Schmidt v. Courtney

Citations: 592 S.E.2d 326; 357 S.C. 310; 2003 S.C. App. LEXIS 212Docket: 3719

Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina; December 22, 2003; South Carolina; State Appellate Court

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Wayne Schmidt and Terri J. Schmidt filed a negligence lawsuit against Michael Courtney after Wayne was injured by a golf ball while roofing a house adjacent to the Crowfield Golf and Country Club, operated by Kemper Sports of Crowfield, Inc. Schmidt was struck in the head by a ball hit by Courtney, resulting in permanent brain damage and loss of work capability. Initially, Schmidt sued Courtney but later included Kemper Sports, alleging negligent design, operation, and maintenance of the golf course. 

The circuit court granted summary judgment to Kemper Sports, leading to Schmidt's appeal. During the summary judgment hearing, Schmidt's attorney introduced an expert witness, Gerald W. Pirkl, specializing in golf course safety, who would testify regarding the foreseeability of golf balls leaving the course boundaries. The attorney noted the difficulty in locating an appropriate expert and provided an affidavit that outlined several points: the full extent of Schmidt's brain injuries wasn't diagnosed until late 1999, there is a lack of case law in South Carolina on golf course liability, and expert testimony would suggest the golf course design made the adjacent house part of a foreseeable area for golf play. The appellate court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Counsel asserts that the design of the fairway limits the ability to play a first shot along its centerline. The expert is expected to testify that the tee shots from the furthest tee box diminish the shot angle towards the fairway’s centerline as designed. Evidence will likely indicate that the golf course operator failed to provide adequate screening or fairway map information, risking the safety of individuals outside the course who could be hit by errant shots. Counsel has initiated aerial photography of the fairway and tee boxes to support a written opinion addressing design and operational deficiencies related to the Defendant, Kemper. A report from the expert landscape architect is anticipated within two weeks, with further aerial photography responses due by May 13, 2002. A judge ruled that the expert witness issue was not before the court due to a late affidavit submission, leading to a summary judgment in favor of Kemper Sports. A subsequent motion to reconsider was denied. The standard of review for summary judgment motions requires no genuine issue of material fact, with evidence viewed favorably toward the nonmoving party. If triable issues are present, they must be determined by a jury.

Under Rule 56(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure (SCRCP), the party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden to prove there is no genuine issue of material fact. If the moving party succeeds, the nonmoving party must present specific facts to demonstrate that a factual dispute exists, rather than relying on allegations or denials in pleadings. The purpose of summary judgment is to facilitate the resolution of cases that do not require a fact-finder.

In this case, Schmidt contended that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to Kemper Sports before allowing adequate discovery. The trial judge recognized the necessity of expert testimony and was aware that Schmidt’s counsel had recently found a qualified expert. However, when the judge inquired about a continuance to secure this testimony, Kemper Sports’ attorney objected, leading to the denial of the continuance request.

The ruling on summary judgment was deemed particularly concerning due to the novel legal issue regarding personal injury from errant golf shots and the severe implications for Schmidt. South Carolina case law emphasizes that summary judgment is a "drastic remedy" that should be used cautiously to ensure that parties are not unjustly deprived of a trial on disputed facts. It is critical that the opposing party has a "full and fair opportunity" to complete discovery before such a judgment is granted.

Summary judgment is inappropriate when further fact-finding is needed to clarify the law's application, as established in several South Carolina cases (e.g., Lanham, Moriarty, Mosteller). Even if evidentiary facts are not disputed, but only the conclusions drawn from them are, summary judgment should still be denied. The case of Schmidt illustrates this, where the application of law to undisputed facts is contested and presents a novel issue. Rule 56(f), SCRCP, allows a court to deny summary judgment or grant a continuance if a party opposing the motion indicates, via affidavits, that they cannot provide necessary facts to justify their opposition. This rule emphasizes that the opposing party must present affidavits explaining the need for further discovery. The affidavit submitted by Kent meets the criteria of Rule 56(f), raising questions about whether "party" includes an "attorney," the conclusiveness of the affidavit, the applicability of the two-day rule, and whether the judge abused discretion by not considering the affidavit. Schmidt argues that the attorney, familiar with the case's circumstances, can submit the affidavit under Rule 56(f).

