Court: West Virginia Supreme Court; April 19, 1990; West Virginia; State Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed an appeal from the West Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles regarding a final order from the Circuit Court of Raleigh County in the case of Vince P. Shumate. The Court determined that the Circuit Court's decision should be reversed. The case involved Shumate's arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol on March 8, 1980, violating W.Va. Code 17C-5-2 [1976]. The statute imposed penalties including a six-month revocation of a driver's license for a first conviction, ten years for a second conviction within five years, and indefinite revocation for a third or subsequent conviction unless restored by the commissioner after ten years, provided certain conditions were met.
Shumate's second arrest occurred on September 19, 1987, under the same statute, now amended in 1986. During the interim, a new provision (W.Va. Code chapter 17C, article 5A) was enacted, allowing the commissioner to revoke licenses through administrative proceedings. Specifically, W.Va. Code 17C-5A-2(i) mandates a six-month license revocation if the commissioner finds evidence of driving under the influence or having a blood alcohol concentration of 0.10% or more. The Court's ruling indicates a significant revision in the interpretation and application of these statutes in Shumate's case.
If the commissioner has previously suspended or revoked an individual's license under specified provisions, the revocation period shall be ten years. Subsection (j) of W.Va. Code, 17C-5A-2 [1986] defines that prior suspensions or revocations, including certain criminal convictions, are considered when determining license status. Specifically, any conviction under previous enactments of W.Va. Code, 17C-5-2 for actions occurring within five years before September 1, 1981, is included. The appellee's first revocation in March 1980 fell within this timeframe, leading the commissioner to revoke the appellee's license for ten years following an incident on September 19, 1987, based on W.Va. Code, 17C-5A-2 (j)(2) [1986]. The appellee argues this application violates ex post facto clauses of both the U.S. and West Virginia Constitutions. The Circuit Court of Raleigh County agreed, ruling the law's application unconstitutional and reducing the revocation period to six months, classifying the September 1987 event as the appellee's first offense. Constitutional provisions state that no ex post facto laws shall be enacted. A precedent from Adkins v. Bordenkircher reinforces that laws increasing penalties post-offense cannot be applied retroactively. However, the court ultimately held that the application of W.Va. Code, 17C-5A-2 [1986] does not violate ex post facto principles, citing a similar case from Washington where the 'Habitual Traffic Offenders Act' was deemed not unconstitutionally retroactive despite similar challenges.
Upon the act's effective date, the defendants were aware that accruing one more violation would classify them as habitual offenders. They each committed an additional violation, which resulted in their classification under the act; without this violation, they would not have been deemed habitual offenders. The act does not create vested rights or impose new duties or disabilities on the defendants regarding their transactions. The defendants could have avoided the consequences of the act by refraining from illegal conduct. A statute is not retroactive if it does not alter the legal effect of past actions, nor does it violate ex post facto principles if it is based on events prior to its enactment without changing their legal implications.
The court also rejected the defendants' argument that revocation of a driver's license constitutes punishment, clarifying that while it may be viewed as punitive in some contexts, it is predominantly protective of public safety and is categorized as a civil action. The relevant West Virginia Code was enacted before the appellee's second violation, aligning with the events and not violating ex post facto principles. The code permits the Department of Motor Vehicles to revoke licenses based on previous suspensions, emphasizing legislative intent to consider past violations in determining revocation duration. The appellee's claim of punitive nature regarding license loss was dismissed, reaffirming the law's focus on public safety rather than punishment for offenders.
It is determined that applying W.Va. Code chapter 17C, article 5A to individuals with previously suspended or revoked motor vehicle licenses does not violate ex post facto clauses under both the U.S. Constitution and the West Virginia Constitution. Even if there were grounds to argue that W.Va. Code 17C-5A-2(j)(2) is ex post facto, it is unlikely that such a claim would succeed. Enacted in 1981, chapter 17C, article 5A provides the Department of Motor Vehicles with administrative authority to revoke licenses for violations related to driving under the influence. The proceedings under this statute are classified as civil, with a burden of proof set at "a preponderance of the evidence," differing from criminal standards. Various courts have established that ex post facto clauses do not apply in administrative license revocation contexts. As a result, the prior ruling by the Circuit Court of Raleigh County is reversed. Additionally, the discussion notes that similar vehicle regulations, such as point systems, are generally valid if they ensure due process and do not discriminate. Ex post facto principles are acknowledged to be applicable only to criminal matters and not to civil proceedings.
