Smith v. State
Docket: S93A1582
Court: Supreme Court of Georgia; February 7, 1994; Georgia; State Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's denial of Ivan Edward Smith's plea of former jeopardy, which sought to bar his retrial after a mistrial was declared in his murder case. The mistrial was granted after Smith claimed his custodial statement to police was coerced during redirect examination, a claim the trial court believed should have been addressed in a Jackson-Denno hearing. The court emphasized that once a jury is sworn, jeopardy attaches, and a defendant may only be retried if there is "manifest necessity" for the mistrial, which must be established under urgent circumstances that prevent an impartial verdict. The state argued that Smith's testimony injected irrelevant and prejudicial matters into the trial, warranting a mistrial to ensure fairness. However, the court determined that the absence of a Jackson-Denno hearing regarding the voluntariness of Smith's statement did not necessitate a mistrial, given that Smith had not objected to the statement's admission prior to or during the trial. Instead, he had used the statement to support his defense. The failure to conduct a Jackson-Denno hearing was not considered an "obvious procedural error" that would justify a mistrial, leading to the conclusion that the trial court did not properly evaluate the necessity of the mistrial. A mistrial was deemed unnecessary due to Smith's testimony concerning the circumstances of his confession. The relevance of these circumstances extends to both the legal question of the confession's voluntariness and the factual determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence, as established in Crane v. Kentucky. The manner of obtaining a confession affects its probative weight, and the Constitution ensures defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. Smith's custodial statement was pertinent in evaluating its probative value, particularly as it could support his justification defense while also informing the jury about the coercive conditions under which it was obtained. Such evidence could lead the jury to disregard the statement entirely, significantly impacting the state's case. Consequently, Smith's testimony was relevant and should have been admitted, negating the need for a mistrial. The judgment was reversed with all Justices concurring. Additional notes indicate that while the state's motion for mistrial also cited testimony from Smith's sister regarding the victim's past, the judge's decision to instruct the jury against considering the victim's character was critical. Defense counsel suggested curative instructions for the sister's statement, but the judge found the implications of Smith's testimony about coercion were beyond remedy. A specific exchange during redirect examination raised concerns, as Smith acknowledged that while he wasn't physically forced to give his statement, he felt it was under duress, leading to the state's mistrial motion.