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People v. Sirhan
Citations: 497 P.2d 1121; 7 Cal. 3d 710; 102 Cal. Rptr. 385; 1972 Cal. LEXIS 223Docket: Crim. 14026
Court: California Supreme Court; June 16, 1972; California; State Supreme Court
Defendant Sirhan Bishara Sirhan was convicted of first-degree murder for the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy and received the death penalty. He was also found guilty on five counts of assault with intent to commit murder against various individuals. Sirhan's automatic appeal raised several arguments, including: 1. The death penalty constitutes cruel or unusual punishment. 2. Evidence of his diminished capacity undermines the first-degree murder conviction. 3. Pretrial publicity denied him a fair trial. 4. Evidence obtained from his residence violated his rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and self-incrimination. 5. Erroneous admission of other evidence. 6. Constitutional violations regarding the initiation of prosecution through indictment instead of information. 7. No evidentiary hearing was held on the exclusion of jurors opposed to the death penalty, potentially leading to an unrepresentative jury. 8. Illegality in the selection process of petit and grand juries. The court determined that the claim regarding the death penalty's constitutionality was valid, referencing People v. Anderson, which found the death penalty violates California's constitutional provision against cruel or unusual punishment. Consequently, the court modified the judgment to life imprisonment instead of death while affirming the conviction for first-degree murder. The evidence showed that Sirhan had fired the fatal shot and was involved in the assault counts, with his defense primarily focusing on diminished capacity. Prior to the shooting, he had been seen at the Ambassador Hotel where Kennedy spoke and had practiced shooting with the revolver used in the assassination. On June 4, 1968, around 10 or 11 p.m., a secretary at the Ambassador Hotel observed the defendant near the Embassy Ballroom. When questioned, he walked away toward the ballroom doors. Shortly before midnight, the defendant inquired if Senator Kennedy would come through the pantry and was told they did not know. He was observed in the pantry for about half an hour without any unusual behavior. At midnight, after Kennedy's victory speech, the senator moved toward the press room, stopping in the pantry to greet kitchen staff. The defendant then approached Kennedy, pulled a revolver, and fired multiple shots, hitting Kennedy and Paul Schrade, causing chaos. Hotel staff attempted to restrain the defendant, who continued to shoot until he was subdued. Injuries were sustained by several individuals, including Irwin Stroll, William Weisel, Elizabeth Evans, and Ira Goldstein. After the shooting, the senator was hospitalized but died on June 6, 1968, due to a gunshot wound to the head, with two additional wounds. Expert testimony revealed that the gun was very close to Kennedy when fired. When police arrived, they took the defendant into custody. During transport to the police station, the defendant was informed of his constitutional rights. He initially responded to questions about the shooting by expressing he would not provide evidence against himself and claimed he acted for his country. Observations by police indicated the defendant was not intoxicated and appeared alert and intelligent during interrogation. Items found on him included a newspaper article regarding Senator Kennedy’s support for aid to Israel. A trash collector testified that he informed the defendant of his intention to vote for Kennedy, to which the defendant responded with a threat to shoot Kennedy. During cross-examination, the witness revealed that after the assassination, he was reluctant to testify due to his intense dislike for Sirhan, indicating a bias in his potential testimony. The prosecution presented documents found in the defendant's home, which included handwritten statements about killing Senator Kennedy. The defendant admitted to shooting Senator Kennedy but claimed he did not remember the act, although he acknowledged having previously stated that he killed Kennedy "wilfully, premeditatively, with twenty years of malice aforethought." The defendant recounted his activities leading up to the shooting, explaining that he initially planned to go to the races but instead went target shooting after being dissatisfied with the race entries. He practiced at a gun range and had a history of interest in guns stemming from a high school cadet corps. The defendant denied recalling statements about killing a dog but suggested he might have claimed his gun was powerful enough for such an act, asserting he had no intention of killing Kennedy. After leaving the range, he became upset over an article about a march for Israel, leading him to the Ambassador Hotel, where he unknowingly attended a Kennedy event. He consumed alcohol and, feeling intoxicated, returned to the hotel for coffee without recalling picking up his gun. He remembered being choked and did not recall asking about Kennedy's arrival. The defendant denied making statements about his actions being for his country and claimed he did not mention to the trash collector his intent to kill Kennedy. He shared details about his background, identifying as a Palestinian Arab born in 1944, who moved to the United States in 1956. During his eight years in Old Jerusalem, the defendant experienced frequent bombings, attended