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Gratz v. Bollinger
Citations: 156 L. Ed. 2d 257; 123 S. Ct. 2411; 539 U.S. 244; 2003 U.S. LEXIS 4801; 2003 D.A.R. 6783Docket: 02-516
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 23, 2003; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
Gratz and Hamacher, both Caucasian residents of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of Michigan's College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) but were denied, despite being deemed qualified. The University uses written admissions guidelines that incorporate various factors, including race, to promote diversity, automatically awarding 20 points to applicants from underrepresented minority groups. The petitioners filed a class action lawsuit claiming that this race-based admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and other civil rights statutes. They sought both compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory and injunctive relief against the University's practices. The District Court certified a class of individuals denied admission from 1995 onward based on race and designated Hamacher as the class representative. In the summary judgment motions, the University argued that its admissions process served a compelling interest in achieving diversity, citing precedent from Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke. The court agreed with the University’s current guidelines but found that the admissions practices from 1995 to 1998 constituted a quota, violating Bakke. This led to a summary judgment in favor of the petitioners for those years. While appeals were pending, the Sixth Circuit upheld a different admissions program in Grutter v. Bollinger. The Supreme Court granted certiorari for both cases, affirming that the petitioners had standing to seek relief despite arguments regarding the hypothetical nature of Hamacher's future injury claim. The 'injury in fact' required for establishing standing in cases of unequal treatment is the existence of a barrier, rather than the inability to obtain a benefit. In Hamacher's equal protection challenge against the University’s race-based undergraduate admissions, he claimed that the University denied him the chance to compete equally for admission. Although Hamacher was not admitted as a freshman, he indicated his readiness to apply as a transfer student if the University ceased its race-based admissions policy, thereby establishing his standing for prospective relief. The argument that the admissions processes for freshman and transfer students differ, as posited by Justice Stevens, was rejected. Both processes utilize identical criteria for evaluating candidates, with the primary difference being the automatic allocation of points to underrepresented minority freshman applicants. While this distinction may be relevant for a narrow tailoring analysis, it does not affect the standing of petitioners to challenge the University’s admissions policy. The District Court appropriately certified the class action based on Hamacher’s demonstrated personal stake and potential injuries. The Court concluded that the University's current use of race in freshman admissions is not narrowly tailored to achieve the asserted interest in diversity, thus violating the Equal Protection Clause. Although the Court acknowledged that diversity can be a compelling state interest, the current admissions policy, which allocates 20 points to all underrepresented minority applicants based solely on race, does not meet the necessary tailoring requirements. This approach diverges from the view expressed in Bakke, which advocates for a more individualized assessment of applicants, considering all their attributes rather than relying predominantly on race. Justice Powell's admissions program emphasized that no single characteristic would automatically guarantee a contribution to university diversity. The current LSA policy, however, lacks the individualized consideration Powell advocated, as it only includes a basic review to confirm minority status alongside a 20-point automatic score increase for underrepresented minorities. This approach effectively makes race a decisive factor for nearly all minimally qualified applicants from these groups, contrary to Powell's model, which allowed for race to be a consideration without being determinative. The LSA's provision for flagging files for individualized review is infrequent and highlights systemic flaws compared to Powell's framework. The court dismissed claims that the volume of applications makes individualized consideration impractical, asserting that administrative challenges do not justify a constitutionally flawed system. The current use of race in the admissions policy violates the Equal Protection Clause, as well as Title VI and Section 1981. Consequently, the court reversed the District Court's summary judgment regarding liability. The opinion was delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, with various concurring and dissenting opinions from other justices. The case was taken under certiorari from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, with legal arguments presented by multiple attorneys for both petitioners and respondents, including the Solicitor General. The brief filed by Theodore M. Shaw and others represents respondents Patterson et al. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the Court's opinion after granting certiorari to determine if the University of Michigan's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions contravenes the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Court concluded that the University’s admissions guidelines, which consider applicants' race, violate these provisions, resulting in the reversal of the District Court's decision that had upheld the guidelines. Petitioners Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher, both Caucasian residents of Michigan, applied for admission to the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) but were denied despite having qualified academic credentials. Gratz's application for fall 1995 was delayed and ultimately denied in April 1995, while Hamacher's was similarly delayed and denied in April 1997. Both subsequently enrolled at other universities and filed a class-action lawsuit against the University and its officials in October 1997, alleging violations of their rights to equal protection and racial discrimination. The District Court certified the class of individuals who applied to the LSA but were denied admission from 1995 onwards, including those treated less