Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court; July 17, 2009; Wisconsin; State Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin addressed whether the Wisconsin Family or Medical Leave Act (WFMLA) provides an implied right to a jury trial for civil actions seeking damages due to statutory violations. The case arose from Kelly J. Harvot's claim against Solo Cup Company, where she sought damages after being denied medical leave and subsequently facing attendance violations under company policy. The court examined two questions: (1) if the WFMLA implicitly grants a right to a jury trial in such civil actions, and (2) whether the Wisconsin Constitution confers this right.
The court concluded that the WFMLA does not imply a statutory right to a jury trial, nor does Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution grant this right in civil actions related to the WFMLA. As a result, the court affirmed the circuit court's decision.
The background revealed that Harvot worked for Hoffmaster Solo Cup Co. and developed a significant back condition, which led to missed work and the utilization of sick leave under a collective bargaining agreement. The agreement allowed for six days of sick leave annually and specified that such leave would not diminish the WFMLA leave entitlement. However, Harvot's request for WFMLA leave was denied due to it being filed late, which put her at risk of discharge for attendance violations.
Harvot notified Hoffmaster of her health condition by submitting a Health Care Provider Certification from Dr. Kasper with a leave request for May 5, detailing treatment dates and the need for intermittent absences. On June 8, she requested additional leave for an epidural injection, which Hoffmaster approved. Harvot was absent on June 11, for which she provided another certification from Dr. Kasper, who relied on Harvot's symptom descriptions without an examination. This leave was also approved. Harvot continued to miss work on July 25, August 1, and August 2 due to her medical condition, and she submitted timely requests for WFMLA leave, including a medical release authorization that Hoffmaster did not use to obtain further information from her healthcare providers.
On August 12, Harvot submitted another certification from Dr. Kasper, who indicated her absences were emergency-related and would require future absences. Dr. Kasper attempted to contact Hoffmaster but received no response. On August 15, Harvot learned her leave request for July 25, August 1, and August 2 was denied, and she was terminated for violating the attendance policy, partly because she had not been examined by Dr. Kasper around the relevant dates. After receiving a memorandum confirming the denial, Harvot was allowed to present additional information to demonstrate her absences were medically related, but evidence suggests Hoffmaster did not fully inform her of what was needed to address any deficiencies in her leave request.
Harvot submitted her medical records and a physician's letter to Hoffmaster, who rejected them, leading to her termination. On September 1, 2005, Harvot filed a complaint with the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development (DWD), alleging violations of the Wisconsin Family and Medical Leave Act (WFMLA) regarding her absences on July 25, August 1, and August 2. A hearing was conducted, resulting in a November 3, 2006 decision by Administrative Law Judge Larry R. Jakubowski, who concluded that Hoffmaster discriminated against Harvot by denying her medical leave and terminating her under the attendance policy. Judge Jakubowski ordered Hoffmaster to cease discrimination, correct records to reflect her medical leave, remove a fourth attendance violation, reinstate her with guaranteed seniority, compensate her for lost wages with interest, reimburse her attorney fees totaling $14,381.35, and submit a compliance report to the DWD.
Hoffmaster subsequently sought judicial review of the administrative decision but later filed for voluntary dismissal, which was granted on January 4, 2007. Following this, Harvot filed a lawsuit in Winnebago County Circuit Court under Wis. Stat. 103.10(13)(a), seeking compensatory and punitive damages, interest, costs, and attorney fees while requesting a jury trial. On March 6, 2007, Hoffmaster answered, acknowledging the factual and legal allegations but denying the availability of interest, attorney fees, or equitable relief. Hoffmaster claimed that the damages sought were previously awarded in the administrative proceeding, referencing the case Butzlaff v. Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services to support its affirmative defense.