school, and lived in poor conditions with his family in a single room with inadequate sanitation. He was informed that their situation resulted from being displaced by Jews and learned of a massacre where 250 people, including children, were killed. Disturbing experiences included encountering a dismembered hand in a well and witnessing the remains of a grocer he knew. In 1956, he became aware of Israeli aggression during the Suez Canal conflict. After moving to the U.S., his father returned to Jordan, and the defendant graduated high school in 1963. He attended college but was dismissed in 1965 for absenteeism and struggled to find work afterward. The defendant developed an interest in the Arab-Israel conflict and the occult, joining the Rosicrucian Order in 1965. He conducted experiments related to his occult interests and expressed strong anti-Zionist sentiments. In his defense, evidence was presented regarding the bombings and traumatic experiences he faced in Jerusalem. Witnesses testified that he was seen drinking on the night of June 4, 1968. For his diminished capacity defense, two court-appointed psychiatrists, Dr. Eric Marcus and Dr. Bernard Diamond, along with several psychologists, testified that the defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and was in a dissociated state at the time of the alleged murder. They concluded he lacked the ability to understand the seriousness of his actions and the legal responsibilities associated with them. Other psychologists corroborated the diagnosis and noted his tendency to fluctuate between psychosis and normalcy under stress. In rebuttal, the prosecution called Dr. Seymour Pollack, a professor of psychiatry and law, who conducted extensive interviews with the defendant. On January 19, 1969, Dr. Pollack conducted an interview with the defendant, having previously observed him during preliminary court proceedings starting on June 28, 1968, and throughout the trial. Dr. Pollack engaged with the defendant's family, reviewed psychological tests from Drs. Richardson and Schorr, analyzed the grand jury transcript, and listened to recordings of the defendant's conversations post-arrest. His total time dedicated to the case approached 200 hours. Dr. Pollack's diagnosis indicated that the defendant was not "clinically psychotic," as there were no significant observable signs of psychosis. He found insufficient evidence of schizophrenia. However, Dr. Pollack diagnosed the defendant as mentally ill and emotionally disturbed, characterizing him as having a paranoid personality—a form of mental illness marked by heightened suspicion and sensitivity, rather than psychosis. He also described the defendant as a "borderline schizophrenic," showing minimal signs of peculiar thinking without clinical psychosis. Dr. Pollack noted indications of a "psychotic personality structure," suggesting the defendant was less stable than average individuals. Although psychological tests indicated psychosis, the interviews did not reveal the expected degree of personality disorganization, although they did suggest paranoid thinking and emotional reactions. The defendant's notebooks contained strong paranoid elements, yet Dr. Pollack did not classify them as evidence of psychosis, interpreting them instead as attempts to bolster his resolve regarding intentions to kill Senator Kennedy. He acknowledged that further time spent with the defendant might have yielded more clear evidence of psychosis. Tracing the defendant's life history, Dr. Pollack attributed aspects of his personality as of June 5, 1968, to formative experiences, including exposure to the Arab-Jewish conflict, though he noted no evidence of the defendant being more affected than others in his community. Dr. Pollack assessed the defendant's character development, noting that despite early vulnerabilities, he became stronger than perceived. Pollack linked the assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy to the defendant's politically charged emotions, emphasizing that the act stemmed from Sirhan's perception of U.S. foreign policy favoring Israel over Arab interests. Pollack opined that at the time of the assassination, Sirhan's mental capacity was intact enough to premeditate the act, as evidenced by eyewitness accounts and recorded conversations showing his reasoning ability and awareness. He found no significant impairment in Sirhan's attention, perception, understanding, logical association, or memory, asserting that while Sirhan's emotional state was becoming more irritable, there was no evidence of impulsivity linked to the crime. Pollack described mental capacity as a continuum, stating that substantial impairment would be below 50 percent, but determined that Sirhan's mental illness only moderately influenced his actions and should be considered a mitigating factor in sentencing. He noted that Sirhan believed killing Kennedy was a duty and a heroic act within the Arab community, a belief he did not classify as a delusion, highlighting a key distinction from other psychiatric evaluations. Pollack clarified that Sirhan did not see himself as divinely chosen to kill Kennedy, which would have indicated a delusional state. Dr. Pollack testified that the defendant believed he would not face punishment for his actions, viewing those with Senator Kennedy's views on the Arab-Israel conflict as murderers. Leonard Olinger, a clinical psychologist, rebutted the defense's claims after reviewing news reports and the tests conducted by Drs. Schorr and