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Kahn-Reiss, Inc. v. Detroit & Northern Savings & Loan Ass'n
Citations: 228 N.W.2d 816; 59 Mich. App. 1; 1975 Mich. App. LEXIS 1311Docket: Docket 17255
Court: Michigan Court of Appeals; February 24, 1975; Michigan; State Appellate Court
The Michigan Court of Appeals case Kahn-Reiss, Inc. v. Detroit Northern Savings Loan Association, decided on February 24, 1975, involves two primary issues stemming from a property sale. In Issue I, the court addressed whether the plaintiff retained an easement over the sold land. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendants, concluding that there was insufficient evidence for claims of mutual mistake, fraud, or misrepresentation. It further determined that the option for easement rights was merged into the warranty deed, and the option's terms were deemed too vague for enforcement. Issue II concerned a boundary dispute regarding the defendants' removal of a concrete wall and chimney, which the trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The court also found that Kahn, the plaintiff's representative, had effectively released any claims related to ingress and egress when he accepted a $1,500 payment from the defendants without securing a written release. The court's findings emphasized Kahn's authority and actions during the transaction, ultimately leading to the conclusion that the claims were settled, and the defendants were not liable for the easement or boundary disputes. In the cross-appeal, the plaintiff does not challenge the trial court's finding on point (1) but asserts errors regarding points (2), (3), and (4). The plaintiff argues that an implied easement for vehicular traffic over lots 6 and 7 was reserved. The court disagrees with the trial court's conclusion that the option agreement merged into the warranty deed, which was based on Clifton v Jackson Iron Co, a case concerning timber rights rather than easements. The plaintiff's cited cases, Goodspeed v Nichols and Mueller v Bankers Trust Co, also do not pertain to easement reservations. The court acknowledges a lack of Michigan case law on easement reservations, creating an open question about whether such provisions are "collateral." Reference is made to Chicago Title Trust Co v Wabash-Randolph Corp, where the court held that an easement provision in a contract was not merged in the deed upon delivery. The case at hand parallels this decision since the option specifies conditions post-deed delivery. Both parties agree on the general rule from Fox v Pierce regarding indefinite options but dispute its applicability here. The trial court, having evaluated evidence, found the option too indefinite, a determination that will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. The established legal principle requires that a right of way must be sufficiently definite for the court to enforce it, necessitating precise descriptions of the right of passage's shape, dimensions, and location concerning lot lines. Stolte establishes that the clarity of the right-of-way description and its "termini" as controlling "monuments" over specific distances is crucial in property agreements. However, this principle does not apply in the current case. The court must evaluate whether the plaintiff has adequately demonstrated that the option agreement detailed the right of passage, including property shape, dimensions, and specific locations concerning lot lines and structures. Insufficient written descriptions may allow for extrinsic evidence to clarify property interests, considering possession, ownership relations, and negotiations. The option agreement required defendants to ensure a means of ingress and egress to the east exit of the Pic Theatre, adjacent to lots 6 and 7, while lot 9 housed the east exit, and lot 8 adjoined it. Mr. Kahn sought a right-of-way for patrons to access the theatre, although the exit served primarily as a fire door. Kahn was also focused on ensuring parking for theatre patrons, which occurred on lots 8 and 9, not 6 and 7. The drafting attorney admitted to using imprecise language and lacked clarity on the legal descriptions, noting ambiguity regarding the adjacency of lots 6 and 7 to the theatre. Testimony from Robert Borsum indicated Kahn's primary concern was emergency egress from the theatre. The option agreement, however, failed to address parking and vehicular access, highlighting significant omissions relevant to any potential easement by implication. The "east exit" lacks a clear definition in terms of shape, dimensions, and specific structures, leading to ambiguity about whether it is intended for pedestrians or vehicles. Unlike the precedent set in *Greve v Caron*, where a specific dimension was provided, the current case does not offer concrete details in either the testimony or the option agreement regarding the pathway. The case law cited, such as *Stolte* and *von Meding*, demonstrates that clear descriptions and evidence of intent are critical for enforceability of easements, which are absent here. The trial court's ruling that the option was too indefinite to enforce is upheld. The plaintiff's assertion of an implied easement over lots 6 and 7 for vehicular traffic was not raised in the trial court, thus limiting appellate review. An implied easement requires evidence of the parties’ intention and must arise from strict necessity, not mere convenience. The