Hoffmaster filed a motion to strike Harvot's request for a jury trial, arguing that the Wisconsin Family and Medical Leave Act (WFMLA) does not provide a right to a jury trial and that no such right is guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution. Hoffmaster maintained that Harvot's claim did not exist at common law in 1848, which is a requirement based on the court's precedent in Village Food. On June 8, 2007, Winnebago County Circuit Judge Karen L. Seifert heard the motion and granted it, stating that the statute does not explicitly allow for a jury trial, nor was there an implied right to one. Judge Seifert also dismissed Harvot's constitutional argument, finding no relevant common law precedent at the time the Wisconsin Constitution was adopted. An order reflecting her decision was issued on June 15, 2007.
Subsequently, Harvot petitioned for leave to appeal, which was granted by the court of appeals on July 11, 2007, as the issue of a jury trial right under the WFMLA had not been previously addressed. The court of appeals certified two questions for the supreme court: whether the WFMLA confers an implied statutory right to a jury trial and, alternatively, whether the Wisconsin Constitution provides such a right under the Village Food test. The supreme court accepted these issues on August 15, 2008.
The appeal will be reviewed de novo, focusing on the interpretation of Wis. Stat. 103.10 regarding the implied right to a jury trial and the interpretation of the state constitution concerning guaranteed jury trial rights. Harvot contends that the structure of the WFMLA implies legislative intent for a jury trial and that the Wisconsin Constitution preserves this right in civil actions under the WFMLA. The discussion will follow an examination of the WFMLA and employee rights under it.
The Wisconsin Family or Medical Leave Act (WFMLA), enacted in 1988, predates the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by several years. Employees eligible for WFMLA leave must have worked for the same employer for over 52 consecutive weeks and at least 1,000 hours in the preceding year. Eligible employees are entitled to return to their previous or an equivalent position, with restored benefits and seniority. The WFMLA prohibits interference with employee rights, and violations can be reported to the Department of Workforce Development (DWD) within 30 days. The DWD investigates complaints, holding hearings if necessary, and can order remedies such as reinstatement, back pay (up to two years prior to the complaint), and attorney fees.
After administrative actions, either the employee or DWD can file a civil suit for damages in circuit court. However, the WFMLA does not explicitly grant a statutory right to a jury trial. Despite this, Harvot argues that the absence of an explicit limitation on jury trials implies legislative intent for such a right. She cites the lack of explicit bench trial requirements in the WFMLA compared to other statutes and interprets the statute's framework, which distinguishes between equitable and legal remedies, as indicative of an intention to allow jury trials in civil damage actions under the WFMLA.
Harvot argues for an implied right to a jury trial under the Wisconsin Family and Medical Leave Act (WFMLA) by referencing federal court interpretations of the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). She cites the Sixth Circuit's decision in *Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight*, which found that the structure of the federal FMLA’s remedial provisions suggests Congress intended to provide a jury trial right for damages. Harvot points to precedents where Wisconsin tribunals, such as in *Metropolitan Milwaukee Fair Housing Council v. Goetsch*, have interpreted similar statutory structures to uphold the right to a jury trial, particularly after legislative amendments to the Open Housing Act that allowed civil actions with guaranteed jury trials. She concludes that this rationale should extend to WFMLA claims.
In contrast, the court finds Harvot's arguments unpersuasive, noting that the WFMLA statute does not explicitly grant a right to a jury trial. The court emphasizes the distinction between recognizing a constitutional right to a jury trial and asserting legislative intent to include such a right. It cites legal precedents affirming that the legislature retains discretion to establish fact-finding procedures, including the availability of jury trials, and has not opted to provide this for WFMLA claims in over 20 years. Thus, the court underscores the legislature's authority to determine procedural rights associated with new remedies.
When a statute does not specify the right to a jury trial, such a right exists only if preserved by Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution. In *Bekkedal v. City of Viroqua*, the court ruled that without explicit statutory provisions for a jury trial, parties are not entitled to one. This principle was reaffirmed in *State v. Ameritech Corp.*, where the court concluded that, given the absence of statutory or procedural references to a jury trial, the trial court correctly denied the request for one. The *Village Food* case indicates that in situations where statutes are silent on the right to a jury trial, the constitutional framework applies, though this does not guarantee a jury trial in all silent statutory actions.
