Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth

Citations: 300 S.E.2d 603; 225 Va. 157; 1983 Va. LEXIS 202Docket: Record 820681

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; March 11, 1983; Virginia; State Supreme Court

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In Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed whether vehicles operated by Browning-Ferris, Inc. (BFI) for transporting waste materials are considered "for hire" vehicles under Code 46.1-1(35) and -160. The trial court had ruled in favor of this classification, leading to BFI's conviction for a traffic infraction. BFI, which provides waste collection and disposal services under contract, argued against the ruling on several grounds: that waste is not property, that any waste transported belongs to BFI, and that its primary business is not transportation.

The court analyzed the definition of "property" as outlined in Code 46.1-1(35) and determined that industrial waste qualifies as property since it can be owned or possessed. Despite BFI's contention that the waste had no economic value, the court referenced support from other jurisdictions and concluded that solid waste must be classified as property to serve the purpose of the motor carrier compensation statutes. The court affirmed the trial court's decision, solidifying the stance that BFI's operations fall within the "for hire" vehicle category under the relevant statutes.

Wear and tear on highways is unaffected by the type of cargo transported, whether garbage or caviar. Compensatory user fees, which serve as license taxes, are intended for highway construction and maintenance. The case involves transporting 30 cubic feet of solid waste, classified as property under Code § 46.1-1(35). BFI asserts ownership of the waste transfers to it upon loading into its truck, arguing that transportation for hire cannot involve one's own property. However, BFI's focus on property ownership is deemed irrelevant; the service of collecting and disposing of waste is the core operation, with compensation linked to using public highways.

The Commonwealth supports the trial court's ruling with two Attorney General opinions, indicating legislative approval of the interpretations. The absence of corrective amendments suggests legislative acquiescence to the Attorney General's views. Thus, ownership of the waste does not dictate the nature of BFI's operations, which are classified as "for hire" under the relevant code.

Additionally, BFI claims collection is its primary business, making transportation incidental and exempt from the license fee, citing rulings from the Interstate Commerce Commission. The Attorney General counters that the Commission's rulings are irrelevant to road maintenance fees. The statute does not differentiate between primary and secondary operations, leading to the court's decision to affirm the trial court's judgment. Justice Thompson contributed to the opinion before retiring on March 2, 1983, with supporting comments from the Attorney General regarding the nature of BFI's services in waste collection and disposal.

Motor vehicles used for solid waste collection and removal generate compensation that directly correlates with their service. The contract stipulates that waste becomes the property of the hauler upon removal, but this does not alter the compensation structure, which is fundamentally for the use of motor vehicles in the transaction. The Attorney General's report from 1979-80 clarifies that the primary service offered is transportation of solid waste, and ownership of the waste during transit does not impact the compensation received for these services. Consequently, it is concluded that the company operates for rent or hire as defined in Code 46.1-1(35). This interpretation is consistent with a prior opinion from 1966.