Richardson, although he did not personally examine the defendant. Olinger criticized the interpretations of the defendant's test responses and stated that the tests indicated the defendant was a borderline schizophrenic with neurotic features. He opined that such individuals could still premeditate and deliberate murder and had the capacity to understand and conform to societal norms. The defendant argued that evidence of his diminished capacity made the proof insufficient for a first-degree murder conviction, advocating for a conviction of manslaughter or second-degree murder. Under the Wells-Gorshen rule, a defendant cannot be convicted of first-degree murder if a mental disability at the time of the offense prevented him from acting with malice aforethought or premeditation. However, the evidence presented, including expert testimony and the crime's circumstances, supported the jury's conclusion that the defendant acted with malice aforethought. The trial's discussion also highlighted that defense counsel suggested a second-degree murder conviction was justified. The court referenced the case of People v. Wolff to illustrate that deliberation and premeditation require consideration of the defendant's ability to reflect on the gravity of his actions. It concluded that the defendant had sufficient time to thoughtfully consider his actions, even though he was not fully mentally well. He recognized the intended act was wrong but appeared to have a vague and detached understanding of its moral implications. Dividing intentional homicides into murder and voluntary manslaughter acknowledges human frailty, and further distinguishing murder into degrees reflects varying levels of personal turpitude among offenders. In evaluating claims of "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing," a deeper analysis beyond mere objective facts is necessary. The defendant had sufficient time to consider the act, and although evidence was conflicting, substantial proof indicated he was not suffering from paranoid schizophrenia, a dissociative state, or intoxication at the time of the shooting. Dr. Pollack, who assessed the defendant multiple times and reviewed pertinent materials, testified that while the defendant was mentally ill, he maintained the capacity for malice aforethought and could meaningfully reflect on his actions. Additional evidence suggested the assassination had political motivations, and observations from witnesses depicted the defendant as alert and coherent shortly before and after the killing. Consequently, the evidence supported a first-degree murder conviction. Regarding the defendant's claim of a denied fair trial due to trial publicity, he argued that extensive media coverage infringed on his right to an impartial jury under the Fourteenth Amendment. After the jury was sworn in, a motion for a guilty plea to first-degree murder was made but denied, with the court sealing the record. Jurors were not sequestered and were instructed not to discuss the case or consume related media. However, on February 12, 1969, an article in the Los Angeles Times suggested a possible guilty plea from the defendant, which was reported to have influenced perceptions of the trial. The article also alluded to discussions between defense and prosecution lawyers regarding the plea change, leading to further media coverage. Speculation emerged regarding Sirhan's potential change of plea to guilty, with hopes of receiving a life sentence instead of the death penalty, as reported by the Los Angeles Times and echoed by KFWB, KMPC, and KNX broadcasts. The defense counsel noted extensive media coverage, with the trial judge acknowledging the pervasive nature of the publicity. On February 13, 1969, Sirhan moved for a mistrial, claiming that the widespread media attention compromised his ability to receive a fair trial. Both defense and prosecution denied being the source of the leaked information. The court individually questioned the jurors, revealing that while some had seen headlines or heard comments about a guilty plea, most claimed they could remain impartial and base their decisions solely on courtroom evidence. The trial court denied the mistrial, asserting jurors' ability to set aside external influences. After the trial, Sirhan moved for a new trial, arguing the denial of the mistrial resulted in an impartial jury; this motion was also denied. The document emphasizes the constitutional requirement for an impartial jury free from external influences, highlighting the challenges posed by extensive media coverage and the need for trial courts to implement measures to protect the accused's rights. It notes that while identifiable prejudice is typically required to claim due process violations, certain situations may allow for presumed prejudice. In several key cases, the courts have evaluated the potential for prejudice due to pre-trial publicity and the influence of trial conditions on jurors. In *Sheppard v. Maxwell*, the standard is the "totality of circumstances," while *Estes v. Texas* and *Turner v. Louisiana* highlight concerns about the effects of televised trials and the presence of key witnesses influencing jurors. In *Rideau v. Louisiana*, the court found significant prejudice from a defendant's televised confession, impacting juror impartiality. In the current case, however, there was no demonstrated prejudice from juror awareness of the defendant's guilty plea, even if the jurors were exposed to this information. The defense strategy focused on distinguishing