The attorney is best suited to file an affidavit rather than a party relying on information from the attorney. Rule 56(f) permits an attorney to submit an affidavit stating their inability to present essential facts for opposition. The affidavit submitted by Kent contains specific facts and does not fall under "conclusory" definitions. Kemper Sports' argument that the affidavit was untimely under Rule 56(c) is rejected, as the rule's application of time limits is not justified. The trial judge noted the affidavit was submitted late but also asserted that the absence of timely filed affidavits made this point moot. The judge's failure to exercise discretion in evaluating the affidavit constitutes an abuse of discretion, as established in prior case law. The non-moving party must show that further discovery could yield relevant evidence rather than merely fishing for information. In Baughman v. American Tel. Tel. Co., the court ruled that summary judgment was premature due to the potential for additional relevant evidence from further discovery efforts. Similarly, in the current case, Kent’s claims regarding the necessity of expert testimony indicate a need for more discovery, as the judge acknowledged Kent's diligence in securing an expert, paralleling the circumstances in Baughman. Schmidt faced similar challenges in obtaining responses to discovery requests, highlighting the complexity of the case.

Kent stated that Pirkl, a California resident, has only recently established a website, of which Kent was unaware until the previous week. In the case of Middleborough Horizontal Prop. Regime Council v. Montedison, Montedison argued against the trial court's summary judgment, claiming inadequate opportunity for discovery. The court ruled that Montedison had sufficient time to oppose the motion, as no formal continuance request was made nor specific prejudice indicated. Kent, in contrast, expressed challenges in finding an expert in golf course design and the inability to obtain discovery responses, contending that summary judgment would be prejudicial given his expert's availability. The court emphasized that negligence claims inherently involve questions about the reasonableness of conduct, foreseeability, and proximate cause, making them unsuitable for summary judgment. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment ruling, noting that genuine material facts existed regarding Kemper Sports' negligence. 

In a negligence claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a duty of care owed by the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) that the breach caused the plaintiff's injury; and (4) actual damages suffered. The court reiterated that establishing duty is a legal question, and if no duty exists, the defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kemper Sports contended it owed no duty to Schmidt, arguing that golf courses are not liable for injuries from errant shots unless deemed unreasonably unsafe.

Kemper Sports cites several cases involving injuries to golfers to argue that liability for such accidents is limited. In **Campion v. Chicago Landscape Co.**, the court noted that golf course operators are not insurers against all accidents, particularly when the injured party is a player. Similarly, **Petrich v. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n** emphasized that golfers must give warnings before hitting, indicating that players assume the risk of injury. **Trauman v. City of New York** also involved a golfer, contrasting with the current case where Schmidt, a non-golfer, was injured. In **Baker v. Thibodaux**, the court ruled that golfers accept the inherent risks, highlighting that Baker was aware of the potential danger. Schmidt, however, testified that he does not play golf and had not previously encountered stray golf balls while working on a house, undermining any assumption of risk on his part. Schmidt must prove negligence by Kemper Sports as the proximate cause of his injury, which requires demonstrating both causation in fact (that his injury wouldn’t have occurred but for the defendant's negligence) and legal cause (foreseeability of the injury at the time of the alleged negligence).

A plaintiff is not required to show that the defendant foresaw the specific event that occurred, but rather that the defendant should have anticipated that their negligence could likely cause injury. The court determined that further discovery, particularly expert testimony, is critical to establish whether Kemper Sports had a duty to Schmidt and if its negligence was the proximate cause of Schmidt's injury. Consequently, the previous grant of summary judgment is reversed. The trial judge recognized the necessity for expert testimony, indicating that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Kemper Sports' duty to Schmidt and the causation of the injury. Due to the need for additional discovery, the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment was erroneous. The case is therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Notably, there is a discrepancy regarding the date of Schmidt's injury, with different sources citing August 27 or August 28, 1998.