The excerpt warns against recognizing an implied statutory right to a jury trial where the legislature has not established such a right, explaining that this could lead to inconsistent and unpredictable judicial interpretations. If the legislature intends to grant a jury trial right in new contexts, it has the authority to do so. The text distinguishes the *Frizzell* case, which interprets federal law, asserting that the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) provides different provisions for damages and equitable relief compared to the Wisconsin Family and Medical Leave Act (WFMLA). In *Frizzell*, the court noted that while juries are available for damages claims, judges determine the appropriateness of equitable relief, highlighting a significant difference in the statutory frameworks.
Three key distinctions exist between the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Wisconsin Family and Medical Leave Act (WFMLA).
1. **Jury Trial Rights**: The Seventh Amendment, as interpreted in federal cases, guarantees the right to a civil jury trial for statutory rights, while Wisconsin's constitutional provision is more limited. Under the FMLA, both plaintiffs and defendants can request a jury trial, whereas under the WFMLA, employers cannot contest violations in jury trials since liability is already determined through administrative processes.
2. **Damages Available**: The federal FMLA restricts damages to those explicitly outlined in 29 U.S.C. 2617 (a)(1)(A), excluding consequential and punitive damages. In contrast, the WFMLA’s damage provisions are less clear, potentially allowing claims for consequential and punitive damages in state court, which would not be available under federal law. This means that if Harvot claims such damages in state court, they will be assessed after liability has been established administratively.
3. **Legislative Intent and Precedent**: There is no evidence of legislative intent in Wisconsin to provide a right to jury trial under the WFMLA, contrasting with the federal FMLA's legislative history. The inclusion of state entities under the WFMLA suggests that the legislature likely did not intend for jury trials to impose punitive damages against state actors. Additionally, reliance on the Open Housing Statute does not support the right to a jury trial, as the statute outlines civil actions for damages without specifying jury involvement.
Overall, the argument for an implicit statutory right to a jury trial under the WFMLA lacks persuasive support, raising concerns about setting new legal precedents in areas where the legislature has remained silent. Harvot's claim for a constitutional right to a jury trial for her WFMLA claim is now under examination.
Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in all civil cases, reflecting the standards in place at the time of the Constitution's adoption in 1848. This provision has been interpreted through a two-pronged test established in precedent, specifically in Village Food and subsequent cases, to determine whether a statutory cause of action entitles a party to a jury trial. The two prongs assess whether the cause of action existed at common law in 1848 and whether it was regarded as a legal action at that time.
Disagreement among justices has arisen primarily over the first prong of the test. For example, in Village Food, a split decision occurred regarding a statutory claim related to the minimum mark-up law, with the majority finding it comparable to common law unfair trade practices, while dissenting justices argued that the majority’s interpretation was overly broad and insufficiently grounded in historical precedent. The concern was that this broad application could undermine the test's effectiveness by allowing modern claims to be artificially linked to historical causes of action solely based on general similarities.
The discord continued in the McGrew case, where a majority of justices affirmed the right to a jury trial for a speeding charge, despite differing opinions on the application of the two-pronged test. The ongoing debate highlights the complexity and lack of consensus in applying constitutional protections for jury trials to various statutory claims.
The majority opinion of the court expanded its analysis to encompass violations of general "rules of the road," while the lead opinion focused specifically on whether a speeding offense was recognized in 1848, distinguishing it from broader statutory mandates like keeping to the right side of the road. In the case of Schweda, the court was divided on whether a defendant charged with environmental regulatory violations had a constitutional right to a jury trial. The majority dismissed the defendant's argument that these violations were comparable to common law nuisance claims, despite acknowledging the historical roots of modern environmental law in common law nuisance. The majority emphasized that common law nuisance required proof of harm, which was not a component of the environmental regulations being enforced, rendering the two causes of action not sufficiently analogous under the Village Food test.
Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in cases at law, but the court noted challenges in applying this provision to statutory causes of action, particularly when it is debated whether a similar cause existed at common law in 1848. The court's precedent requires it to consider historical context when assessing these cases. The majority referenced the term "counterpart" from a previous decision (Ameritech) to establish a two-pronged test for evaluating whether a modern statutory cause of action is analogous to a historical one. This test hinges on the purpose of both the modern statute and its alleged common law counterpart, asserting that a statutory cause of action cannot be considered a counterpart if their purposes diverge significantly.
The minimum mark-up law for gasoline and common law actions like forestalling, regrating, and engrossing aim to prevent market price manipulation in controlled markets. In contrast, the contemporary traffic laws in McGrew facilitate safe roadway travel. The court in Schweda determined that common law nuisance and modern environmental regulations serve different purposes; historical nuisance laws require evidence of actual harm, while modern laws address more nuanced harms. The Schweda decision is seen as a narrower application of the Village Food test. In Village Food, the defendant faced claims of 103 violations of minimum mark-up laws, with a $2,000 damage claim for each instance, and sought a jury trial. McGrew involved a speeding conviction where the court acknowledged a constitutional right to a jury but did not mandate a 12-person jury. In Schweda, the defendant requested a jury trial for multiple environmental violations, leading to significant forfeitures. The court unanimously found that some environmental violations lacked a common law counterpart, resulting in a more limited interpretation of the Village Food test. No common law cause of action from 1848 aligns with the WFMLA's purpose, which establishes minimum family and medical leave rights.
The WFMLA (Wisconsin Family and Medical Leave Act) was established to help workers balance job demands with family needs, particularly in light of increasing female participation in the workforce, traditionally associated with family caregiving. Its objectives include enhancing employee productivity during work by allowing them to address family crises, alleviating daycare shortages, reducing healthcare costs through home care for seriously ill parents, and facilitating bonding for new and adopted children, thus providing long-term psychological benefits. The act safeguards employees' jobs and benefits during leave for family or personal medical needs.
While Harvot asserts that labor standards, including those related to the WFMLA, have historical roots, the comparison to a 1849 Wisconsin statute regarding apprentices is deemed inappropriate. The historical statute focused on apprentice-master relationships, which significantly differ from modern employer-employee dynamics. Harvot's reference to common law obligations of masters towards servants is also critiqued, as these obligations pertain to employment contracts rather than the family and medical leave context addressed by the WFMLA.
The document addresses the legal implications of the Wisconsin Family or Medical Leave Act (WFMLA) concerning the right to a jury trial in civil actions for damages resulting from violations of the WFMLA. It clarifies that once an oral agreement between an employer and an employee is established, both parties are legally bound by their commitments, similar to apprenticeship agreements. The primary aim of common law actions for breach of employment contracts was to ensure that employees, who could face criminal charges for leaving before their contract's expiration, were compensated as promised. However, this common law action does not align with the WFMLA's objectives, which arose from the modern workforce's evolution, indicating that it is not a direct counterpart. Consequently, Harvot failed to meet the first prong of the Village Food test, leading to the conclusion that she does not possess a constitutional right to a jury trial for her WFMLA claim. The court affirmed the circuit court's order, stating that neither the WFMLA nor the Wisconsin Constitution provides an implied right to a jury trial in these circumstances.
In dissent, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley argues that the majority's interpretation is overly broad and undermines established jury trial rights. She contends that the absence of an express jury trial provision in the WFMLA does not negate the existence of an implied statutory right to a jury trial, cautioning that the majority's ruling could jeopardize numerous jury trials within the state.
Ad hoc judicial discovery of implied statutory rights to a jury trial is deemed ineffective for establishing consistent legal tests across cases. The majority opinion finds no implied statutory right to a jury trial and critiques the current approach to determining constitutional rights, ultimately proposing a new test that concludes no such right exists. This assertion raises concerns regarding the legitimacy of numerous jury trials, particularly in cases under Wisconsin's Lemon Law and Fair Dealership Law, both of which lack explicit provisions for jury trials but have historically been tried by juries. The Lemon Law allows consumers to seek damages from automotive dealers, while the Fair Dealership Law permits dealers to sue grantors for violations. Both laws have received jury instructions and forms from the Civil Jury Instruction Committee. The majority's ruling creates uncertainty about the validity of past jury judgments and the handling of future cases, prompting questions about the potential for challenges to previous verdicts and the role of advisory juries. Additionally, it is argued that the majority misinterprets relevant Wisconsin case law regarding implied jury trials, citing examples that are not aligned with the current issue at hand.
