Bowden v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
Docket: Record No. 0780-89-1
Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia; February 26, 1991; Virginia; State Appellate Court
Ronald E. Bowden appeals a decision by the Industrial Commission of Virginia, which denied his workers' compensation claim for injuries sustained on October 11, 1984, while employed by Newport News Shipbuilding, Dry Dock Company. The commission found Bowden's claim was time-barred under Code § 65.1-87, which requires filing a claim within two years of the accident. Bowden contends that his receipt of compensation from the employer between October 1984 and April 1987 tolled the limitations period under Code § 65.1-87.1, thus making his application timely. He also argues that the employer's failure to file a first report of the injury, required by Code § 65.1-124, prevents them from invoking the statute of limitations.
From October 1984 to April 1987, the employer made payments under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, including a lump sum payment for permanent partial disability on April 17, 1987. After that, the employer ceased payments, prompting Bowden to apply for benefits under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act in December 1987 and February 1988. The employer did not file the first injury report with the commission until March 26, 1988, after Bowden’s applications. The commission ruled that Bowden’s claim was barred because he did not file within the two-year window. Bowden cites National Linen Service v. McGuinn to support his assertion that the employer's failure to comply with reporting requirements misled him regarding his rights to file a claim.
The case parallels the decision in Stuart Circle Hospital v. Alderson, where the Virginia Supreme Court emphasized that statutory time limits for filing claims are jurisdictional and must be strictly adhered to. In that case, the claimant argued that the employer's three-year payment of medical bills waived the two-year filing limit. However, the court found no evidence of fraud or concealment by the employer that misled the claimant about the filing deadline, thereby barring the claim. The court ruled that voluntary payments do not toll the statute of limitations. Following this, Code § 65.1-87.1 was enacted, allowing for tolling under specific conditions when an employer pays compensation without an award being entered. The claimant contended that his federal payments constituted "compensation" under this code, asserting his Virginia claim was timely. However, it was concluded that voluntary payments do not impede a claimant's right to file and that "compensation" in § 65.1-87.1 refers to payments made in lieu of an award under the Virginia Act, which were not present in this case. The relevant statutes indicate that compensation entitlements are exclusively governed by the Virginia Act, reaffirming the distinction between federal and state compensation frameworks.
Code § 65.1-87.1 does not suggest that 'compensation' encompasses payments beyond those specified in Chapter 5, such as lost wages or a percentage paid in lieu of a commission award. The absence of contrary intent indicates the legislature's intention to limit the statute's scope to prescribed payments under the Virginia Act. While the Act is to be interpreted liberally to benefit injured employees, this does not empower courts to modify or extend its provisions or to approve every claim made. If the legislature intended 'compensation' to include other sources, it would have articulated that intent clearly. The liberal interpretation of the Virginia Act does not grant courts the authority to broaden its explicit limitations. Consequently, the commission's decision is affirmed.
