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State v. Jackson
Citations: 677 P.2d 1321; 139 Ariz. 213Docket: 1 CA-CR 6482
Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; December 12, 1983; Arizona; State Appellate Court
Richard Vershoun Jackson was convicted of possession of a dangerous drug, a class 4 felony, after an incident involving police officers in Phoenix. Following an admission of a prior felony conviction, he was sentenced to six years under enhanced punishment laws. Jackson appealed on three grounds: 1) the trial court’s decision to allow the prosecution to impeach him with a prior unspecified felony; 2) the denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal; and 3) the failure to reinstruct the jury on the state's burden of proof. The incident occurred when police observed Jackson and another individual drinking in a parking lot. Upon seeing the officers, Jackson attempted to leave and allegedly discarded a glass jar containing cigarettes wrapped in foil, which the officers believed contained PCP. Jackson denied possessing the jar, claiming he only discarded a beer bottle while fleeing. His friend corroborated his account, stating he never saw Jackson with the jar. Regarding the impeachment issue, Jackson had sought to prevent the introduction of his prior drug conviction, arguing it was unduly prejudicial. The trial court allowed the impeachment without revealing the nature of the prior conviction, a decision supported by precedent which emphasized the trial court's discretion to balance the probative value against prejudicial impact. The appellate court upheld this decision, affirming that the trial court acted within its discretion. The judge assessed the probative value of the defendant's prior conviction for possession of dangerous drugs against its potential prejudicial effect, ultimately deeming it inadmissible due to undue prejudice. However, the judge acknowledged that the existence of a prior felony conviction was relevant to the defendant's credibility. The trial court complied with Rule 609 of the Arizona Rules of Evidence by conducting an independent evaluation as required. Regarding the appellant's motion for acquittal, he argued insufficient evidence was presented on the usability of the dangerous drug. He referenced State v. Moreno to support his claim that evidence must demonstrate usability when the quantity of narcotics is minimal. The court clarified that only when evidence is insufficient to indicate any effective use will a conviction be unsupported. In this case, testimony indicated the appellant discarded a glass jar with cigarettes suggesting they were laced with PCP. An undercover officer confirmed the packaging indicated PCP presence, and a criminalist verified that the cigarettes contained sufficient phencyclidine to affect a user and were smokable. Thus, the court found adequate evidence to satisfy the "usability" requirement. The trial court provided the jury with initial instructions, emphasizing the state's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for each crime element, alongside a definition of reasonable doubt. The trial concluded with the jury being charged the following morning, but the judge did not reiterate the burden of proof instruction. The jury received preliminary instructions on reasonable doubt, which they took to the jury room. The appellant, for the first time on appeal, claimed that the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury again on the state's burden of proof at the close of evidence was a fundamental reversible error. This argument referenced State v. Marquez, where the trial counsel had explicitly requested such an instruction, leading to a finding of error. The state countered that the failure to give the instruction did not constitute fundamental error since the appellant did not request it or object during the trial. The court agreed with the state, noting the absence of a request for a reinstruction and the fact that the jury had been instructed on the burden of proof at the trial's start. Given these circumstances, while not reinstructing was an error, it was not reversible error. The judgment and sentence were affirmed, with Presiding Judge Grant and Judges Haire and Eubank concurring. Additionally, the court ordered the redesignation of a prior memorandum decision as an opinion for publication.