favorably based on race. Hamacher was designated as the class representative. The court also bifurcated the proceedings into a liability phase to assess the constitutionality of the University's race-based admissions practices. Throughout the litigation, the University modified its admissions guidelines multiple times, which were summarized in the Court's opinion. The Office of Undergraduate Admissions (OUA) at the University manages the admissions process for the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA), utilizing written guidelines to ensure consistent evaluations of the numerous applications. Key factors in admissions decisions include high school grades, standardized test scores, high school quality, curriculum strength, geographical location, alumni connections, leadership, and race. The University has recognized African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans as 'underrepresented minorities' and admits nearly all qualified applicants from these groups. In 1995 and 1996, admissions decisions were based on a GPA 2 score derived from high school GPA and specific 'SCUGA' factors—school quality, curriculum strength, unusual circumstances, geography, and alumni relationships. Admissions counselors referred to tables correlating GPA 2 and ACT/SAT scores to determine outcomes, which could vary by race or ethnicity for applicants with identical scores. For instance, a Caucasian in-state applicant may have faced a postponed decision while a minority applicant with the same scores would likely be admitted. In 1997, the admissions formula was revised to allocate additional points under the 'U' category for factors such as underrepresented minority status and socioeconomic disadvantage. This adjustment continued the trend of differing outcomes based on racial or ethnic status, with minority applicants typically favored. From the 1998 academic year onwards, the OUA replaced the prior guidelines with a 'selection index' scoring system, allowing a maximum of 150 points based on various criteria, including academic performance and personal achievements. Notably, applicants could receive an additional 20 points for being part of an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority. The University clarified that while the scoring mechanics changed, the fundamental approach to considering race and ethnicity in admissions remained consistent. From 1995 to 1998, the University adopted guidelines for admitting qualified applicants from underrepresented minority groups, prioritizing prompt notification of admission to increase the likelihood of enrollment. During this period, the University utilized a rolling admissions system with 'protected seats' for specific groups, including underrepresented minorities. The Enrollment Working Group (EWG) managed admissions pacing to ensure adequate consideration of these applicants, filling any unoccupied seats at the end of the admissions season with other qualified candidates. In 1999 and 2000, the Office of Undergraduate Admissions (OUA) implemented a selection index that awarded 20 points to applicants from underrepresented racial or ethnic minority groups, and established an Admissions Review Committee (ARC) for additional application consideration. Counselors could flag applications for ARC review based on the applicant's academic readiness, selection index score, and unique qualities or characteristics pertinent to the University's desired freshman composition. The ARC then decided on admissions outcomes for these flagged applications. Petitioners filed cross-motions for summary judgment, arguing that the Law School Admissions (LSA) practice of considering race in admissions violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondents cited Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, which suggested that race consideration might serve a compelling government interest. They claimed the LSA's interest lies in the educational benefits of a diverse student body and asserted that their program is narrowly tailored to achieve this goal. Respondent-intervenors pointed to a compelling interest in remedying historical discrimination against minorities. The District Court reviewed the Bakke decision and noted that while no subsequent rulings explicitly endorsed the diversity rationale, it had not been dismissed either. The court found that there was substantial evidence supporting the claim that a diverse student body yields significant educational benefits, establishing it as a compelling governmental interest. The court evaluated whether the LSA's admissions guidelines effectively served the interest in fostering a diverse student body. Citing Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, the District Court concluded that the LSA's admissions program implemented in 1999 was a narrowly tailored approach to achieving educational benefits from diversity, as it did not employ rigid quotas or predetermined numbers for minority admissions. Awarding 20 points for underrepresented minority status was deemed not equivalent to a quota, as candidates still underwent comprehensive review. The court found no merit in claims that the LSA's system resembled the objectionable two-track system from Bakke or that it aimed solely for racial balancing, clarifying that the LSA did not seek specific minority proportions. In contrast, the court criticized the admissions guidelines from 1995 to 1998, which effectively reserved spots for minority applicants, thereby restricting competition and operating as a quota, contrary to Bakke. The court granted summary judgment favoring petitioners regarding the earlier admissions practices while supporting the 1999 and 2000 programs. As a result, the petitioners' request for injunctive relief was denied. The court issued a ruling consistent with these findings and certified questions for interlocutory appeal to the Sixth Circuit. After the Sixth Circuit upheld the University of Michigan Law School's admissions program in Grutter v. Bollinger, petitioners sought certiorari from the Supreme Court to examine the constitutionality of race consideration in university admissions more broadly. The case proceeded despite the Court of Appeals not having completed its judgment. The petitioners argued that the University's admissions practices violated the Equal Protection Clause, Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The Supreme Court first assessed the petitioners' standing for declaratory and injunctive relief, affirming their standing despite dissenting opinions questioning the basis of Hamacher's claims regarding future injury. Hamacher's