degrees of homicide rather than seeking outright acquittal, aligning with the jurors' knowledge. The defense also introduced evidence of a later attempt to plead guilty to first-degree murder, along with the defendant's admission of intent, which countered any potential bias. Thus, the court concluded that the juror's awareness of the guilty plea and related general statements did not undermine the trial's fairness. This situation contrasts with *Rideau*, where extensive media exposure tainted the jury's impartiality, affirming that the circumstances here did not warrant similar concerns. Rideau argues that any court proceedings in a community exposed to extensive publicity are likely to be mere formalities. The dissent notes that while the trial included other confessions from the defendant, the court deemed them irrelevant. The dissent suggests that the impact of juror knowledge from publicity is less harmful than a confession viewed at home, and thus does not invalidate subsequent proceedings. The defendant claims violations of his rights against unreasonable searches and seizures (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments) and self-incrimination (Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments) due to the prosecution's introduction of evidence obtained from his notebooks and an envelope found in his bedroom and trash. The Attorney General argues that the defendant cannot claim error since the defense introduced related evidence to support a diminished capacity argument. The prosecution asserts that the defense's evidence is more damaging than what was introduced by them and that the defense voluntarily included it to bolster its case. Despite the defense's introduction of evidence, there is a reasonable possibility that it was prompted by the prosecution's earlier evidence. The defense's presentation aimed to contextualize the prosecution's excerpts, suggesting they reflect a mentally unstable perspective rather than malicious intent. The court finds that the defendant did not waive his right to appeal the introduction of the prosecution's evidence, as the Attorney General did not provide legal authority to support a waiver claim based on the defense's later use of the evidence. The defendant also filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence from the June 5, 1968, search, claiming it was unlawful, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing, and evidence regarding this search was presented during the trial. Defendant's second motion to suppress was effectively made through an objection that was overruled. On June 5, 1968, following a newspaper article linking the defendant to the Kennedy shooting, his brothers, Adel and Munir, visited the police station. Adel, interviewed by Sergeant Brandt, disclosed the suspect's identity and provided the family's address in Pasadena. Although the officers sought permission to search the home, Adel expressed concern about alarming their mother, suggesting they proceed without her explicit consent. Upon arriving at the residence, the officers, motivated by a belief that evidence of a possible conspiracy might be present, were admitted by Adel. They located a dressing table drawer containing an envelope with a threatening note about Robert F. Kennedy (RFK) and two notebooks with extremist writings, including intentions to assassinate RFK and other officials. The handwriting was confirmed to be the defendant's. The search was conducted without a warrant, placing the burden on the prosecution to justify it. The trial court accepted Adel's consent as a basis for the search. However, the defendant contended that Adel lacked the authority to consent to the search of his belongings. The Attorney General argued that an emergency situation justified the search due to concerns about potential conspiracies against political figures. The defendant countered that no evidence of an emergency existed, citing officers’ lack of evidence regarding a conspiracy. The discussion includes whether the emergency justification was presented in the trial court. The People cannot introduce a new theory to justify a search for the first time in the appellate court, as defendants assume the only justification is that presented by the prosecutor. This precludes the defendant from cross-examining witnesses or presenting rebuttal evidence. However, in this case, the prosecutor articulated the theory during the motion for a new trial, providing the defendant with sufficient notice, despite the Attorney General not citing an earlier explicit mention of this theory in the trial court. The defense did not argue they were surprised by this theory, and their cross-examination indicated awareness of its implications. The court determines that the People are not barred from presenting this theory on appeal. The validity of the theory is examined in light of precedents, particularly Johnson v. United States, which recognizes exceptional circumstances where a search warrant may be bypassed for effective law enforcement. The court in Johnson found such circumstances absent, noting the absence of fleeing suspects, the nature of the premises searched, and the lack of risk of evidence destruction. This principle has been reiterated in subsequent Supreme Court cases, emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment requires a magistrate's assessment before police can invade privacy, except in grave emergencies. Warden v. Hayden established that exigent circumstances can justify warrantless searches, particularly