Ward v. COM., DEPT. OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Citations: 408 S.E.2d 921; 13 Va. App. 144; 8 Va. Law Rep. 845; 1991 Va. App. LEXIS 254Docket: Record No. 1270-90-4

Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia; September 17, 1991; Virginia; State Appellate Court

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Elette Ward appeals the Alexandria Family Court's order terminating her residual parental rights to her son, Carlauntae Ward. The appeal raises two primary issues: (1) whether the Commonwealth demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence the predicates required by Code 16.1-283(B), and (2) whether it met the predicates of Code 16.1-283(C)(2). The Commonwealth argues that the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction, claiming the case began in the Alexandria Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court, thus requiring an appeal to the Circuit Court. Ward counters that Code 16.1-296.1, which allows appeals from experimental family courts directly to the Court of Appeals, applies. The Court ultimately rules that it has jurisdiction and that the Commonwealth provided ample evidence for the statutory requirements, affirming the Family Court's decision. The decision references the relevant statutes: Code 20-96.1, Code 17-116.05:5(1)(b), and Code 16.1-296.1, clarifying the appeal process from experimental family courts.

The Commonwealth's argument that the case was not referred by the circuit court to the family court, thus lacking appellate jurisdiction, is rejected. The term 'referred' in Code 20-96.1(B) applies to marriage annulment, divorce, and cases under the juvenile and domestic relations district courts, which includes the termination of parental rights under Code 16.1-241(A)(5). The case began in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Alexandria before the court was designated as an experimental family court; upon this designation, it transitioned to the Family Court of Alexandria. The statutes governing appeals from this court are procedural and do not grant substantive rights, indicating legislative intent for appellate jurisdiction in this matter.

The termination of Ward's residual parental rights was conducted under Code 16.1-283(B) and (C)(2). Ward argues the evidence was insufficient for termination, which requires clear and convincing proof of three factors: (1) that termination serves the child's best interests, (2) that neglect or abuse posed a serious threat to the child's well-being, and (3) that conditions leading to neglect or abuse are unlikely to be corrected in a reasonable timeframe. The appeal is evaluated favorably towards the Commonwealth, which prevailed in the trial court.

Evidence shows Ward's weekly cocaine abuse and her failure to comply with a protective order mandating participation in a substance abuse program. Despite referrals for assistance, she did not pursue treatment before the final hearing. The record details instances of neglect, including inadequate food and unsupervised care for her child Carlauntae, leading to an emergency removal order on January 25, 1989, placing the child in the custody of the Department of Social Services. At the time of removal, Carlauntae was found in poor conditions, without adequate care or necessities, highlighting the severity of Ward's substance abuse and her unsuccessful attempts at treatment.

Carlauntae's mother, referred to as Ward, missed eight meetings at the Alexandria Substance Abuse Program and provided five positive urine screens for drugs. Expert testimony from Vicki Edwards, a social worker, indicated that it was in Carlauntae's best interests to be placed in a nurturing environment, which Ward was unlikely to provide for at least another year due to her substance abuse issues. Barbara Newman, Ward’s counselor at the Alexandria Detention Center, testified that Ward had a severe substance abuse problem and would require at least two years of drug and family counseling after her release in August 1990 to resume a parenting role. The trial court found that Ward's substance abuse severely impaired her parental abilities and that she failed to engage with available treatment options, leading to the conclusion that the requirements of Code 16.1-283(B) were met.

Regarding the termination of parental rights under Code 16.1-283(C)(2), the court needed to establish that termination was in the child's best interests and that Ward had been unwilling or unable, without good cause, to remedy her situation within twelve months, despite reasonable efforts from social and rehabilitative services. The record showed that Ward did not make adequate progress, as she did not complete a substance abuse program, remained transient in her housing situation, and relied on others for basic needs. The court affirmed its findings under Code 16.1-283(C), concluding that Ward had not made substantial efforts to improve her circumstances within the designated timeframe. The judgment was affirmed.