standing to seek prospective relief regarding the University of Michigan's use of race in admissions hinges on his intent to apply as a transfer student, despite not having submitted a transfer application. The District Court found that Hamacher intends to transfer once the race-based preference is eliminated. Established case law supports that intent can be relevant for standing in equal protection challenges, as seen in Clements v. Fashing, where standing was granted based on the intent to announce candidacy despite an automatic resignation rule. Similar principles were applied in other cases, demonstrating that the injury in such challenges stems from the discriminatory barrier itself rather than an inability to obtain a specific benefit. Hamacher asserted he was ready to apply as a transfer student, having been denied admission as a freshman due to the race-based admissions policy, which further solidifies his standing. Additionally, Justice Stevens argues that Hamacher lacks standing to represent class members in challenging the freshman admissions policy due to differences in how race is applied in transfer admissions. The excerpt addresses the status of a legal challenge to the University’s use of race in undergraduate admissions, focusing on whether the issue pertains to Article III standing or class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). It notes that both standing and adequacy requirements are met, as petitioners have consistently opposed racial discrimination in admissions, seeking injunctive relief against such practices and proposing a class of individuals who are not part of underrepresented minority groups and who applied or intended to apply to the LSA from 1995 onward. The District Court found that the proposed class met numerosity, commonality, and typicality requirements, and that Hamacher was a suitable representative without conflicting interests. The court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(2), concluding that the University’s discriminatory practices were applied uniformly. Justice Stevens references Blum v. Yaretsky to argue against the certification, where the Supreme Court found named representatives could not represent absent class members in different circumstances. However, it is concluded that the concerns raised by the University’s admissions practices do not differ significantly between freshman and transfer admissions, and respondents did not substantiate any claims of differing concerns regarding Hamacher’s standing. The OUA annually publishes guidelines titled 'COLLEGE OF LITERATURE, SCIENCE AND THE ARTS GUIDELINES FOR ALL TERMS,' outlining the admission criteria for various applicant types, including freshmen and transfer students. Notably, the evaluation criteria for transfer applicants mirror those for freshmen, particularly in assessing contributions to diversity. In 1997, a specific section within the transfer guidelines emphasized that transfer applicants contributing to a diverse student body should generally be admitted, even with lower qualifications. Admissions counselors were guided to evaluate transfer candidates based on diversity criteria initially defined for freshmen. The University prioritizes diversity, asserting that it enhances educational experiences, and considers membership in underrepresented minority groups as a significant factor in admissions for both categories. The process for freshmen includes a fixed point system, while transfer applicants are admitted more broadly based on similar diversity contributions. This distinction may pertain to narrow tailoring analysis but does not impact the standing of petitioners challenging the University's race considerations in admissions, which are defended as serving a compelling state interest in promoting diversity. The District Court found that the University’s rationale for race-based preferences centers on the educational benefits of a diverse student body, and the petitioners contest the legitimacy of diversity as a compelling state interest. Ultimately, the District Court's decision to certify a class-action challenge to the University's race-based admissions policies was upheld, as these policies are applied uniformly across all undergraduate admissions. Class determination in this case necessitates a thorough examination of the factual and legal issues related to the plaintiff's claims. The significance of a class action arises from the potential mootness of individual students' claims, ensuring that a justiciable issue is presented to the Court. Hamacher's personal stake, stemming from both past and potential future injuries, legitimizes his participation in the class-action challenge against the University's racial considerations in undergraduate admissions. Petitioners assert that the University's race-based admissions practices violate the Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that the Court has only permitted racial classifications as a remedy for proven discrimination, a rationale not adopted by the respondents. They contend that the justification of "diversity" is vague and insufficient to support narrowly tailored racial preferences. However, the Court, referencing Grutter v. Bollinger, has previously dismissed these arguments. Additionally, even if diversity is a legitimate state interest, petitioners claim the District Court incorrectly concluded that the University's admissions policy is narrowly tailored to achieve this goal. They argue that the University's guidelines established in 1999 deviate from the racial considerations endorsed by Justice Powell in Bakke. In contrast, respondents maintain that their admissions program is appropriately tailored and avoids issues present in the U.C. Davis program criticized by Justice Powell, asserting that it closely aligns with Powell's and Harvard's endorsed admissions practices. The Court underscores that all racial classifications under the Equal Protection Clause are subject to strict scrutiny, regardless of the race of those affected. This principle allows any individual to challenge governmental racial classifications demanding rigorous justification. For respondents to meet the strict scrutiny standard, they must show that the University's admissions practices employ narrowly tailored measures advancing compelling governmental interests. Racial classifications require a stringent justification due to their harmful nature. The University’s policy of awarding 20 points to every "underrepresented minority" applicant is not narrowly tailored to promote educational diversity, as it equates to discrimination based solely on race. Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke allows for race to be a "plus" factor in admissions, emphasizing that applicants should be evaluated individually and holistically, considering all their qualities rather than making race a decisive factor. However, the current LSA policy lacks this individualized assessment, as it automatically assigns points based solely on race, making race a decisive factor for most minimally qualified applicants. This approach fails to reflect the nuanced consideration advocated by Justice Powell, which would assess each applicant's unique contributions to diversity without presuming that race alone determines their perspective. The excerpt analyzes the admissions system of the LSA in comparison to the approach discussed in Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke regarding Harvard College's Admissions Program. It highlights the significance attached to race in admissions decisions, illustrated by a scenario involving three applicants: A, a black student from a successful background; B, a black student from a disadvantaged background with leadership qualities; and C, a white student with exceptional artistic talent. In the scenario, while A and B receive automatic 20 points due to their minority status, C only receives a maximum of 5 points for his talent, showcasing the lack of individualized consideration in the LSA's system. The analysis critiques the LSA's admissions process for failing to evaluate applicants based on their unique backgrounds and characteristics, as demonstrated by the automatic points awarded to underrepresented minorities. It suggests that while the LSA allows for some applications to be flagged for individualized consideration, this mechanism does not effectively address the flaws in the system. Specifically, it argues that qualified minority applicants like A are not evaluated on their individual merits due to the automatic point distribution, while B and C might be flagged but still face challenges in being considered fairly. Overall, the excerpt underscores the inadequacies of the LSA's admissions system in providing an equitable and individualized selection process. The LSA's admissions program primarily relies on selection index scores established by the EWG, with only a small portion of applications undergoing individualized review, which is an exception to the standard process. This individualized review is triggered when admissions counselors use a "plus" system that makes race a significant factor for nearly all minimally qualified underrepresented minority applicants. Respondents argue that the high volume and complexity of applications make it impractical for the LSA to adopt an admissions system consistent with the Court's ruling in Grutter. However, administrative challenges do not justify a constitutionally flawed system, as noted in prior cases rejecting convenience as a basis for constitutional compliance. The court finds that the LSA's current policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest in diversity, violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Consequently, the court reverses the District Court's summary judgment in favor of the respondents and remands the case for further proceedings. Additionally, multiple amici curiae filed briefs supporting the reversal, representing various organizations and legal interests. Amici curiae briefs urging affirmance were submitted by a diverse group of parties, including members of the U.S. Congress, numerous state attorneys general, educational institutions, civil rights organizations, and other stakeholders. Notable submissions came from the Attorney General of Maryland and various state attorneys general representing states such as Arizona, California, Colorado, and New York. Additional briefs were filed by representatives from significant entities like the American Educational Research Association, the American Psychological Association, and various universities, including Harvard and Columbia. Civil rights organizations, such as the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law and the National Urban League, also provided support. The briefs reflect a wide-ranging coalition advocating for the legal position in question, emphasizing the importance of the case across multiple jurisdictions and sectors. Amici curiae briefs were submitted for various parties, including Michigan Governor Jennifer M. Granholm, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, and several universities and organizations such as the Asian American Legal Foundation and the Anti-Defamation League, represented by multiple attorneys. Hamacher, who previously indicated intentions to transfer due to discriminatory admissions practices at the Law School, has since graduated from Michigan State University. The University of Michigan Board of Regents was designated as the proper defendant instead of the University and the Law School. Notably, Duderstadt, the University president when Gratz's application was considered, is sued in his individual capacity, while Bollinger, president during Hamacher's application, was originally sued both individually and officially but is no longer in that position. A group of African-American and Latino students, along with a nonprofit organization, sought to intervene in the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. Initially denied by the District Court, this request was reversed by the Sixth Circuit. The District Court also agreed to consider the petitioners' requests for injunctive and declaratory relief during the liability phase of the proceedings. The description of the admissions process is primarily derived from a Joint Proposed Summary of Undisputed Facts submitted in the District Court. In 1995, four distinct applicant tables were utilized based on residency and minority status, while in 1996, this was reduced to two tables that differentiated between minority and nonminority applicants based on GPA and ACT/SAT scores. Michigan resident applicants needed 80 points to be flagged for consideration, whereas out-of-state applicants required 75 points. The District Court dismissed the arguments of respondent-intervenors, stating they failed to provide evidence supporting claims of discrimination that justified the LSA's race-conscious admissions practices. It affirmed that the University did not assert this justification during litigation. Additionally, the court granted summary judgment to respondents Bollinger and Duderstadt on qualified immunity grounds, a decision the petitioners did not challenge. The Board of Regents’ motion for summary judgment regarding Title VI claims was denied based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying equal protection under the law, while Title VI prohibits discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in federally funded programs. Section 1981 ensures that all individuals in the U.S. have equal rights to make and enforce contracts, akin to the rights enjoyed by white citizens. The reference to Hamacher's request for admission as a transfer student highlights the ongoing nature of the case. There is noted tension regarding issues of standing and adequacy in class actions, as illustrated by previous cases. The admissions policy, which includes race as a factor for both freshman and transfer applications, remains a central issue before the Court. Petitioners have not specifically challenged the narrow tailoring of the university's transfer policy, yet they argue that any use of race to promote diversity, including in the transfer policy, is problematic. The transfer policy is comparable to the freshman admissions policy in that both consider race in a discriminatory manner. The university's rationale for considering race to achieve diversity is viewed as insufficiently compelling, suggesting that if this rationale is invalidated, it would similarly affect the transfer policy. The class-action mechanism is highlighted as an efficient means to resolve issues affecting all class members, contrasting with previous cases where class representation was deemed inadequate due to differing evidentiary standards. The excerpt references U.C. Davis's special admissions program, which reserved seats for minority applicants, criticized for creating a discriminatory two-track system that violated individual rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Powell’s opinion emphasized a misunderstanding of the concept of diversity, asserting that the university's arguments for such a program were flawed. Furthermore, Justice Souter acknowledges that race is a decisive factor in admissions but speculates on the voluntary nature of minority applicant selection, which is contested as misrepresentative of the individualized consideration applicants receive. Justice O'Connor's concurrence highlights that the Law School Admissions (LSA) program fails to allow for individual assessment of applicants' diversity contributions, as the majority of admissions decisions rely on a point system rather than a thorough review by the Admissions Review Committee (ARC). Justice Souter's claim that the Court is applying a new legal standard to an undeveloped record is countered by the assertion that the respondents provided sufficient information for the case's resolution. The limited review process by the ARC contrasts sharply with the individualized assessments referenced in prior rulings, such as Justice Powell's discussion in Bakke. Justice Ginsburg, in her dissent, anticipates that universities will strive to maintain minority enrollment regardless of the legality of their affirmative action plans, suggesting that Michigan's transparent approach is preferable to covert methods. This raises concerns about universities potentially disregarding constitutional mandates in favor of preserving their affirmative action practices, advocating instead for constitutional changes to align with university conduct. The excerpt emphasizes that discrimination violating the Equal Protection Clause also breaches Title VI for institutions receiving federal funds. It cites various cases affirming that discriminatory practices in education constitute violations of the Equal Protection Clause and related statutes. Justice O'Connor notes that, unlike the upheld law school admissions policy in Grutter v. Bollinger, the University of Michigan's undergraduate admissions procedures do not adequately provide for meaningful individualized applicant reviews. The Office of Undergraduate Admissions grants all underrepresented minority applicants an automatic 20-point bonus on a selection index score, disregarding individual backgrounds or experiences, which conflicts with the individualized consideration mandated by the Supreme Court in Grutter. The admissions process heavily relies on this selection index, which largely dictates admissions decisions without adequate personalized evaluation of applicants’ qualifications and contributions to diversity. The District Court upheld the constitutionality of the University’s admissions policy, instituted in 1999, which utilizes a Selection Index Worksheet to score applicants out of a maximum of 150 points. Applicants scoring above 100 are automatically admitted, while those with scores between 95-99 may be admitted or postponed, and scores below 74 result in rejection. Admissions counselors assign points based on academic and nonacademic factors, including race, with up to 110 points for academics and 40 for other criteria. Specific bonuses are given for factors such as Michigan residency or alumni children, while notable contributions like outstanding essays or leadership can also earn additional points. In 1999, the University introduced a review process where applications can be "flagged" for further consideration by an Admissions Review Committee after initial scoring. This committee evaluates flagged applications to decide on admission, deferral, or denial, enhancing the admissions process beyond the initial mechanized scoring system. Counselors can flag applicants for committee review based on academic preparedness and a selection index score of at least 75 for non-Michigan residents or 80 for Michigan residents, alongside certain valued qualities such as high class rank, unique experiences, and socioeconomic disadvantages. They may also flag applicants with high scores if there are indications of unsuitability, and in rare cases, flag those with lower scores if they believe these scores do not reflect true potential. The Office of Undergraduate Admissions assigns points for "soft" variables related to diversity, but these are limited compared to race-based allocations, which can disproportionately favor underrepresented minorities. While the law school’s admissions plan allows for nuanced evaluations of diversity contributions, the undergraduate program’s reliance on a selection index hinders individualized assessment. The Admissions Review Committee, which could provide personalized consideration, operates as a secondary mechanism, reviewing only a subset of applications, and insufficient evidence exists to demonstrate its significance or the volume of cases it evaluates compared to the overall