when police are responding to urgent situations. In this case, police entered a residence shortly after receiving information about an armed robbery and the suspect's location. The court deemed their actions reasonable given the immediate threat to their safety and the need to locate the suspect and any weapons. Similar principles were applied in California cases, where searches were warranted to preserve life or address potential dangers, such as a moaning sound indicating distress or the threat of an unexploded bomb. The Attorney General argued that exigent circumstances were present in the current case, where officers suspected a conspiracy to assassinate political figures. The gravity of the offense, particularly involving a major presidential candidate who had already been attacked, justified immediate police action, even without concrete evidence of a conspiracy within the residence. The potential for further political violence necessitated a swift response from law enforcement. However, any search conducted must be limited to the circumstances that justified its initiation. Officer Brandt testified that after Adel allowed them into the house, the officers conducted a general search to determine if others were involved in the crime and to find relevant evidence. Although exigent circumstances permitted a warrantless search for evidence of a conspiracy to assassinate political leaders, the officers were specifically searching for such evidence. A thorough search was deemed necessary to ensure no evidence of the conspiracy remained in the house. The defendant objected to the admission of notebooks and an envelope found in his bedroom, arguing on different grounds than that they were "communicative" or "testimonial" in nature, which would negate their classification as objects of a reasonable search and seizure. Since this particular argument was not raised at trial, it would not be considered on appeal. The court concluded that the trial court correctly admitted the evidence found in the defendant's bedroom. Regarding the alleged illegal search and seizure on June 6, 1968, the prosecution presented an envelope containing writing attributed to the defendant, stating violent intentions towards Robert F. Kennedy. Officer Young, assigned to secure the Sirhan residence, discovered the envelope during a search of the rear yard where trash boxes were located. He found the envelope in a box of trash while discarding his coffee cup. Young did not have a search warrant, and the burden was on the prosecution to justify the warrantless search or seizure. The prosecution relied on the case of People v. Bly to argue that discarded papers in a trash can do not constitute an illegal search and seizure. However, Bly was later disapproved in People v. Edwards, where marijuana was found in trash cans located in an open backyard, necessitating a trespass by officers for the search. The Edwards case established that the legality of a search hinges on whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy that has been violated by unreasonable governmental intrusion. This principle was reaffirmed in People v. Krivda, where contraband was concealed in trash barrels, and it was determined that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy. In contrast, in the current case, the officer did not rummage through the trash; part of the envelope was visible without moving any objects. It is established that items in plain view of an officer in a lawful position can be seized without a warrant, even if the officer may have committed a trespass. In this situation, the officer was in the rear yard to prevent intrusion, and the presence of nearby houses and individuals entering the yard negated any reasonable expectation of privacy for the defendant regarding visible objects. In People v. Bradley, officers discovered marijuana plants in the rear yard of a residence during a felony investigation. The property layout included a house facing the street, a driveway leading to a garage at the rear, and a fenced yard adjacent to the defendant's residence. The marijuana plants were partially obscured but could be inferred to be in plain view within a foot of a tree, located just 20 feet from the defendant's door, accessible to delivery personnel and visitors. In People v. King, officers observed stolen property in plain sight while investigating a felony, though it was not visible from the sidewalk but could be seen from the driveway and adjacent windows. Despite factual differences from Bradley and King, the court concluded that similar principles applied regarding the visibility of objects in the back yard. The admissibility of an envelope found by Officer Young was upheld, as his examination did not constitute a search infringing on the defendant's privacy, following the precedent set in Katz v. United States. Although there is debate on whether inadvertence is required under the plain view doctrine, the court inferred that Young's discovery was indeed inadvertent, contrasting the circumstances in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, where police had prior knowledge of the evidence. The defendant's objection to the envelope's nature was not addressed on appeal. Additionally, the court found no error in admitting the defendant's statements made during cross-examination, where he discussed shooting Senator Kennedy, as the defense did not object at the time of the admission. During redirect examination, defense counsel revealed a disagreement with the defendant