the district and its officers or employees but does not explicitly mention agents. However, a broader interpretation suggests that "district" liability encompasses actions by agents, supported by the liberal construction principle outlined in section 3 of the Education Code. Notably, provisions for insurance coverage under section 1029 imply that the legislature considered agents within this liability framework.
Ultimately, the evidence indicates that Cranston was an employee of the college, as the district exercised sufficient control over him, particularly regarding the educational objectives of the flight training, rather than the technical operation of the aircraft. This control aligns with precedents that define employer-employee relationships based on the extent of control exerted.
The appellant district possessed the contractual authority to dictate the manner and subjects of discussion for Cranston during student flights. It could have specified flight routes, considering weather conditions, thereby exercising control over the operational aspects to achieve desired outcomes. This situation parallels Isenberg v. California Emp. Stab. Com., where freelance jockeys were deemed employees under the Unemployment Insurance Act due to the level of control exercised by the employers. Similarly, in Smith v. Fall River Joint Union High Sch. Dist., a school district was found to have sufficient control over a bus driver, Fitzwater, due to its right to terminate his contract at will, indicating an employer-employee relationship rather than that of an independent contractor. The appellate court emphasized that the right of control, not necessarily its actual exercise, is crucial in determining employment status. The ability to terminate the relationship without liability is intrinsically linked to the right of control. The ability of the Press Publishing Company to hire and discharge carriers conferred upon it the authority to enforce obedience to its directives, establishing a significant level of control over the drivers. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the judgment.