admissions process. Eligibility for consideration by the Admissions Review Committee is determined by automatic cutoff levels based on selection index scores, with no evidence of individualized consideration in decision-making from the Office of Undergraduate Admissions. This absence of individualized evaluation renders the committee's addition insufficient to address the shortcomings of the admissions process. Consequently, the current admissions system for the University’s College of Literature, Science, and the Arts fails to provide the necessary individualized consideration, particularly regarding race. The University is permitted to revise its admissions approach to incorporate such consideration. Justice Thomas concurs, affirming that racial discrimination in admissions is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause but notes that the admissions policy does not discriminate among groups within underrepresented minorities. However, it lacks adequate consideration of non-racial distinctions among applicants. The policy is invalidated for failing to allow for these distinctions while adhering to constitutional requirements. Justice Breyer concurs in the judgment but does not join the Court's opinion, aligning with Justice O'Connor's views on the importance of distinguishing between inclusionary and exclusionary policies as aligned with constitutional equality. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, dissents regarding the petitioners' request for injunctive relief against the University of Michigan's race-conscious freshman admissions policy. The dissent highlights that the petitioners, Jennifer Gratz and Patrick Hamacher, had already enrolled in other institutions prior to filing their class-action complaint and were not reapplying to Michigan at the time of the suit. There is no evidence indicating that either would benefit from the prospective relief sought, leading to the conclusion that neither petitioner has standing in this case. Gratz applied in 1994 but chose to attend the University of Michigan at Dearborn after being placed on a waiting list. Hamacher applied in 1997 and similarly enrolled at Michigan State University after being delayed. Although Hamacher claimed he intended to transfer to Michigan if the discriminatory admissions system was eliminated, the dissent supports Michigan's argument that he lacks standing due to his existing enrollment elsewhere. The District Court initially ruled that Hamacher had standing to seek injunctive relief, certifying him as the class representative. However, the court later determined that the admissions system in effect during their applications was unlawful, while the subsequent 1999-2000 system was lawful. The dissent notes that Michigan did not cross-petition regarding the earlier admissions policies, leaving only the review of the new admissions policy before the Court. Hamacher and Gratz possess standing to seek damages for the alleged wrongful denial of their applications under Michigan's prior freshman admissions system. However, similar to the precedent set in Los Angeles v. Lyons regarding past injuries, their historical claims do not grant them standing for injunctive relief aimed at preventing future harm to third parties. To obtain such relief, they must demonstrate an imminent threat of future injury, which they fail to do, as neither faced any impending threat under Michigan's new admissions policy at the time of filing. Hamacher's assertion of a personal stake in the suit is based on a hypothetical intention to apply for transfer admission to Michigan, a claim deemed insufficient due to a lack of evidence of an actual application. This future injury is regarded as conjectural rather than immediate. Additionally, the transfer admissions policy was not part of the current case, nor was it addressed by the District Court, further undermining Hamacher's standing. The criteria for transfer admissions differ significantly from those for freshman admissions, negating Hamacher’s ability to challenge the latter based on potential injuries related to a separate transfer policy. The right to challenge one administrative deficiency does not automatically grant the right to challenge all deficiencies, as seen in Lewis v. Casey and Blum v. Yaretsky. A plaintiff injured in one context lacks the necessary stake to litigate unrelated claims. The differences between freshman and transfer admissions policies suggest that modifying the freshman program would unlikely affect the transfer policy, as established in Allen v. Wright. Relief must be likely to follow from a favorable decision, as noted in Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War. The specific context of the injury ensures that the court's ruling is narrowly tailored to the facts presented. Petitioners did not seek a blanket prohibition on race in admissions but challenged the University’s rationale for using race to achieve diversity, asserting it is not a compelling interest. While petitioners acknowledged that race could be considered for remedial purposes, they did not advocate for an absolute restriction. The transfer policy was not contested and remains undefined regarding its justification. Consequently, the argument that striking down the diversity rationale for freshman admissions would equally impact the transfer policy is flawed, as the two raise distinct issues. The transfer policy in question has not been directly challenged in this case, leaving uncertainty regarding Michigan's defense of the policy and the implications of the lack of a point system on its narrow tailoring analysis. Petitioners seeking an injunction for younger parties have interests similar to those of unemancipated minors and Medicaid patients in previous cases where they lacked standing to represent others. To establish standing, petitioners must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome, which neither of the petitioners possesses in this instance. Although the petitioners filed as a class action, and Hamacher was certified as a representative of a potentially affected class, this does not suffice for standing. Named plaintiffs must show personal injury rather than rely on injuries to unnamed class members. The precedent established in Blum confirms that class representatives cannot claim standing based on the experiences of other class members. Therefore, despite the potential standing of some class members regarding Michigan's admissions policy, Hamacher fails to meet the necessary personal stake requirement under Article III. The case is dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction as neither petitioner has a personal stake or standing to seek relief on behalf of unidentified class members. Barbara Grutter, who challenged race-based admissions at Michigan's law school, claimed a desire to attend the Law School but did not seek class representation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). The court noted that petitioner Hamacher lacked standing because he needed a minimum GPA to transfer and was already enrolled elsewhere, making it unlikely he faced a real threat of future injury under Michigan's admissions policy. While previous rulings allow for class actions to proceed even if the named representative's claim becomes moot, in this instance, neither Gratz nor Hamacher had standing for a forward-looking claim when the suit was filed. The dissenting opinion cautions that if Hamacher were allowed standing to challenge the transfer policy, it could lead to unlimited challenges against all race-based admissions policies at Michigan. Hamacher has standing to claim damages for past harm on behalf of class members but was certified as the class representative solely for seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Justice Souter, dissenting with Justice Ginsburg on Part II, agrees with Justice Stevens that Hamacher lacks standing to challenge a freshman admissions policy that will not harm him. He emphasizes that the Court's interpretation of standing is flawed and asserts that even if the merits were examined, he would dissent from the Court's judgment. The majority's finding of Article III standing is based on two key points: the University of Michigan's policies aim for diversity through race considerations, and Hamacher's ability to contest the transfer policy by arguing that diversity cannot justify the use of race in admissions decisions. The Court concludes that if Hamacher's challenge to the transfer policy succeeds, it would also undermine the freshman admissions policy, thus granting him standing for both. However, Souter critiques this reasoning, arguing it overlooks the principle that a plaintiff cannot challenge a program that does not affect him. He contends that even under the Court's broad interpretation of standing, it should only recognize that diversity can serve as a compelling state interest justifying race-conscious admissions. Since the petitioners did not challenge the transfer policy's narrow tailoring, the precedent set in Grutter v. Bollinger invalidates Hamacher's challenge to it. Consequently, Hamacher's standing to contest the freshman admissions plan is irrelevant and should be addressed by an affected plaintiff. The discussion also highlights two principles from existing case law regarding race-conscious admissions: Grutter affirms the individualized consideration of race for achieving student diversity, while Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke outlines limits on such considerations. A racial quota or set-aside, where race alone determines eligibility for admission, is explicitly ruled out. The freshman admissions system under review is argued to align more with the approval in Grutter than the condemnation in Bakke, and should not be deemed unconstitutional based on the existing record. The record does not indicate a system resembling the quota invalidated in Bakke, which effectively insulated non-minority candidates from competing for specific seats. Instead, the admissions process allows all applicants, regardless of race, to compete for all spots, taking into account various factors such as grades, test scores, and personal characteristics. A non-minority applicant can surpass a minority applicant who receives a racial bonus if their qualifications are strong enough across the board. This approach mirrors the constitutional standards set forth by Justice Powell, emphasizing that all relevant diversity factors are considered without automatic exclusion based on race. The only exception noted is the allocation of 20 points for underrepresented minority status on a 150-point scale; however, this does not isolate race from other considerations in the evaluation process. Nonminority students can accumulate various points based on factors such as athletic ability (20 points), socioeconomic disadvantage (20 points), residency in Michigan (10 points), and leadership (5 points), among others. The Court criticizes the automatic allocation of 20 points to minority applicants, arguing that this approach relies solely on an applicant's minority status without considering other qualifications. However, it acknowledges that assigning value to racial diversity is permissible and that race can be a relevant factor in admission decisions. Justice Powell’s approach to considering "plus factors" is noted as a valid method of evaluation, similar to a holistic review process. The Court emphasizes that the current admissions system does not guarantee minority applicants higher rankings over nonminority applicants, as nonminority candidates may still achieve greater point totals based on other merits. Moreover, the absence of set-asides for minority applicants, along with the holistic review of candidates, supports the legality of the admissions scheme. Ultimately, the Court finds that suspicion regarding the point distribution does not constitute sufficient grounds to invalidate the college's admissions process. The District Court found no constitutional issues with the specific point assignment used in the university's admissions process and provided limited findings regarding the individualized review conducted by the Admissions Review Committee. The record does not clarify the committee's role or the number of applications flagged for individualized consideration, suggesting that the court would benefit from more evidence on the committee's determinations. It argues that the transparency of Michigan's admissions plan, which openly states its considerations for underrepresented minorities, should be viewed favorably compared to alternative admissions practices that obscure their racial considerations, such as percentage plans used in other states. While these alternatives are not unconstitutional, they lack the candidness of Michigan's approach. The author expresses a willingness to affirm the District Court's summary judgment if a plaintiff with proper standing were to challenge the admissions plan, but ultimately suggests vacating the judgment due to jurisdictional concerns. Additionally, there are implications that the court's ruling may challenge established legal principles regarding standing in class actions, and acknowledges that the record