Hill v. State

Citations: 401 S.E.2d 48; 198 Ga. App. 1; 1990 Ga. App. LEXIS 1524Docket: A90A0996

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; December 5, 1990; Georgia; State Appellate Court

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Appellant Hill was convicted of theft in a case involving a $2,500 fee paid by Anwar Ali for assistance in obtaining financing for a property sale. Although Hill attempted to arrange financing, no loan was secured, and when Ali requested a refund, Hill issued a check that bounced due to insufficient funds. Hill's appeal focuses on the denial of his motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, arguing that the State did not meet the burden of proving theft by conversion under OCGA § 16-8-4(a). The court found that Ali's payment was made in exchange for Hill's promise of future services, not under a legal obligation to apply the funds in a specific manner. The court concluded that while a breach of contract occurred, it did not rise to the level of criminal conversion as defined by the statute. Thus, the State failed to establish that Hill unlawfully converted the funds, leading to the reversal of the conviction.

Graddy contracted with the appellant to construct a laundry room for $800, paying this amount upfront. When the appellant failed to start the work, Graddy terminated the contract, and the appellant agreed to refund the payment minus $25 for materials, which he did not do. The appellant was convicted of theft by conversion, based on the premise that he was given the money under an obligation to use it for specific purposes and knowingly misappropriated it. However, four judges expressed disagreement with the precedent set in Byrd v. State, asserting that a contractor using funds for purposes other than specified may be guilty of theft by conversion. Conversely, a contractor receiving funds as consideration for future services, without a specific legal obligation regarding the application of those funds, cannot be criminally liable for theft by conversion. The judges emphasized that since the appellant did not have a contractual obligation to apply the funds in a certain way, he could not be charged with theft under OCGA. 16-8-4. Additionally, since the appellant was not a contractor and did not have any intention to deceive when accepting a fee from Ali, the state failed to prove theft by deception under OCGA. 16-8-3 (b). The only potential crime demonstrated was passing a bad check, for which the appellant was not on trial. Consequently, the conviction for theft was reversed. The dissenting opinion supported the original ruling in Byrd v. State, arguing for the correctness of the appellant's conviction.

Byrd's appeal centers on two main arguments: the denial of his motion for directed verdict of acquittal and the jury instruction regarding theft by taking under OCGA § 16-8-2. Byrd contends he was incorrectly charged, asserting that the appropriate charge should have been theft by deception per OCGA § 16-8-3 (b). He also claims there was insufficient evidence for either charge. The court rejected Byrd’s claim regarding the charging statute, affirming that the theft by taking statute is broad enough to include thefts by various methods, including deception. Citing legal precedents, the court noted that the statute's language allows for indictment under theft by taking, regardless of the specific manner of appropriation. 

Additionally, the court upheld the venue in Clayton County, noting that Byrd had control over the victim's money there, as evidenced by an arrangement made at a realtor's office and the issuance of a returned check from that location. The dissenting opinion emphasizes that the circumstances of Byrd's actions fit within the legal definitions of theft and proper venue. The dissenting judges concur with the majority's findings regarding the sufficiency of evidence and statutory applicability.