State v. McGrath

Citations: 749 P.2d 631; 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 47; 1988 Utah LEXIS 5; 1988 WL 777Docket: 19878

Court: Utah Supreme Court; January 6, 1988; Utah; State Supreme Court

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In the case of State of Utah v. Richard McGrath, the Supreme Court of Utah reviewed the first appeal under the Utah Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act (RICE). McGrath was indicted on nine counts, including eight for distribution of a controlled substance and one for racketeering. The trial court consolidated the indictments for a single trial, which led to McGrath being convicted on one count of attempted distribution and one count of racketeering after the jury acquitted him on the other distribution counts. 

McGrath claimed he was granted transactional immunity by the county attorney in exchange for his cooperation in an ongoing drug investigation, alleging that this verbal agreement led him to waive Fifth Amendment rights during a debriefing. The trial court, however, found that no immunity was granted and that McGrath's testimony was not in good faith, thus rejecting his motion to dismiss the charges. 

Additionally, McGrath argued against the consolidation of indictments, asserting they were not closely related. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s discretion in consolidating the charges, noting that the offenses occurred within a seven-week period during a continuous investigation and involved transactions where the cocaine was supplied by McGrath to a lower-level dealer, who sold it to an undercover agent. The court found no abuse of discretion in the consolidation decision.

Over five months, the defendant supplied cocaine to an individual approximately every other day, leading to the consolidation of eight indictments for trial due to the similarity of offenses and consistent involvement of the same parties. An additional racketeering indictment, linked to ongoing sales to this individual, was also properly joined. This situation was distinguished from State v. Gotfrey, where separate charges involved different victims and occurred months apart.

Regarding witness exclusion, the court allowed a motion to keep witnesses out of the courtroom per rule 615 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. A witness, while outside, reviewed an agent's report and spoke with other witnesses, prompting the defendant to request a mistrial. The court found no collusion and denied the motion, noting the defendant must show actual prejudice from the violation of the exclusion order. The witness stated that his memory was not influenced by these discussions, and there was no evidence of altered testimony. The court's denial of the mistrial was deemed not an abuse of discretion.

On the admission of evidence related to drug paraphernalia and suspected drugs, the court allowed two exhibits despite the defendant's objections regarding their foundation and relevance. The defendant argued that the items lacked proper testing and were prejudicial under rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. However, a witness testified that the items were drugs seized during a raid, and they were packaged similarly to known controlled substances. This corroborated testimonies linking the defendant to drug trafficking and established an enterprise, thus affirming the relevance and necessity of the evidence presented.

Interference with a trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence is not warranted unless there is a clear abuse of discretion that likely resulted in injustice. The court found no such abuse in this case. The defendant argues that the State failed to establish a 'pattern of racketeering activity' necessary for conviction under section 76-10-1603, citing the failure to convict on two of eight distribution indictments. However, a 'pattern of racketeering activity' is defined as at least two episodes of conduct with similar characteristics, and acts constituting racketeering do not need to be formally charged. Federal cases reversing RICO convictions when predicate crimes are invalidated do not apply here since none of the predicate acts supporting the racketeering charge have been invalidated.

The jury acquitted the defendant on seven distribution indictments, but he was convicted of an amended charge of attempted distribution. The court rejected the argument that the jury's verdict indicated insufficient proof of two episodes of racketeering. The racketeering indictment covered a broader time frame and did not limit itself to the specific incidents of distribution. Jury instruction No. 8 allowed consideration of any two occasions of supplying cocaine to an individual, while instruction No. 6 required specific findings regarding the distribution charges. The latter instruction clarified that merely providing cocaine was not sufficient for conviction; the jury needed to find that the defendant intended for the cocaine to be resold.

Conviction of the defendant for distribution necessitated proof of several elements not required for the racketeering charge, which only required evidence of at least two sales of cocaine to Marcus. The defendant's counsel acknowledged the strict proof standards for distribution, noting that seven indictments stemmed from sales by Eric Marcus, of which the defendant had no knowledge. Thus, it was possible for the jury to acquit the defendant on those indictments while still finding him guilty of supplying cocaine to Marcus on two occasions over five months. In a posttrial motion, the defense conceded that the jury could reasonably infer two episodes of racketeering but contested the sufficiency of evidence to establish an 'enterprise.' Counsel argued that while evidence indicated a pattern of racketeering through 74 transactions documented in a ledger, there was no proof of an organization or association as required by the legal definition of 'enterprise.' The defense did not object to jury instructions during the trial regarding notice of charges, nor did they claim surprise on appeal. Additionally, under section 76-10-1602(1), the acts constituting racketeering do not need to be specifically charged. The jury's instructions did not limit their consideration to the distribution charges, and thus, the verdict does not imply a failure to prove two episodes of racketeering conduct. The definition of 'enterprise' in section 76-10-1602(3) includes various legal entities and associations, and federal precedents require proof of an 'enterprise' in addition to a pattern of racketeering activity to avoid double jeopardy concerns.

Defendant contends that the State presented evidence indicative only of a pattern of racketeering activity, lacking proof of an enterprise. However, referencing *United States v. Turkette*, the court clarifies that a conviction under RICO requires proving both an 'enterprise' and a 'pattern of racketeering activity' as separate elements. While the proof may overlap, establishing one does not inherently establish the other. The court agrees with this interpretation and asserts that the State did provide sufficient evidence of an enterprise's existence. Specifically, evidence shows an ongoing association between the defendant and Marcus aimed at profiting from controlled substance sales. They maintained written accounts of their transactions, with a ledger documenting seventy-four sales. The relationship went beyond isolated transactions, as the defendant facilitated drug deliveries and Marcus sourced supplies primarily from him. This collaboration constituted a 'continuing unit for a common purpose,' confirming the existence of an enterprise engaged in drug trafficking. Consequently, the evidence supports the jury's verdict, and the court found no error in denying the defendant's motions to dismiss or arrest judgment, thereby affirming the conviction.