over witness testimony, prompting the defendant to express a desire to plead guilty to first-degree murder. When asked about the penalty, the defendant requested execution, citing "that is my prerogative." The court indicated that a valid reason was needed to accept a plea, to which the defendant responded that he killed Robert Kennedy willfully and with malice aforethought. The court ultimately declined to accept the plea and warned the defendant that further disruptions would lead to restraint. As no objections were raised during trial regarding the admission of this evidence, the defendant is barred from claiming error on appeal. It is established that evidentiary issues must be objected to in a timely manner during trial to be considered on appeal, as per Evidence Code § 353 and Penal Code § 1259. Additionally, while offers or withdrawn guilty pleas are generally inadmissible under Evidence Code § 1153 and Penal Code § 1192.4, the defendant's statement was not part of a bona fide plea but rather an outburst during the trial. Consequently, such remarks do not fall under the exclusionary rule. The defendant's further concerns about the admissibility of evidence related to his admission are unfounded since it was presented by his own counsel. Lastly, the defendant argues that his constitutional rights were violated due to the prosecution being initiated by an indictment instead of an information, claiming a denial of due process and equal protection. A defendant facing prosecution via information has specific rights, including the right to counsel during the preliminary hearing, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to present evidence. These rights are outlined in various provisions of the California Penal Code and supported by case law. In contrast, a defendant indicted does not enjoy the same level of procedural rights, and there are no established standards for prosecutors when choosing between indictment and information. Historically, common law required indictments for serious crimes, which is upheld by the Fifth Amendment in certain federal cases. However, California law permits prosecution of felonies by either method without violating due process or equal protection rights. The defendant argues that the exclusion of jurors opposed to the death penalty may lead to an unrepresentative jury and increase the likelihood of conviction. He requested an evidentiary hearing to explore this issue, intending to call Professor Hans Zeisel as a witness and submit related documents. The court denied this request, despite the defendant's attempts to specify the nature of Zeisel's testimony and provide supporting documentation. The document analyzes the influence of jurors' attitudes towards capital punishment on their guilt determinations. It references an "improved analysis of data" from a preliminary manuscript presented to the U.S. Supreme Court in *Witherspoon v. Illinois*, which examined juror characteristics related to opposition to the death penalty, including demographic statistics. The *Witherspoon* decision did not resolve whether excluding jurors opposed to capital punishment necessitates overturning a guilt judgment. The petitioner in that case cited two surveys and a study involving interviews with 1,248 jurors, but the court found the evidence too tentative to support a claim that non-opposing jurors favor the prosecution in guilt determinations. Additionally, it noted the lack of concrete evidence regarding the studies' validity. In *In re Anderson*, petitioners sought an evidentiary hearing to argue that excluding anti-death penalty jurors leads to unrepresentative juries and increased conviction risk; however, their request was denied due to insufficient preparation. Unlike in previous cases, the current defendant indicated readiness for an evidentiary hearing and identified the evidence to be introduced, but the court deemed this insufficient to warrant a hearing. A hearing could have clarified uncertainties regarding the meaning of terms in studies referenced by the Supreme Court in Witherspoon, but the offer of proof did not demonstrate that Zeisel's data was more substantial than that in Witherspoon. Zeisel's data, specifically concerning juror attitudes towards the death penalty, was the same as that analyzed in his preliminary manuscript presented to the Supreme Court. The defendant argues that the use of voter registration lists as the sole source for selecting petit jurors resulted in an unconstitutional jury. A motion to quash the petit jury panel was based on claims that jury commissioners did not utilize diverse sources to ensure a representative cross-section of the community. Evidence showed jurors were randomly selected solely from the voter registration list. Courts have upheld the constitutionality of using such lists unless there is proof of systematic exclusion of a cognizable group or discrimination in compiling the lists. The defendant failed to provide this showing at the hearing, instead relying on general statistics indicating underrepresentation of racial minorities and less-educated individuals in voter registration lists, which did not specifically pertain to Los Angeles County. Defendant seeks judicial notice of alleged facts claimed to be of common knowledge, referencing Evid. Code. § 452, subd. g. and § 459. The Attorney General contests that these facts are not commonly known, which the court agrees with. The statistics and data cited by the defendant were not presented during the hearing to quash the petit