Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon; April 17, 1996; Oregon; State Appellate Court
In the case of Trabosh v. Washington County, the Court of Appeals of Oregon reviewed a wrongful death action brought by Victoria Trabosh, the personal representative of the estate of Charlene Jensen, after the trial court ruled in favor of Washington County. The central issue was whether Jensen qualified as a "subject worker" under the Workers Compensation Act, which would grant the county immunity from liability. The trial court determined that Jensen was a subject worker, leading to the dismissal of the case.
Jensen and her husband operated a business providing horse rides and participated in a hayride shuttle service at the 1992 Washington County Fair. During this service, an accident occurred resulting in Jensen's death and her husband's injury. When her husband sought compensation for medical and burial expenses, Washington County denied the claim, classifying Jensen as an independent contractor and thus not a subject worker.
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, which were denied due to factual disputes. The court later held a separate trial focusing solely on the workers' compensation issue, using the prior factual record. Ultimately, the court concluded that Jensen was a subject worker.
The Workers' Compensation Law defines a subject worker as someone who provides services for remuneration under an employer's control. The plaintiff argued that Jensen fell under an exception for partnership members, which requires independent contractor status for exemption. On appeal, the plaintiff shifted focus to argue that Jensen did not meet the definition of a worker, referencing a relevant Supreme Court decision and the legislative framework established by ORS 670.600, intended to create a uniform test for independent contractor status across various laws. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision.
At trial, the legal framework relied upon the statutory criteria for determining independent contractor status, believing these criteria from ORS 670.600 had replaced the 'right to control' and 'nature of the work' tests established in Woody v. Waibel. Consequently, the parties concentrated their arguments on ORS 670.600, which includes factors relevant to the right to control but renders them conclusive. After the trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, the Supreme Court later reversed this decision in S-W Floor Cover Shop, deeming the ORS 670.600 criteria largely irrelevant for assessing worker status under the Workers' Compensation Law. The Supreme Court clarified that the assessment of whether an individual is a subject worker under ORS 656.027 only applies if they are considered a worker under ORS 656.005(30). This definition incorporates the right to control test, maintaining the traditional independent contractor test as the operative standard without reference to ORS 670.600. Following the Supreme Court's ruling, the right to control and nature of the work tests have been utilized to evaluate worker status in Workers' Compensation cases, regardless of prior arguments. In cases with undisputed facts, the question of status is a legal one for the court, which first applies the right to control test, moving to the nature of the work test if necessary. The right to control test includes: direct evidence of control, method of payment, provision of equipment, and right to terminate employment.
In the specific case regarding Jensen, horse owners began providing a hayride shuttle service at the fair around 1990, coordinating efforts voluntarily without compensation. They received $20 per hour for the rides and were responsible for their own liability insurance, without any benefits or tax withholdings. Teamsters utilized their own horses and could choose between their own wagons or those provided by the fair, which were lent by other horse owners. Initially, the Jensens used their own wagon but later opted for a provided wagon. All parties involved considered the ride providers to be independent contractors, with no directives on how to conduct the rides, only an expectation of reasonable conduct.
The evaluation of the "right to control" test indicates that while the fair exerted some control over the Jensens' work by setting the hours and defining performance parameters, this control pertains primarily to the outcome rather than the execution method, aligning with independent contractor status. The requirement to perform rides during fairgoers' demands emphasizes task completion over employee status, similar to the precedent set in Bell v. Hartman, where jockeys were deemed independent contractors despite receiving guidance from horse owners.
Payment by the hour, typically indicative of employment, does not imply control in this case, as the Jensens provided rides for variable durations, mirroring their billing practices for other customers who had no control over their service. The use of equipment was shared; the Jensens utilized both their horses and a wagon from another teamster, suggesting the fair lacked control over their operations.
The absence of evidence regarding the fair's ability to terminate the contract at will further supports the notion of independent contractor status, as the arrangement resembled a new daily contract rather than a conventional employment relationship.
The "nature of the work" test shifts focus to factors relevant to the workers’ compensation system, assessing whether the Jensens’ services are integral to the employer’s business. This test considers the nature of the work, including its skill level, independence, and the relationship to the employer's operations, analyzing the regularity and duration of service to determine if it resembles continuous employment rather than a specific contract for services.
Jensen was determined not to be a worker based on several key factors. The Jensens operated hayrides as a separate business, carrying their own liability insurance, utilizing business cards, and advertising in the Yellow Pages. While the hayrides were offered at the fair, they were ancillary to the primary purpose of showcasing horses. The nature of the work was temporary, akin to hiring for a specific task. Consequently, the court concluded that Jensen was not a "subject worker," and it found that the trial court erred in dismissing the case based on the defendant's immunity under ORS 30.265(1)(a), leading to a reversal and remand.
The case also raised the question of whether Jensen was an "employee" or an independent contractor, with the court opting for the term "subject worker." The fair, an agency of Washington County, was subject to amendments in the Workers' Compensation Law, but no substantive changes affected the case. The plaintiff's arguments on appeal mirrored those made at trial; thus, the change in focus did not impact the relevancy of evidence. The court clarified that it reviews legal determinations for errors rather than for abuse of discretion, and since the facts were undisputed, the trial court's decisions regarding jury submission and trial segregation were justified. The court rejected the trial court's view that Jensen's limited scheduling indicated employee status, noting that the task necessitated performance during specific hours. Both parties regarded Jensen as an independent contractor before and after the accident until the defendant denied Robert's workers' compensation claim, which, while not dispositive, could influence the case's outcome.
