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State v. Nix
Citations: 469 S.E.2d 497; 220 Ga. App. 651; 96 Fulton County D. Rep. 1082; 1996 Ga. App. LEXIS 218Docket: A95A2125
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; March 1, 1996; Georgia; State Appellate Court
The Court of Appeals of Georgia upheld the trial court's decision to grant Roy Gene Nix's special demurrer, resulting in the dismissal of one count of vehicular homicide and two counts of failure to yield right of way from the charges against him. Nix faced charges stemming from a traffic accident where he turned left and collided with an oncoming vehicle. The charges included two counts of vehicular homicide and three counts of failing to yield the right of way. The trial court determined that the relevant statutes, OCGA § 40-6-21 and § 40-6-1, did not define a specific violation of law, as the first statute outlines the meanings of traffic signals rather than establishing violations, while the second simply states that failing to comply with provisions can be a misdemeanor. The State argued that the language in OCGA § 40-6-21 implied a requirement to yield, thus constituting a violation. However, the court emphasized the need to interpret statutes in a way that aligns with legislative intent, indicating that while the legislature aimed to enforce adherence to traffic signals, the specific provisions cited did not provide a clear basis for the charges. The court's reasoning was guided by principles of statutory construction, emphasizing coherence and intent across related laws. The court declines to adopt the state's interpretation that the legislature intended to charge the offense of failure to yield under both relevant Code sections. The purpose of amending OCGA § 40-6-21 in 1995 was to clarify the meaning of traffic signals, indicating that this section serves only as a definitional guideline. The cited case law does not necessitate a different outcome, as most cases involved charges under both OCGA § 40-6-20 and § 40-6-21, with one case discussing OCGA § 40-6-21 in the context of jury instructions, which is not relevant here. Although OCGA § 40-6-21 contains language about yielding, this does not align with the statute's intent. OCGA § 40-6-20, however, mandates compliance with traffic control devices and can support charges like vehicular homicide or failure to yield. OCGA § 40-6-1 cannot be the sole basis for charges as it does not specify prohibited conduct, only penalties for violations of provisions that lack their own penalties. The trial court's granting of Nix's special demurrer for Counts 1, 3, and 4 is upheld, and the state's argument citing OCGA § 40-6-393 (b) is rejected because it requires a specific violation, which OCGA § 40-6-21 does not provide. The judgment is affirmed, with concurrence from McMurray, P.J., and Blackburn, J.