jury panel. Although the defendant refers to the transcript from People v. Castro, Los Angeles Superior Court Crim. A-232902, he fails to provide legal authority supporting his claim that the trial court should have taken judicial notice of it. The court notes that even if such evidence had been introduced, it would not demonstrate systematic exclusion of a cognizable group in Los Angeles County. Furthermore, the defendant argues that the selection of jurors from county-wide voter registration lists for the central district violates due process and equal protection, contrasting it with juror selection in other districts. However, this issue was not raised before a juror was sworn, and although it could be a valid challenge, it was not appropriately presented in the trial court. The defense counsel's request for judicial notice of the Castro transcript during the motion for a new trial did not constitute a valid challenge to the jury panel. Additionally, any facts alleged in the defendant's brief are not part of the record, and reviewing courts do not consider extra-record matters on direct appeal. Consequently, the issue remains improperly before the court, as established by prior case law. A motion to quash the indictment was filed on the basis that the Grand Jury selection process discriminated against minority races, specifically targeting individuals of foreign ancestry, including Spanish, Mexican, Oriental, and Arabian descent. The defendant, identified as a Palestinian Arab, argued that there was purposeful discrimination against "Spanish surnamed Mexican Americans." The court denied the motion after a hearing. On appeal, the defendant claimed that racial minorities were under-represented on the Los Angeles County Grand Jury but failed to demonstrate that these minorities formed an identifiable class or had experienced unconstitutional discrimination. The court deemed it unnecessary to explore the claim about "Spanish surnamed Mexican Americans" further, as the defendant did not belong to that group. The ruling referenced the precedent set in Peters v. Kiff, which allows a defendant to challenge a conviction based on the exclusion of any race from the grand jury, but noted that this case was initiated before the Peters decision. It was established that typically, individuals cannot challenge jury composition unless they are part of the discriminated group, and the defendant did not provide evidence of prejudice resulting from the alleged discrimination. The discussion included comparisons to similar cases and affirmed that the exceptions to the general rule of jury composition challenges were not applicable here, given the lack of demonstrated prejudice. Justice Marshall affirmed that any criminal defendant, regardless of race, has the standing to challenge the jury selection process if it excludes members of any race, constituting a violation of due process without needing to prove actual harm. Justice White, in a concurring opinion, supported this stance by allowing a white petitioner to contest his conviction based on the exclusion of Black jurors from the grand jury. He emphasized the need to uphold a federal statute that prohibits racial disqualification in jury service, making this the standard for future criminal proceedings. Chief Justice Burger, dissenting, acknowledged the unlawfulness of racial exclusions but argued that such illegality does not automatically invalidate a conviction without evidence of prejudice. Neither Marshall nor Burger disputed White's view on retroactivity, which the court chose to adopt. The defendant also contended that the judiciary's role in nominating and reviewing grand jurors violates the separation of powers and challenges the indictment's validity, though he did not raise these points in his motion to quash the indictment. The court referenced prior cases indicating that failure to challenge irregularities in grand jury selection waives those claims. Consequently, the court modified the judgment to impose life imprisonment instead of the death penalty for the murder and affirmed it. Justice McComb concurred with the opinion but dissented regarding the proposed modification of the judgment, referencing his dissent in People v. Anderson, asserting the unconstitutionality of the death penalty. The appellant's request for a rehearing was denied on July 26, 1972. The defendant argued that the court abused its discretion by rejecting his plea offer for first-degree murder with life imprisonment and contended multiple reasons for overturning the death penalty beyond claims of cruel or unusual punishment. A doctor’s evaluation noted the defendant showed no signs of psychotic delusions or autism, indicating he was defensive and preferred to be seen as an Arab nationalist rather than as insane. The doctor described delusions as fixed, false, and illogical beliefs. Additionally, the court's decision was influenced by a desire to avoid confining jurors to a hotel during the holiday. The defendant claimed he was denied a fair trial, pointing to the replacement of two jurors and two alternates before deliberations. However, no violation of the admonition against discussing the case was established. Some jurors mentioned hearing speculation about a guilty plea, but there was no evidence that this affected the impartiality of the jury. A juror's claim of impartiality and ability to disregard extraneous information is not always determinative, as established in various case law precedents. It cannot be assumed that jurors will