Williams v. E. T. Gresham Co.

Citations: 201 Va. 457; 111 S.E.2d 498; 1959 Va. LEXIS 249Docket: Record 4994

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; November 30, 1959; Virginia; State Supreme Court

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Henry Harold Williams, an employee of the Chesapeake Bay Ferry District, sustained severe hand injuries when part of a crane's rigging owned by E. T. Gresham Company, Inc. fell on him while he was working on a pile-driving project. Williams filed a lawsuit for $100,000 in damages, alleging negligence due to defective equipment and improper operation by the defendant's employees. E. T. Gresham denied negligence and claimed contributory negligence on Williams's part, additionally asserting that Williams's claim was barred by the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act, under which both the plaintiff and defendant were covered. The trial court denied motions to strike the plaintiff's case, but the jury ultimately ruled in favor of the defendant. Williams's subsequent motion to overturn the verdict was also denied. The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the case, concluding that the Workmen's Compensation Act provided Williams with his exclusive remedy, thus precluding his common law action against the defendant. The court deemed it unnecessary to address other assignments of error since the Workmen's Compensation Act's applicability was determinative.

Chesapeake Bay Ferry District and the Chesapeake Bay Ferry Commission were established by Chapter 693 of the 1954 Acts of Assembly, designating the Ferry District as a political subdivision of the Commonwealth. The Commission was tasked with acquiring, constructing, operating, and maintaining ferry services connecting various locations, including Hampton and Northampton, and facilitating links within the State Highway System. The Act permitted the issuance of ferry revenue bonds, to be repaid from earnings, and authorized toll collection for bond payments and project maintenance.

By April 23, 1957, the Ferry District was already operating a ferry service across the Chesapeake Bay, with a maintenance department of about twelve employees led by Kenneth Barber and port captain George Daniels. The maintenance department managed ordinary upkeep, while major repairs were contracted out. Prior to the specified date, Captain Daniels requested crane assistance from William N. Gresham, leading to the dispatch of crane No. 14 and a crew to perform dredging and pile driving tasks.

Ferry District was responsible for providing materials and direct supervision of the work, despite the crane crew not being directed by their employer on-site. The Ferry District’s employees, including a selected carpenter, played a vital role in guiding the operations, connecting equipment, and managing the placement of piles. The Ferry District had never owned pile-driving equipment and has always relied on external sources for such needs.

Chappell and Bjork operated the crane involved in the incident where the plaintiff sustained severe injury when a follow block fell and struck his right hand. The defendant was responsible for selecting the crane, hiring, and training the operators. Captain Daniels noted a collaborative effort between the crane crew and the Ferry District maintenance employees. It was established that both Ferry District and E. T. Gresham Company, along with their employees, had accepted the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act at the time of the accident. The plaintiff received compensation for total disability and later a specific award for permanent disability, with no appeals filed against these awards from the Industrial Commission.

The main legal issue at hand is whether the plaintiff's claim is barred by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Relevant sections of the Act indicate that employees who accept its provisions forgo other common law rights for injuries sustained in the course of employment. Specifically, Section 65-37 states that the rights and remedies under the Act exclude all other claims for injuries. Section 65-38 establishes that a lawful claim for compensation operates as an assignment of any potential claims against other parties to the employer, who can seek recovery on behalf of the injured employee. Section 65-99 mandates that employers must insure compensation payments, limiting their liability to the terms specified in the Act while insurance is active. Additionally, Section 65-26 holds that an owner who contracts a subcontractor for work retains liability to compensate any workers injured as if they were directly employed by the owner.

A similar case, Rea, Administratrix Ford, involved a principal contractor renting a crane and operator for a construction project. An accident occurred during the hoisting of trusses, resulting in the death of an employee, underscoring the complexities of liability in such scenarios.

Arthur H. Jurgensen, the superintendent for Daniel, directed the crane crew, who were on Ford's payroll but received no operational instructions from him. The widow of a deceased worker filed a claim for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act against Daniel and its insurer, resulting in an award from the Industrial Commission. The plaintiff alleged that the worker's death was due to Ford's negligence, citing defective equipment and negligent operation by Ford's employee. However, the trial court struck this evidence, ruling that the incidents fell under the Workmen's Compensation Act, making it the plaintiff's exclusive remedy. On appeal, it was affirmed that Ford was not considered an 'other party' under Code 65-38, as he acted as a subcontractor engaged in essential work for the principal contractor, Daniel, thereby also being protected under the Act. A referenced case, Anderson Thorington Construction Company, illustrated a similar legal principle, where an employee of one independent contractor could not sue another independent contractor for negligence due to the exclusivity of workmen's compensation benefits as a remedy. The Authority, a political subdivision, had contracted various independent contractors for construction work and had ensured workers' compensation coverage for its employees.

Mr. Chief Justice Eggleston addressed the legal implications surrounding the Workmen's Compensation Act as it pertains to the case involving Thorington, the Engineers, and the Ferry District. It was determined that both Thorington and the Engineers were engaged in the Authority's trade and, thus, not considered "strangers" to the work. Consequently, Thorington was not classified as an "other party" under Section 65-38, which would allow for a legal action for damages related to personal injuries sustained by an employee of the Engineers, Anderson.

The plaintiff argued that the Ferry District's purpose was solely to provide ferry services, and maintenance did not fall under its business activities per the Act, referencing the Sears case where a business was not held liable for injuries sustained during construction alterations. The court noted that the nature of the work was critical, distinguishing the case at hand from the Sears and Kramer cases, where the work was not part of the primary business.

The Ferry District Commission was explicitly authorized to undertake various duties, including maintenance, which was directly related to its operational responsibilities. The evidence indicated that the injuries occurred while the defendant was performing essential duties of the Ferry District, thus falling under the protections of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The plaintiff's assertion that the Ferry District's status as a political subdivision exempted it from the Act was rejected, aligning with previous rulings. The trial court's failure to strike the plaintiff's evidence and rule in favor of the defendant was deemed erroneous, resulting in the affirmation of the original judgment.