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State v. Ward
Citations: 284 S.E.2d 881; 168 W. Va. 385; 1981 W. Va. LEXIS 771Docket: 15170
Court: West Virginia Supreme Court; December 8, 1981; West Virginia; State Supreme Court
James Ward appealed his twenty-year sentence as an accessory before the fact to armed robbery, claiming denial of a speedy trial and erroneous pretrial and evidentiary rulings. The Circuit Court of Wetzel County had indicted him during the May 1978 Term while he was absent; he returned for the January 1979 Term, and trial was set for later that term. The court made three significant rulings challenged on appeal: allowing the State to amend its witness list, denying Ward's motion to exclude post-robbery evidence, and continuing the case to investigate a possible conflict of interest concerning his defense counsel, who had previously worked for the opposing prosecutor. During the May 14, 1979 trial, the State's key witness, Jerry Lee Hicks, testified under immunity, admitting to the robbery and implicating Ward in its planning. Despite objections, Hicks detailed Ward's involvement in actions following the robbery. On the stand, Ward denied participation, but his stepdaughter, Dora Morgan, later testified against him, leading to a defense motion for mistrial, which was denied, though her testimony was stricken from the record. Ward argued that the continuance from January to May constituted a denial of a speedy trial; however, the delay was justified by the trial court’s concern over potential conflict of interest. The court ruled that good cause existed for the continuance, affirming that a trial could be postponed past the indictment term under such circumstances. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia ultimately found no reversible error and upheld the conviction. The trial court has discretion under W.Va. Code, 62-3-1 to grant continuances for good cause, which was deemed applicable in this case due to a potential conflict of interest with defense counsel. The court did not abuse its discretion in continuing the appellant's trial. The appellant also claimed that the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding his actions after the robbery, arguing that this constituted evidence of collateral crimes. However, under established exceptions, such evidence is admissible if it demonstrates motive, intent, absence of mistake, a common scheme, or identity. The court found that the evidence related to the robbery and subsequent actions of the appellant unified the series of crimes, supporting the conclusion that they were part of a common scheme. Additionally, the appellant argued the trial court erred in permitting the State to amend its witness list shortly before trial. The State provided an addendum without specific witness information due to threats made against them. The prosecutor offered to provide this information orally, and the court indicated that if defense counsel was unsatisfied, he could request a continuance, which he did not do. It was noted that nondisclosure by the prosecution does not always result in reversible error unless it is prejudicial, as recognized in State v. Grimm. Non-disclosure is deemed prejudicial if it surprises the defense on a material issue and impedes the defendant's case preparation and presentation. In this case, the issue at hand is not non-disclosure but late disclosure. Citing Wilhelm v. Whyte, W.Va. 239 S.E.2d 735 (1977), the same prejudicial effect test applies to late disclosure. No continuance was requested, and the trial occurred a month after the late disclosure. The record indicates that the defense's preparation or presentation was not adversely affected by the delay, rendering the late disclosure argument meritless. Additionally, the appellant contends that the court erred in permitting Ms. Morgan's rebuttal testimony, which was intended to contradict the appellant's claim of non-involvement in the robbery's planning. This aligns with the established rule from State v. Pietranton, which allows the State to introduce evidence after the defense has rested, as it falls within the trial court's discretion. Thus, the admission of Ms. Morgan's testimony was not erroneous. With no reversible errors identified, the Circuit Court of Wetzel County's judgment is affirmed.