follow instructions to disregard certain evidence. During the defense's motion for a mistrial, the counsel emphasized that the jury's role was to determine the degree of murder, not to seek acquittal. The defendant argued that the court wrongly admitted evidence of an admission, but the court's decision was ultimately upheld. The excerpt discusses constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and self-incrimination, referencing the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, as applied to states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, it includes controversial statements introduced by the defense, suggesting violent intentions against government officials, and mentions the property deeded to Adel and his mother in 1963. The prosecution's response to the defendant's motion to suppress focused on the issue of consent provided by Adel. During the hearing, Officer Brandt testified to the prosecution's interest in evidence related to a potential conspiracy, suggesting the involvement of others not yet in custody. The prosecution emphasized the seriousness of the situation, referring to an attempted assassination of a prominent public figure and noting that the suspect in custody was uncooperative. The prosecution argued that the officers acted reasonably based on Adel's consent, asserting an emergency context that justified their actions. Despite not explicitly stating the target of the alleged conspiracy (whether it involved Senator Kennedy alone or multiple political leaders), it was implied that the latter was considered. The ruling in Vale was referenced, contrasting it with Johnson v. United States regarding the circumstances of seizing evidence, with Vale indicating that the seized items were not at risk of destruction. Officer Brandt mentioned consulting his superior about the legality of searching the home with Adel's consent, indicating a cautious approach rather than a denial of perceived emergency. Judicial notice was taken of the recent assassinations of both Martin Luther King, Jr. and President John F. Kennedy, establishing a context of heightened concern for public safety. When evidence found in the defendant's bedroom and trash was presented, defense counsel objected on several grounds: the search violated constitutional rights due to the lack of a warrant, the possibility of obtaining one, insufficient probable cause, absence of the defendant's consent (asserting that Adel's consent was not valid), and questioning Adel's authority to consent to a search of the defendant's private areas. Counsel reiterated arguments made during the earlier motion to suppress. The items in question were not explicitly identified as exempt from search and seizure based on their nature. The court dismissed the argument that the principles from Edwards should only apply prospectively. Following an assassination, the defendant's mother was relocated for several days. An envelope found in the trash was crumpled and contained nonsensical writing, including the phrase "disposed of properly." Evidence Code section 1153 states that a withdrawn guilty plea or an offer to plead guilty is inadmissible in any criminal action. Penal Code section 1192.4 at the time allowed for a defendant's guilty plea to be deemed withdrawn if not accepted by the prosecutor and approved by the court, making it inadmissible in criminal proceedings. Sections 1192.1 to 1192.3 permitted conditional pleas, limiting potential punishment to what was specified in the plea. The court found it unnecessary to determine if admissions related to a genuine offer to plead guilty fall under the exclusionary rule of Evidence Code section 1153 and Penal Code section 1192.4. Witherspoon noted that a future defendant could challenge a jury's impartiality if jurors opposed to the death penalty were excluded, raising questions about balancing the state's interest in capital punishment and the defendant's right to a fair trial. The court ruled that individuals who do not register do not constitute a "cognizable group." According to Penal Code section 1059, a challenge to the jury panel must be based on significant procedural errors or intentional omissions in summoning jurors, which the defendant did not argue. The defendant's arguments were largely supported by transcripts and exhibits from two prior cases that were not introduced into the current proceedings. Prior to the hearing on Sirhan's motion to quash the indictment, the court and counsel discussed the Castro transcript. Initially, the court indicated that it understood the transcript would be utilized; however, it later expressed a desire to avoid it and suggested that defense counsel call witnesses instead. During the motion for a new trial, defense counsel sought judicial notice of the Castro transcript to support a challenge to the grand jury, but the court rejected this request, stating it had not examined or considered that evidence in its original ruling. The court noted the defendant failed to provide authority for judicial notice and deemed it unnecessary to address the matter given the court's conclusions. The defendant cited cases suggesting a different stance on whether one can complain about unconstitutionally excluded groups but acknowledged that the prevailing rule in this jurisdiction differed. The defendant claimed the contentions in the Castro transcript were adopted by him, but the court determined that the arguments raised were not timely and did not effectively present the current issues to the trial court.