is limited regarding the decision-making process for transfer applicants. The transfer policy under discussion does not employ a points-based selection index for evaluating applicants; instead, it incorporates race as one of several factors in assessing an applicant's potential contribution to a diverse student body. This suggests a holistic review approach, similar to that upheld in Grutter v. Bollinger. The court notes that the committee involved may not significantly influence the individualized review of applications, and the determination of the committee's role should be left to the District Court due to an undeveloped record. The dissenting opinion emphasizes that educational institutions are allowed to consider race in admissions, arguing against a uniform standard of review for all race classifications. Justice Ginsburg highlights the ongoing impacts of historical discrimination, pointing out persistent disparities in unemployment, poverty, health care access, and educational quality among racial groups. She argues that irrational biases persist in various sectors, hindering true equal opportunity and nondiscrimination in the United States. The Constitution mandates equal protection under the law, prohibiting government actions that deny this right (14th Amendment). Government officials can differentiate between policies of exclusion and inclusion, particularly when addressing historical injustices against marginalized groups. Efforts to rectify past discrimination should not be equated with actions that perpetuate racial inequality. While race is considered a "suspect" classification, it is not always impermissible if used to achieve equality. The Constitution is described as both color blind—prohibiting race-based denial of benefits—and color conscious—aimed at preventing and remedying discrimination. Racial classifications that suggest harmful implications are generally disallowed, while those intended to correct inequalities may be permissible. Any race-conscious policy must undergo rigorous judicial scrutiny to ensure it serves a legitimate governmental purpose and does not unduly harm others' opportunities. In evaluating the University of Michigan's admissions policy, it is concluded that it does not violate constitutional standards, as articulated in Justice Souter's dissent. The College faces a high volume of applicants, allowing it to admit only a fraction each year. All admitted applicants meet the qualifications for attendance. The College provides special consideration to historically marginalized groups (African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native-Americans) who have faced legal and social inequities, and continue to do so. There is no evidence that the College's policy aims to limit enrollment for any racial or ethnic group, nor are seats reserved based on race. The admissions process does not appear to unduly disadvantage non-minority applicants. Given that white applicants outnumber minority applicants, preferences for the latter do not significantly affect the chances of the former. The legacy of racial oppression persists, prompting institutions to maintain minority enrollment through affirmative action, which may be more transparent than alternative methods that could obscure racial considerations. Such alternatives could involve encouraging applicants to emphasize their cultural backgrounds or minority associations. The author advocates for the transparency of Michigan's affirmative action program as a preferable approach to achieving diversity. Consequently, the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed. In 1999, the unemployment rates were 3.7% for whites, 8.0% for African-Americans, and 6.4% for Hispanics. By 2001, these rates had changed to 4.2% for whites, 8.7% for African-Americans, and 6.6% for Hispanics. In 2000, poverty rates were reported at 7.5% for non-Hispanic whites, 22.1% for African-Americans, 10.8% for Asian-Americans, and 21.2% for Hispanics, with blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans facing poverty rates nearly twice that of Asians and three times that of whites. Health insurance coverage disparities were also noted, with 9.7% of non-Hispanic whites uninsured compared to 18.5% of African-Americans, 18.0% of Asian-Americans, and 32.0% of Hispanics. Additionally, Latinos and African-Americans generally experience poorer health and healthcare access than non-Hispanic whites. Residential segregation statistics show that whites typically attend schools where 80% of the student body is white, while almost three-fourths of black and Latino students are in predominantly minority schools, with significant percentages attending schools that are almost entirely minority. Urban public schools are primarily attended by African-American and Hispanic students, who are disproportionately poor and have lower academic performance metrics compared to their peers in non-urban schools. Discrimination in the job market is illustrated by studies indicating that white applicants receive more interviews and job offers than equally qualified black or Hispanic applicants. Similarly, national results from housing discrimination studies highlight ongoing disparities in metropolitan housing markets. Paired testing studies reveal persistent discrimination in rental and sales markets against minority homebuyers in large metropolitan areas. Research indicates that minority individuals face disadvantages from mortgage lending institutions. A separate study on automobile pricing shows that dealers offer lower prices to white males compared to other demographic groups. The United States cites "percentage plans" in states like California, Florida, and Texas as race-neutral alternatives for increasing minority enrollment in colleges. However, these plans are criticized as disingenuous since they were designed to enhance representation of African-Americans and Hispanics. The effectiveness of these plans relies on ongoing racial segregation in high schools, as they ensure substantial minority enrollment only if a significant number of minority students rank in the top percentages. The plans are also said to promote negative incentives, such as keeping students in underperforming schools and discouraging enrollment in advanced courses. While percentage plans may increase minority undergraduate enrollment, they do not address graduate and professional school admissions. The document argues for a constitutional interpretation that allows for open consideration of race in admissions policies, suggesting that transparency in such considerations is preferable to concealment.