The majority did not address the existence of an implied statutory right to a jury trial but focused instead on whether a constitutional right can be established without an expressed statutory right. In contrast, the analysis presented concludes that the Wisconsin Family and Medical Leave Act (WFMLA) implies a right to a jury trial in civil damage actions. This conclusion is supported by comparing the WFMLA with the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which shares a similar structure and remedial scheme. Both acts do not explicitly provide for a jury trial in damage actions, yet federal courts have recognized an implied right to a jury trial based on their remedial frameworks. The distinction between damages and equitable relief in the FMLA indicates Congressional intent to allow jury trials for damage claims while leaving equitable relief decisions to judges. Relying on federal court rationale, it is determined that the WFMLA's provision for a separate cause of action for damages indicates a legislative intent for these cases to be tried by a jury. Thus, the absence of explicit language in the WFMLA does not negate the implied statutory right to a jury trial. While not addressing constitutional arguments directly, the analysis critiques the majority's application of the established test for a constitutional right to a jury trial in civil actions.
Dissatisfaction is expressed with the Village Food test and its inconsistent application by the court, despite a unanimous agreement on its validity. The test assesses whether a statutory cause of action is analogous to a legal action from 1848. The lack of consensus arises from differing interpretations of how broadly or narrowly to define causes of action as "counterparts." In an attempt to address these issues, the majority proposes a new test incorporating "similar purpose," but this reform is criticized for potentially perpetuating the existing inconsistencies instead of resolving them. The dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, argues that the new approach adds complexity without improving clarity in the application of the Village Food test.
The document also outlines legal provisions regarding civil actions for damages against employers following administrative proceedings and specifies conditions under which an employee may take family leave, including for childbirth, adoption, or to care for family members with serious health conditions. Furthermore, it emphasizes the need for employees to consider their employer's needs when scheduling leave.
A "serious health condition" is defined as a disabling physical or mental illness, injury, impairment, or condition that requires either inpatient care in a hospital, nursing home, or hospice, or outpatient care necessitating ongoing treatment or supervision by a healthcare provider, as outlined in Wis. Stat. 103.10(1)(g). Judicial review as per Wis. Stat. 227.57(1) is conducted by the court without a jury. Historical case law, such as Bekkedal v. City of Viroqua, underscores that the right to a jury trial is preserved as it existed when the Wisconsin Constitution was adopted, and is specifically governed by Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution, which does not extend the Seventh Amendment's application to state courts. Non-statutory causes of action that had a guaranteed right to a jury trial prior to the state constitution's enactment retain that right post-adoption. The excerpt also references various cases that illustrate these principles, emphasizing that the constitutional provision maintains the inviolability of the right to trial by jury.
The law referenced pertains to the "law of the road" as it existed at the time the constitution was formed, specifically stating that when vehicles meet on a bridge or road, they must pass to the right to avoid interference. In the context of legal interpretations, "seasonably" was understood in 1849 to mean actions taken without rashness. In the case of McGrew, the justices dismissed comparisons of speeding to common law nuisance as overly broad. The court also addressed the right to a jury trial, noting that such a right is only protected if it existed under common law at the time the Wisconsin Constitution was established. Since unfair labor practice litigation did not exist then, there is no constitutional requirement for a jury trial in these cases. The document references various cases to illustrate this point, as well as the provisions under Wisconsin Statutes regarding actions against employers for violations of the Wisconsin Family and Medical Leave Act (WFMLA), allowing employees to seek remedies through circuit court following administrative proceedings.