existence of an alternative route can negate claims of necessity, as illustrated in *Zemon v Netzorg*, where the plaintiff was denied an easement despite seeking access because the property was reachable from an existing road. Plaintiff seeks an easement over lots 6 and 7 for vehicular access, but evidence indicates that Kahn was primarily concerned with pedestrian access to a fire door on lot 9. The court finds that any need for vehicular access is based on convenience rather than strict necessity, which is required for an easement by implication. A narrow driveway provides access to lots 8 and 9 from Quincy Street, but it is insufficient for large service vehicles. Although servicing the theatre's furnace via Quincy Street may be inconvenient, this does not meet the threshold of "strict necessity." Consequently, the court concludes that the plaintiff fails to prove entitlement to the easement, and there is no need to determine if Kahn's acceptance of a $1500 check waived his claim. Part II addresses a 2.35-foot concrete wall and chimney on the east side of the Kahn-Reiss Building on lot 8. Following a fire in 1959, the plaintiff constructed a supporting ledge after the fire damaged the building's structure. A land survey conducted in 1970 revealed that the wall may encroach entirely on lot 7. D&N, who purchased adjacent property for a new office building, faces additional costs if the wall is not removed, as it would impede the planned drive-in facility. The plaintiff argues that removing the wall would endanger the structural integrity of its building. Both parties presented independent surveys: the plaintiff’s survey shows only a 7-inch encroachment, while D&N’s survey, conducted by a non-registered engineer, provides conflicting results. The trial court determined that the Riipi Survey accurately established the north-south boundary line between lots 7 and 8, despite a 7-inch encroachment on lot 7, which was deemed insignificant, resulting in no monetary damages awarded. Block 1 of the Village of Hancock was originally platted without a metes and bounds description, leading to complications in determining a reliable starting point for surveys due to the disappearance of stakes and the lack of precise measurements in adjacent blocks. Each surveyor employed different starting points and methodologies, leading to conflicting surveys. The appellate court does not typically intervene in survey disputes unless the trial court's findings are overwhelmingly unsupported by evidence. In this case, the trial court’s conclusions were found to be substantiated by the record, particularly as the sole witness for the U.P. Survey lacked credentials as a registered land surveyor, while the Riipi Survey was conducted by a qualified surveyor with a higher accuracy standard. The Riipi Survey was based on actual ground measurements, whereas the U.P. Survey relied on mathematical calculations, which did not meet professional standards. The core discrepancy between the surveys revolved around the delineation of the east line of Block One, First Addition Plat, which also serves as the west line of Montezuma Street. The trial court made a factual finding regarding the determination of the east line based on testimonies and evidence presented. The defendants argue that adopting the Riipi Survey leads to multiple encroachments within the block, while the U.P. Survey results in only one encroachment. They cite Diehl v. Zanger, claiming that it establishes that long-standing occupational lines should prevail over new surveys when original monuments of title are absent. However, Diehl does not assert that occupational lines automatically control; rather, it indicates that such lines are part of the evidence for jury consideration. In this case, the trial court evaluated both occupational lines and established title markers, concluding that the Riipi Survey accurately located controlling pins and corners. The U.P. Survey's starting point disregarded significant evidence that could have aligned the two surveys more closely. Concerns regarding potential encroachments within Block 1 due to the trial court's ruling are unfounded, as the court's order only applies to the parties involved and does not alter existing lot lines. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, with no costs assigned to either party, as neither prevailed in full. The Riipi Survey was deemed the accurate representation of the property line between lots seven and eight. Both surveys established a new East line for the specified Block and proceeded West 264 feet to define the North-South property line between lots seven (7) and eight (8), revealing a discrepancy of 1.8 feet. The surveyors aimed to align their findings with adjacent plats, noting the absence of original monuments in the First Addition Plat. Case law cited by the defendant indicates that established fence lines and other recognized occupation lines hold greater evidentiary weight for determining true lot lines compared to surveys reliant on uncertain monuments. Key legal principles from related cases establish that when original boundary markers have vanished, surveys should seek to ascertain their original locations. Various types of evidence, including newly placed stakes, reference points, and long-established occupational lines, are permissible in this determination, with no single factor dominating as a matter of law.